Chapter Four
Indigenous Sources of Instability in The Crimea
As discussed previously, the nearly unanimous opinion of people who are either directly involved in, or who closely monitor, developments in the Crimea is that the inter-ethnic situation remains potentially explosive. Many sources of tension-emanating from both within and from outside the Crimean peninsula-have fostered an environment in which the elements for violent confrontation can quickly fuse, as they did during protests in 1992 and 1995. Stirred by widespread anxiety, discontent in the Crimea simmered in mid-1996 alarmingly near the boiling point. The longer the feelings of mutual suspicion fester between the Russian and Tatar communities in the Crimea, the greater the chances that even the smallest of sparks could ignite serious unrest. And if the pent-up hostilities blow the lid of the Crimea's ethnic cauldron, containing the spillover would certainly be difficult. There is so much history involved that a conflict could approach the scale of viciousness already seen in the former Yugoslavia and in the separatist Russian region of Chechnya.
The font of the Crimea's social problems is a stagnant economy. So, the ability to defuse the potential for of inter-ethnic tension is linked to the region's ability to implement economic reforms. Government authorities and experts say that increasing entrepreneurial activity, thereby boosting employment levels, would logically cause hostility to dissipate. Unfortunately, the reality of the Crimean situation is that an economic turn-around is unlikely to occur anytime soon. Not only is the necessary investment capital lacking, but, most importantly, so is the will to undertake the necessary reforms. At least in the near term, stress created by a stagnating economy will continue to menace the Crimea. Feelings of hopelessness will likely build among Tatars, while Russian fears about a loss of influence will probably become more intense.
Feeding off of ongoing economic uncertainty are two extremely dangerous tendencies; Russian separatism and Tatar radicalism. Allowed to incubate long enough under moribund conditions, separatism and, or radicalism are both capable wreaking havoc. No one can predict at what point either trend might attain critical mass in the Crimea. But as recent history demonstrates, such tendencies are capable of rapid growth. And once such movements develop a following, they are capable of crushing reason and replacing it with irrationality.
Of the two, Russian separatism would appear to present the lesser danger. Certainly, separatist sentiment was far less evident in mid-1996 than it was just two years earlier, when secessionist efforts by the regional government came close to sparking a confrontation between Ukraine and Russia. Since then separatist passions have cooled considerably. But it would be unwise to consider it a spent force. Separatism may have merely entered a dormant stage, awaiting new developments to stir it up again. Indeed, one of the main pillars that supported the separatist drive of the early 1990s, the so-called "empire mentality," appears as deeply entrenched in the Crimean Russian consciousness as ever.
As long as a significant portion of the Crimean Russian population continues to cling to the idea of the Crimea's inherent "Russianess," the secessionist threat will linger, and inter-ethnic harmony in the Crimea will be endangered. A cause for concern is the seeming intractability of the "empire mentality" in the Crimea. "To ask a Russian to give up the imperial idea is like asking a Russian to cease being a Russian, " Vladimir Kazarin, an ethnic Russian social scientist at Simferopol State University, said about local sentiment. In the Crimea's case, the empire phenomenon is enhanced by to the fact that the peninsula was an integral part of Russia until 1954. Even though they may no longer be undertaking active measures to reunite the peninsula with Russia, many Russians remain steadfast, if passive, opponents to Ukrainian control of the Crimea. Many if not most would still like to see the peninsula returned to Russian jurisdiction. Some say such a move would make them feel more secure, regardless if economic conditions improved or not. "I can not give a concrete reason, but I would just feel safer if we were part of Russia," said a ethnic Russian food vendor in Sevastopol. The false hopes raised by Yuri Meshkov's separatist movement left many Russians disillusioned, so that few these days view are willing to take action to promote the Crimea's reunification with Russia. Getting Russians to rally again around the separatist banner would seem to require new impulses.
The twin companion to Russian separatism is Crimean Tatar radicalism. The radical tendency is significantly less developed than its counterpart, although that could make it a more, not less combustible portion of the Crimean equation. Russians have been tempered by past experience. But Tatars, seemingly mired in an infinite loop of hardship, might be more tempted to listen to those proffering simplistic solutions to current problems. Whether or not Crimean Tatars ever abandon moderation in favor of violence as a means to achieve their goals will probably depend upon the future course pursued by the mejlis. In mid-1996, the mejlis unequivocally stood on the side of restraint, arguing that Tatars would end up being the biggest losers if events ever turned violent in the Crimea. But, according to top mejlis members, support for moderation was eroding.
The potential for radicalization of the Tatar cause becomes more apparent upon closer examination of the hierarchy. Standing behind the top echelon in the mejlis are a significant number of Tatar activists-mostly on the county and town level-with great expectations and a weak grasp of the realistic possibilities. For example, the mejlis, as already mentioned, has proceeded with utmost caution in the autonomy drive, using conciliatory rhetoric to assuage the sensitivities of Crimean Russians and the Ukrainian government. Lower-level activists, meanwhile, have been much more blunt and incendiary in their choice of words. "We are an indigenous people (in the Crimea) and we don't want to merely restore our nationality, but also our statehood," said Refat Memetov, who heads a Tatar charity organization. "We don't know how soon this will happen, but it is possible."
It might not take much to prompt the rapid growth of a radical Tatar movement. Poverty is widespread enough so as to ensure there is a massive pool of potential supporters. All that the radical movement would seem to need is a charismatic personality. Without a leader to step forward to formulate a coherent agenda and provide direction, radicals among Crimean Tatars have had difficult harnessing prevailing discontent. All that might be required for a sharp turn towards radicalism is a provocation, even something as simple as harassment of Tatar food vendors at a local farmer's market. Enough Tatars already feel they have so little left to lose that the slightest incident could lead to the spontaneous combustion of frustration.
Another development that encourages instability in the Crimea is the high level of organized criminal activity. Car bombings and contract murders have been routine events, especially in Simferopol, and it is difficult for any entrepreneur to avoid the unwelcome attention of protection rackets. Crime is able to thrive in large part because of the law-enforcement void created by Ukrainian and Russian jostling over the Crimea's destiny. "The criminals exert so much control because political authority is not so strong," explained Jemilev, the mejlis leader. Of late the criminal atmosphere in the Crimea has intensified, observers say, adding that the trend is an unwanted side-effect of the Chechen War. Before the imbroglio began, Chechnya was notorious across the former Soviet Union as a smuggler's paradise and a money-laundering center. The Russian invasion changed that, forcing criminals to look elsewhere to re-establish their illicit activities. Although hard evidence is difficult to produce, observers say the Crimea is fast emerging as one of the main alternatives to Chechnya. "The Crimea is becoming a money-laundering center for the entire former Soviet Union," said Lubow Horich, the UN representative in Simferopol. She added that continued instability makes it easier for criminal elements to thrive.
External Influences on The Crimea
The conflict in Chechnya is just one of many external events swirling about the Crimea-beyond the control of local inhabitants-capable of exerting a negative influence on peninsular developments. As already mentioned, the Chechen fiasco has undermined efforts to stabilize the Crimea's socio-political environment. But in other ways, Chechnya has had a positive influence on the Crimean inter-ethnic situation. For starters, it has dampened enthusiasm for extremism, from both Russian separatists and Tatar radicals. The Chechen conflict's indiscriminate violence and savagery has highlighted the fact that, in the former Soviet Union, there is virtually no middle ground between dialogue and blood-lust in inter-ethnic relations. On the Tatar side, "Chechnya has reinforced in us the idea that a peaceful way is needed," said Chubarov, the deputy leader of the Mejlis. The impact has also been great on Russians. "Chechnya almost killed the independence movement because it made many think twice about the high costs of breaking away," said the International Organization for Migration's Nicolaas de Zwager. Perhaps the most important result of Chechnya, vis-à-vis the Crimea, is that it has preoccupied Moscow. Crimean separatists had relied heavily on Moscow's logistical and moral support to sustain their effort. With Russia waging war on one of its own ethnic minorities, it lacks the credibility to complain about the treatment of Russians in the Crimea. "As long as Russia remains involved in Chechnya, there is a virtual guarantee that separatism in the Crimea will remain under control," said Vladimir Lehovich, the Deputy Head of Mission of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe's Ukrainian office.
Russia perhaps presents the greatest external threat to the Crimea's security. With market-democratic principles having been largely discredited in Russia, nationalism has emerged as a major force behind President Yeltsin's presidency. Before Chechnya, the Crimea was the cause celebre of the Russian nationalist cause. And while Russian tolerance of Ukrainian independence may be growing slowly, most continue to view Kiev's possession of the Crimea as intolerable. The Russian stance on the Crimea is remarkably unified, even as opinion on other issues is dangerously polarized. Russian communists and democrats alike consider the peninsula's 1954 transfer to be without legal merit. "Nobody in Russia, including me, considers the Crimea to be Ukrainian. The Crimea is part of the Russian cultural heritage," said Galina Starovoitova, a leading democratic politician in Moscow.
Given the refusal to recognize the permanent loss of the Crimea, it is conceivable that Moscow may once again start meddling in peninsular affairs. And for this purpose, there are several instruments available to the Kremlin. There are Crimean Russians who could be pushed into conflict, creating the necessary pretext for more active Russian involvement. Disputes over the Black Sea Fleet, as well as over oil and gas pipeline routes could also supply Moscow with reasons to interfere. The process of dividing the 300-vessel fleet-which is strategically worthless, but psychologically important to both Ukrainians and Russians-is far from over. As long as there is a lack of agreement between Kiev and Moscow, Russia could use the unresolved fleet-division question as cover for destabilizing action, such as an attempt to reclaim sovereignty over the Crimea, or efforts to support secessionist activity by Crimean Russians.
In a similar manner, the Crimea potentially could become a pawn in the competition over lucrative oil and gas transit routes in the Black Sea area. Turkey and Russia are the main contestants in the battle over pipeline routes that would link the West to the vast new oil and gas fields being developed in the Caspian Sea area. In order to ensure success for its proposed pipeline, Russia could try to stir up trouble in the Crimea-something that would undoubtedly drive a wedge between Turkey and Ukraine, which are opposing the projected Russian transit route via the port of Novorossisk. One way for Russia to weaken the bonds between Kiev and Ankara would be to foster some sort of Crimean crisis involving Tatars. Because Turkey is home to an estimated 5 million ethnic Crimean Tatars, the Turkish government might be forced to react strongly to an "incident" in the Crimea, thereby introducing an element of tension into Ankara-Kiev relationship. And without strong Ukrainian-Turkish ties to contest Russian plans, the Novorossisk pipeline option might become a irresistible.
Turkey has close historic ties to the Crimea and strong cultural links to Tatars. But Ankara has played down its affinity to the Tatar community so as not to raise Ukrainian concern over its grip on the peninsula or provide Russia with an excuse for mischief. Turkey is careful to avoid becoming deeply involved in the political or civil rights aspects of the Tatar cause. It has, for example, refrained from opening a consulate in Simferopol because such a move could possibly be viewed as a provocation by the Russian community. Not only some Russians, but Ukrainians too, suspect Ankara of wanting ultimately to reclaim the peninsula. To allay concerns, Turkish officials stress that Tatar repatriation is an internal matter for Ukraine. "Turkey is aware of Ukrainian sensitivity, and is sure to keep Ukraine fully informed about Turkish intentions," a Turkish diplomat said.
Constitutional issues in Ukraine provide another potential source of problems. Kiev officials maintain the Ukraine should be a unitary state, i.e. without delegated powers to individual regions of the country. However, the Crimea, pending final ratification, will have its own basic law and become a legally recognized entity within, but distinct from the rest of Ukraine. Reconciling Kiev's longing for a unitary state, and Simferopol's equally strong desire to keep autonomous rights, may prove impossible. It might be only a matter of time, therefore, before a new constitutional crisis occurs, creating an opportunity for Russian intervention.
Some Ukrainian officials expect Russia's "great-power" behavior to intensify. "The critical moment has yet to come," said Viktor Yakovlev, the staff member of the Ukrainian Supreme Rada committee on inter-ethnic relations. "The ongoing deterioration of conditions there (in Russia) may transfer the attention of the Russian leadership once again to the near abroad." Thwarting any Russian moves to stir up trouble would require united and resolute opposition on the part of Moscow's adversaries. "The main question is; Can a complex system of security be built?" Mr. Yakovlev said about efforts to contain Moscow's imperial ambitions. "If not, the Crimea will be a key card in new geo-political games."
For those looking for signs that Russia is mellowing, the presidential election process of 1996 proved inconclusive, political experts said. The elections were "just part of a long drama. That is what makes it intriguing here [in the Crimea]," said the OSCE's Lehovich. From the viewpoint of Crimean Tatars, Russia will cease to be a threat to Crimean stability only when it signs a friendship treaty with Ukraine. "That would put a stop to Russian separatism," said Chubarov. Kiev and Moscow have made many gestures about signing such a treaty, a major component of which would presumably be recognition of existing borders. But so far each attempt to conclude a friendship pact has ended in postponement. And there is no indication as to when both sides will make another, serious effort to reach a deal.
The mejlis insists that Tatars would never be the instigators of a new Crimean crisis. Even so, that does not preclude the possibility of Tatar repatriation being used as a pretext by another force that is interested in fomenting conflict. "If something starts, it will be related to Tatars, but not started by Tatars," said de Zwager of the IOM. Thus, it would appear unlikely that Tatars could remain out of any fray. Indeed, given the seething hostility in the settlements, Tatars seemed poised in mid-1996 to respond immediately and forcefully to any provocation.
