UNHCR Phase-DownAs the preceding chapter indicates, UNHCR officials admit that they have been criticized for not having an adequate “exit strategy” in Tajikistan. Even officials in other branches of the UN contend that the conditions in Tajikistan were still so tenuous that it was premature, and ultimately inefficient, to scale down the emergency operation at the time.
Others who witnessed the “preventive protection” process pointed out weaknesses in protection where the particular field officers lacked initiative. As for protection of the refugees who were in Afghanistan, it is widely acknowledged that UNHCR failed to correct severe violations of refugees’ rights in the camps where the agency was denied access by opposition fighters.
OSCE Mandate
Based on interviews with a number of international relief officials who have field experience in Tajikistan, there is a great deal of praise for individuals who work tirelessly for returnee reintegration and strengthening the rule of law. But there are several criticisms as well.
First is the view that OSCE’s effectiveness has suffered from a disagreement in interpretation of their mandate: between the more scholarly work of organizing seminars and legal education, and the more active role in the field as human rights ombudsman and legal consultants to local law enforcement offices.
One UN official commends the organization’s human rights work in general, but says it is not using its mandate to the fullest to engage in more activities promoting democracy building. Another official touches upon the issue of recruitment and staff development, stressing the need for OSCE personnel to have more background in human rights and constitutional law.
UN Coordination Role
It is heartening to see the goodwill and respect shown to international workers in regions outside Dushanbe, a reminder of an era before attacks on international humanitarian aid workers became commonplace in settings such as Rwanda and Chechnya. But the United Nations, with its relatively large budget, has a delicate balance to maintain with the more modestly funded NGOs that complement its work. Some NGOs criticize the UN decision following the November hostage crisis to consolidate its staff in guarded compounds.
“The UN is so rich in the Tajik setting, and so they can afford to recommend increasing the security with fortified buildings and armed guards,” says one NGO worker. “But the rest of us can’t afford that.”
Arguably more important is the imbalance between the UN personnel and the struggling Tajik community, which a Russian-speaking westerner cites as one reason for the higher tension felt by foreigners in the capital than in field postings. “The locals in Dushanbe are becoming jaded by the UN, and especially UNMOT,” says this resident of the capital. “You can see it in the restaurants, with the merchants. There are only about 200 to 300 foreigners in Dushanbe, and you can see Tajik women getting into UNMOT cars. Some people are starting to resent this.”
The anxiety during the hostage crisis in November aggravated the strains in status and coordination within the international community. “There’s a chasm between UNMOT and everyone else,” says one NGO worker in Dushanbe. “UNMOT does not share information to facilitate the effective coordination of the relief operation.”
Nowhere was this more poignant than at a briefing on the hostage crisis for the highly charged international community. Many in the audience expressed anger at the government’s slowness in tracking down the captors to secure the safe release of the hostages.
But the UNMOT general who chaired the meeting replied that the government did not seem to know whom to contact at all. He further displeased the audience with his rationale that the Tajik “‘power ministries’ have trouble sharing information because of their traditional secrecy, and they don’t want us to know more about their structures.”
During the meeting, which the Forced Migration Projects attended, many in the foreign community were impatiently waiting to hear about plans for evacuation, should it become necessary. UNMOT has the mandate to organize a convoy and escort the UN personnel out of the country, if deemed necessary by the UN Special Representative.
Several personnel complained about calling UNMOT headquarters and being brushed off by the duty officers, who said they did not know anything about such plans. Tension reached a fever pitch in Dushanbe that week, heightened by the scarcity of confirmed information on the hostage situation and the spread of rumors among foreigners holed-up in their apartments and office compounds.
The UNMOT Mandate
The frustration with UNMOT’s performance during the November 1997 hostage crisis only added to the spectrum of criticisms from a range of people working in Tajikistan, concerning the effectiveness of the UN military mission overall.
According to the UN Security Council resolution that formally established the UN Mission of Observers to Tajikistan (968/1994), UNMOT’s mandate includes a human rights contingent and reporting role. But “in practice the function is limited strictly to the reporting of cease-fire violations, and should the cease-fire expire, their continued presence in the country would depend on further authorization from the Security Council.”
In addition to monitoring the cease-fire, UNMOT is mandated to support the UN Special Representative and assist in the delivery of humanitarian aid by the international community. (UNMOT’s responsibility for the delivery of humanitarian aid expired in November 1997.)
But even in the narrow interpretation of its mandate, UNMOT’s performance draws startlingly blunt criticism.
“They are the first to run away from trouble, when really they should be there to monitor violations of the peace accord,” says one person with field experience in a number of war zones. “They’re not working well at all. They could at least go out into the villages when there is something happening, or threatening to happen, and just park their big white UN car.”
For example, during the coup attempt by a renegade government commander in August 1997, UNMOT troops had orders to pull out of their field office in Qurghonteppa—the scene of the main clashes—and remain in Dushanbe. Subsequently, during the November hostage crisis, they received orders to travel in pairs, which meant that one of the three officers in Qurghonteppa was rendered “immobile” in the office.
Another international worker with extensive field experience laughs and says, “The UNMOT are the last to know anything. Many of them don’t speak Russian, and they don’t meet with local officials.” These comments echo the general view that as professional officers, UNMOT officials could be making much more of their potential to encourage law and order among the Tajik authorities. Moreover, the May 1998 report of the UN Secretary General notes that UNMOT had not yet established the fortified building and armed guards to protect the UN humanitarian contingents.
The Importance of Recruitment
Implicit in the critiques of UNMOT is the ever-daunting challenge of staff recruitment in the UN system, and again the Forced Migration Projects heard criticism of the leading international agencies. As one NGO worker comments, “The UN and OSCE say they don’t have enough time, and they’re rushed to find qualified internationals to work in Tajikistan. Tajikistan is a wash-up place for the UN. The level of staff has been low, and only recently have they begun adding to it.”
There is no doubt about the difficulty involved in recruiting professionals to work in some of the former Soviet republics, where there has suddenly been a demand for people trained and experienced in the fields of human rights and governance.
OSCE, for example, is praised for the refugee protection and general human rights monitoring it has done in the last three years. But a UN official notes that OSCE officers, too, could be doing more toward human rights and democracy-building, and need to be “creative” in this “uncharted territory.” Ideally, he says, field candidates should be lawyers with a strong background in human rights. They should “make an impact on the daily life of the people and penetrate as deep as they can—not just write reports about the situation.”
That criticism is slightly unfair, judging by the heavy workload the Forced Migration Projects observed in OSCE field offices, and the officers’ expressed desire to broaden their educational activities in human rights and law.
The Post-Communist Lacuna
Indeed, the sheer understaffing of the OSCE field operations has been one of the mission’s most visible weaknesses. But perhaps because of Tajikistan’s extraordinary setback—the “lost transition” in the wake of general social and economic collapse—a number of people interviewed by the Forced Migration Projects express the special need to recruit field professionals from outside the Soviet bloc.
Some of those interviewed make no attempt to be diplomatic about their views, which have evolved from several years of searing field experience. Others echo such opinions, while a couple of people interviewed are in sharp disagreement. There are, of course, many exceptions to such general observations, but the issues underpinning them must be addressed if the international community is serious and realistic about encouraging state-building in Tajikistan.
First of all, one field veteran believes that international staff from outside the Soviet orbit can be freer from local pressure and less subject to local corruption. Perhaps this view is a bit too optimistic about countering corruption, but the perception of credibility is vital in tense and frightening locations. As one field officer recalls, “I would have local people come to me with information about crimes and other problems, because they couldn’t tell others what they knew.”
Secondly, more than one person with extensive field experience stressed the need for western democracies to provide international staff for human rights postings. This is particularly so because their background and education bears no association with Soviet power relations or political and ethnic biases. As one official bluntly says, “It’s good to have staff who didn’t live under repressive regimes, who never had to kowtow to such arbitrary authority.”
By contrast, this same official found that field officers who were raised in Communist hierarchies tended to show less initiative in investigating reports of abuses. They also required an inordinate amount of explanation concerning their responsibilities as human rights monitors and informal legal ombudsmen. While crucial in the long term, this daily education process consumes a great deal of time, especially when crises are erupting day and night. Human rights emergencies often require a protection officer to respond instantly, almost reflexively, drawing on a repertoire of experience with law and justice.
Another person with a background in field monitoring found that the officers sent from Soviet republics and Eastern Europe “constantly say, ‘No, that’s not our job, not our job.’” After a while, this person discovered that some of these staff members actually had an aversion to the Tajiks. Such bias, which is all too commonly expressed by nationalists in the large slavic republics of the former Soviet Union, compromises the staff’s effectiveness. Moreover, Tajiks are particularly sensitive to hints of condescension that remind them of the “big brother” attitude of the more prosperous Soviet republics.
Another argument advanced for staffing field positions with western professionals is to counter a crippling consequence of Tajikistan’s “lost transition.” “The government class here has no idea of how to adopt new skills,” says one international worker summarizing views expressed by others. “There is no idea that you serve your country. The general manner is very much of the Soviet era. They don’t understand the need for a general system of law. There’s no grasp here of trying to adapt to being something that’s not the former Soviet Union.”
Indeed a kind of torpor hangs over many of the administrative offices in towns like Shaartuz, in southern Tajikistan, where local officials sit in bare, dark offices, adorned only with busts of Lenin. As if detached from the needs of their local population, two such officials directed the Forced Migration Projects consultant back to the local offices of international NGOs and the UN, “because they had all the statistics and information.”
The foregoing comments are contradicted by the views of another international humanitarian worker, whose experience in various former Soviet republics supports the opinion that the Tajiks must accept their history and work with people from their own region. Furthermore, local people need the on-the-job training if the region is ever to manage its own conflicts and migration problems.
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