“With what weapons have you equipped yourself for war? Throw away those arrows and your vengeful sword, thrust your brutal claw into the earth and let us two make an end of standing. Let us rather seat ourselves and brighten our scowling visages with wine. Let us make a pact before the Lord and may our hearts repent our pursuit of war. Others can go to war; do you come to an agreement with me and let us prepare a feast.”Shah-Nama (the national epic of Persia)
by Ferdowsi
Preface
It has been more than seven years since the stunning breakup of the Soviet Union, ample time to observe the trends in the political breakdown and chaotic population displacements that have altered several former republics forever.One of these troubled lands is the Central Asian republic of Tajikistan, which came to ruin over a complex clash of regional, religious, and ethnic interests within a year of the Soviet Union’s collapse. The war lasted roughly six months, and it took more than six times as long for a United Nations–sponsored peace process to wrest an agreement from intransigent adversaries. It was signed, at last, on June 27, 1997.
If the peace negotiations were arduous, the truly hard work of postwar reconciliation and reconstruction—in its broadest sense—lies ahead. Time is perilously short. The damage done by the war is estimated at $7 billion.
Thousands of combatants from the government and opposition must be demobilized, disarmed, and retrained for jobs that do not yet exist. Tens of thousands of refugees have returned from five years in Afghanistan, finding their houses razed or occupied by interlopers and the country’s infrastructure and administration to be barely functioning. Some 20,000 people still await repatriation from neighboring Central Asian states. Salaries for the general Tajik population have gone unpaid for months, if not years.
The urgent need for economic support to sustain the ambitious peace plan during this fragile period prompted a special donors’ conference in Vienna on November 24 and 25, 1997. In preparation, an interagency task force was formed, bringing together United Nations agencies, the World Bank, the Inter-national Organization for Migration (IOM), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and the numerous nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) working in Tajikistan.The result was a plan outlining the key activities needed in order to complete the peace process within the 12-18 month transition period specified under the agreement. The cost of these acti-vities was estimated at $65 million, and a host of donors responded with pledges of $56.6 million. Added to previous commitments, a total of $96 million had been pledged for peace and reconciliation in Tajikistan by the end of 1997, and another $250 million was pledged at a World Bank conference in May of this year.
The subject of this report is the very challenge that the Tajiks and their international supporters now face, and the role that the international community can play to promote a durable peace and prevent a backslide into violence and forcible displacement.
The report examines the lead taken by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in responding to the humanitarian emergency from late 1992 through 1995, and the unprecedented handover of UNHCR protection activities to the OSCE as the former withdrew at the end of 1995.The work of humanitarian organizations in transitional settings such as Tajikistan demands creativity and resourcefulness, including new roles as human rights monitors, mediators, and advocates of civil society and the rule of law.
The bulk of this report was written before the murder of an unarmed UNMOT (UN Mission of Observers to Tajikistan) detachment on patrol. While our analysis of the weaknesses in the UNMOT response still holds, the recent attack reinforces our view that the UN Security Council should urgently consider a response under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter to ensure a sufficient measure of security for societal rehabilitation.
This report explores the aspects of a humanitarian relief effort that may be instructive for similar postconflict situations. It makes recommendations for actions to strengthen international regimes that deal with the political disorder that arises in disintegrating states, and the attendant collapse of fundamental institutions, including the economy, education, and health care. Proposals are made to strengthen humanitarian action as well as security for humanitarian workers, civil society, and the rule of law in Tajikistan.
The experience of Tajikistan provides an apt case study. It suffered the worst civil conflict in the former Soviet Union until the 1994-1996 war in Chechnya. After more than four years of sporadic fighting among regional, ideological, and ethnic alliances, the Tajik state splintered into various factions. Several have armed contingents, and each is now contending for power and control over the republic’s few economic assets.Much of what appears in this report will be familiar to those following developments in Abkhazia, Angola, Bosnia, Cambodia, and Mozambique. Like Bosnia, Tajikistan barely caught a glimpse of independence when it plunged into several years of war. During those years, the Tajiks missed out on the crucial period of “reform” that has bestowed certain modest benefits upon its Central Asian neighbors; thus Tajikistan has emerged further behind economically and politically. The absence of an opportunity for innovation reinforces a tendency to revert to old habits and thinking, and to idealize the Soviet institutions relied upon in the past.
The goal of this report is to identify what the international community can do to avoid greater hardship and renewed violence; to promote stabilization and encourage the rule of law and civil society; and to protect refugees and other civilians, as well as the humanitarian workers who seek to minister to their needs.While offering a range of recommendations, this report seeks at bottom to provoke debate on some of the basic questions raised by humanitarian workers themselves. Perhaps the approach of “best practices” has limited application in lawless lands like Tajikistan. Perhaps there is need for a new approach for working in settings ruled by criminal networks, who pose dangers that far surpass the traditional obstacles of official corruption. Serious work is needed to address these vexing dilemmas.
Methodology
This report is one of a series of special reports published by the Forced Migration Projects. It is based on a mission of inquiry conducted from November 18 to December 4, 1997, by Kathleen Hunt, a Projects consultant who covered the outbreak of Tajikistan’s civil war in 1992 as a correspondent for National Public Radio. She is the principal author of this report. She was accompanied by James Nubile, a photographer.
Ms. Hunt traveled to Tajikistan and neighboring Uzbekistan, where she conducted dozens of interviews with international humanitarian aid officials, government officials, diplomats, local and international nongovernmental organizations, academic experts, and journalists. She also traveled to the principal towns and villages in Tajikistan’s southern region of Khatlon, which was most affected by the war.
There, she surveyed the enduring war damage and interviewed scores of former refugees, some of whom had returned from Afghan-istan only days before. In addition to returnees, she interviewed villagers who had remained in Tajikistan during the war, including ethnic Uzbeks who were generally allied with government forces and who might even have encouraged the flight of their neighbors.
Both before and after the mission of inquiry, Ms. Hunt conducted numerous interviews in person and by telephone with officials involved with Tajikistan from the United Nations, OSCE, ICRC, western donors, and international NGOs.
It is essential to note that just as Ms. Hunt and Mr. Nubile arrived in Central Asia, an international hostage crisis was unfolding in the Tajik capital, Dushanbe. As the captors issued threats to take additional victims, foreign aid workers were fearful to speak candidly if they were to be identified in the report. The crisis ended tragically with the death of one of the hostages during a government rescue operation.Given the latest attack on the UNMOT observers, the need to avoid exposing them to added risk is all the more pressing. At their request, therefore, most international officials and relief workers interviewed have been given anonymity, or identified only with general references such as a “UN official.” A list of written sources consulted is included at the back of the report, along with a brief chronology of Tajikistan’s war and aftermath.
The Forced Migration Projects sincerely thank the many people in the field who were generous with their time, in particular, UNHCR, UNDP, OSCE, UNMOT, UNOPS, and a variety of NGOs, including Relief International, Save the Children-UK and USA, and Human Rights Watch. The Open Society Institute offices in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan helped immeasurably with logistics, and we are grateful to Anthony Richter for sharing his detailed chronology with us. We also appreciate the information and insights shared by UN officials in New York from the offices of OCHA, DPKO and DPA.
Perhaps the word most often heard to describe Tajikistan’s current situation is “fluid,” and no report can keep up with daily developments concerning the peace plan. Among these is the return this year of the controversial Islamic opposition leader, Qazi Akbar Turadzhonzoda, and the bitter process of replacing 30 percent of the government officials with representatives of the United Tajik Opposition.
But one of the greatest unknowns is the outcome of the government’s pledge to rein in the armed bands in Dushanbe and elsewhere, who are responsible for crime, bomb blasts, and terror. Another unknown is the registration, disarmament, and reintegration of combatants into civilian life, as contemplated by the peace accord.
Much hinges on the outcome of these uncertainties—not least the degree of security perceived by the international community—that will affect the speed with which donors’ pledges will be transmitted to the Tajikistan Development Fund and thereafter utilized. The international community may simply be very limited in what can be done under the present circumstances.
This report is designed to assist those involved in the work of postwar reconstruction amid weak central governments—states that are not capable of discharging the basic responsibilities of governance and that are faced with broken economies, public health epidemics, and criminality. The intended audience includes a wide variety of actors who make and implement policy in the international community, who are concerned with how to seize Tajikistan’s present conjuncture of war-weariness and budding goodwill in order to prevent further conflict and forced migration.Arthur C. Helton
Director, Forced Migration Projects
September 1998
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|