Humanitarian Action
1. The Forced Migration Projects urge the establishment of an Independent Center for Human Rights, consistent with recommendations made by the June 1997 assessment mission conducted by the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). The needs for legislative reform, institutional development in the rule of law, human rights education, and monitoring of civil and political rights are vast and urgent. Only one independent human rights NGO (Human Rights Watch) has had a permanent representative in Tajikistan.Sponsorship of the Center should be discussed by OHCHR and OSCE, which is now responsible for technical assistance in legal reform, human rights education, and field monitoring for repatriated refugees.
2. The Forced Migration Projects urge the postwar Tajik authorities to revive efforts to establish an Office of Legal Ombud-sman recommended by OSCE in 1996. The Ombudsman’s office could bridge the information gap between the changing power structure in Dushanbe and the general public seeking to resolve a variety of legal problems. The office would work closely with the OSCE mission, as originally intended, and would also cooperate with the Independent Center for Human Rights.
3. The OSCE mission should expand its field staff, at least as long as it is the lead agency providing legal assistance to locally based courts and law enforcement institutions, as well as liaison to refugees and other citizens seeking to navigate the changing laws and bureaucracy. OSCE staff could be reduced at a time when an Independent Center is fully operational and can provide the replacement personnel for the much-neglected provinces.
4. All these recommendations will bear little fruit unless the international agencies, particularly the UN and OSCE, expand their efforts to recruit field staff with essential qualifications. These include local-language capability, experience in postconflict recovery programs, expertise in basic civil and political rights, and some familiarity with public education.
To this end, the Forced Migration Projects encourage the establishment of a postconflict clearing house, perhaps under the auspices of the Office of the Coordinator for Humanitarian Affairs, for experienced personnel who are available for short-term field assignments. Such a clearing house could eventually serve as a training facility for capable candidates from Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union with limited experience in conflict zones, and limited education in civil and political rights.
5. Given the fluid situation in Tajikistan and a weak central government, international economic support should focus on small-scale projects that stand a chance of surviving the shifting alliances at higher levels of power. They will also bolster morale among the population, whose crushing poverty will likely spawn disillusionment with the slow progress of the peace and rehabilitation program. Smaller scale investments, unlike large infrastructure projects, also run less risk of being targets of terrorism or sabotage.
6. The UN-led recovery program should appoint a “quality control” commission made up of members of the donor community in Tajikistan to monitor the distribution of international assistance. In a country with such weak banking and communications systems, the opportunities for corruption are considerable. This commission would conduct biweekly consultations with heads of the leading implementing agencies and investigate reports of potential misappropriation of funds.
Security for International and Local Humanitarians
7. If the international community is serious about state-building, it must make haste to address a series of questions which are fundamental to establishing day-to-day security for humanitarians as well as society at large. These go straight to the heart of Tajikistan’s crippled criminal justice system and general lack of law and order—features that are much discussed in the world’s other postconflict settings.
The Forced Migration Projects urge the establishment of a multinational police-training force under OSCE auspices. The force, which would be deployed throughout Tajikistan, would concentrate on the development and training of a professional civilian police force, following international policing norms and respect for civil and human rights.
The dire need for a civilian police force has been identified by the Tajiks themselves in their comprehensive plan for postconflict recovery, and in 1997 OSCE identified a candidate police officer to initiate a small-scale program in the south. Regrettably, that program did not take shape. But now funds could be solicited from the World Bank program for Tajikistan, while a multinational bureau is formed to recruit candidates from appropriate police forces.
8. Both parties to the Tajik peace process—the government and the United Tajik Opposition, must make new and aggressive efforts to prevent and punish acts of terrorism by armed factions of any persuasion. This includes hostage-taking and attacks
on diplomats and humanitarian officials (both international and local).This new effort must involve the active participation of Qazi Akbar Turadzhonzoda, the leader of Tajikistan’s Islamic movement and spiritual leader of opposition forces still operating east of Dushanbe. The time has come to identify and prosecute the perpetrators of several fatal terrorist operations during the past year, and to bring the armed militias into the process of disarmament and reintegration.
9. The July 1998 ambush and murder of four unarmed members of UNMOT exposes anew the vulnerability of such observer missions, and underscores the limits to their effectiveness without armed protection. Consideration should be given to a response under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter, authorizing the deployment of an armed contingent to bolster peace implementation before it is too late.
10. The United Nations, as sponsor of Tajikistan’s long-negotiated peace accord, should also impose fundamental conditions on both parties, prohibiting terrorism by any factions, and in particular, the taking of hostages. It should demand that the two signatories of the peace plan and the leader of the Islamic faction consolidate their influence with their followers and put an end to these practices. This must be seen as a contribution from the parties who now enjoy power in exchange for UN mediation efforts and international rehabilitation programming.
11. The international community, through the Bretton Woods Institutions and bilateral assistance plans, should make any further outlay of funds already allocated to Tajikistan conditional upon a clear list of steps required of both government and UTO to ensure security for the implementation of the peace plan.
12. The Forced Migration Projects also urge states to sign and ratify the Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel (opened for signature December 9, 1994, 34 I.L.M. 482). The convention clarifies the duties of states to protect UN and associated personnel, particularly if personnel are deployed on that state’s territory or if the host state is unable to comply. The convention also establishes a state’s duty to punish crimes against UN and associated personnel. In widening
jurisdiction over such crimes, the convention allows states with more initiative to extend their reach in efforts to enforce it.
Developing Civil Society and the Rule of Law
13. International development programs should devote special attention to strengthening the nascent nongovernmental sector, taking care to avoid the common error of “advertising”funds available for NGO development. Initial inquiries should be made through international NGOs with effective field operations to establish contact with local communities and successful training techniques.
14. The Forced Migration Projects urge support for small, locally based seminars for the procuracy, attorneys, and law students aimed at resolving the range of issues facing returnees and their communities. The seminars should be sponsored by OSCE, and led by senior Tajik judges or attorneys. Many such experts are based in the capital and have extensive knowledge of the legal code and the various amendments to it since Tajikistan became independent from the Soviet Union.
15. The Forced Migration Projects encourage the support of community-based legal clinics in Khodje-Maston and Bokhtar districts and Dushanbe, which provide counsel to returnees and other local citizens on a range of civil matters. Working through such existing clinics guided by leading Tajik jurists, an internship program should be established for law students and young graduates.
16. The current UN-funded program to prevent unpaid workers in crucial professions such as medicine, nursing, and education from deserting their posts and seeking other ventures to support their families should be accelerated. The UN project provides professionals with a private plot of land which they can cultivate to support their families. In exchange, the beneficiaries sign a five-year contract to continue working at their profession. This system can prevent further “brain drain,” while minimizing distortions in the local economy.
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