Chapter Five
International Aid Efforts
The socio-political situation in the Crimea remains volatile. As such, the peninsula presents a serious challenge to the international community. It is generally recognized that continued stability in the Crimea will be linked to economic development. In turn, improving living standards will be difficult, if not impossible, to achieve without foreign assistance. Thus, the international community is in position to play a pivotal role in conflict-prevention efforts.
A number of foreign governments, along with multilateral organizations and non-governmental development groups, have made moves to help with regional development. In addition, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe maintains a presence in Simferopol to monitor political and military developments. Nevertheless, the international response so far has left a lot to be desired. That is because, for the most part, development projects in the Crimea have involved more talking than concrete action.
The chasm separating words from deeds is evident in virtually every international development project. For example, the Turkish government has pledged to construct housing and necessary infrastructure for 1,000 Tatar families. Actual work, however, had not begun as of mid-1996, and there is no indication that ground will be broken anytime soon. Meanwhile, the UN's Crimea Integration and Development Program (UNCIDP) has a $15 million plan, unveiled in 1994, that is designed to alleviate some of the worst conditions in Tatar settlements, as well promote inter-ethnic tolerance. But the plan, two years after its announcement, remains limited in scope. Even one of the most advanced aid projects-the Dutch-financed Tatar national library-had not begun to be constructed as of mid-1996, although the site selection process had been completed.
A variety of reasons explain the seeming discrepancy between words and deeds. Poor planning sometimes has been a factor. In one case, a program to bring potable water to a Crimean Tatar settlement experienced a lengthy delay because the pipes used for the extension were of a different type than those of the already existing system, and could not be properly connected. In the case of the Turkish housing project, both domestic and foreign political considerations have helped hold up construction. Recent political instability in Ankara, featuring rule by fractious and weak coalition governments, has focused the attention of the nation's leaders inward. But regardless of the infighting, Turkey is treading gently in the Black Sea basin so as not to arouse the sensitivities of both the Ukrainian and Russian governments.
As for the United Nations' program, the largest of multilateral aid efforts is stalling. According to Lubow Horich, the UN coordinator in Simferopol, the project has received only between $3-$4 million in pledges from various foreign governments, far short of the $15 million target. Horich attributes the shortfall to donor fatigue, adding that generating greater enthusiasm for the Crimean aid plan will be difficult. The threat of inter-ethnic violence does not create the same sense of urgency for action in the international community that it did a few years ago. Attracting donations for Crimean development is all the more difficult because most programs on the peninsula are aimed at prevention, not stopping a fight already in progress, or alleviating the results of a conflict. "Donor countries have very specific frameworks for the provision of emergency or developmental aid. Bosnia is the prime example," said Horich. "The Crimea does not fit into any of the established aid categories. If we had a few riots or a rebellion, then aid would come quickly to the Crimea. But there's none to help prevent a crisis."
The most promising of existing aid plans is the UNCIDP program. It is far from comprehensive, but it seeks to address many of the Crimea's most pressing needs. If fully implemented, the program could make a significant contribution to the stabilization of the Crimea. The plan relies on the International Organization for Migration for help in easing the logistical and material difficulties associated with Tatar repatriation. The major thrust of the program is to strengthen social services in new settlements, encourage small business activity, and, most importantly, increase the level of trust among the peninsula's various ethnic groups, especially between Tatars and Russians. The ability of different groups to establish a good working relationship is a building block of civil society.
Currently the Tatar and Russian communities rarely interact. In order to ease prejudice and suspicion, UN officials have selected two Tatar settlements that are closely situated to more established Russian communities-one outside Simferopol, the other in the Sudak region-to serve as proving grounds for the program. In both areas Tatars and Russians will have to work together if development projects are to be successful. The hope is that once they work together, the two sides will find that stereotypes do not match reality, allowing a spirit of cooperation to take root. The major feature of the UN project is so-called Participatory Local Planning Councils (PLPC). Any community that is to receive UNCIDP aid must elect a council, which then becomes largely responsible for planning and implementing any given project. PLPCs, comprising both Tatars and Russians, have already been elected in both the Simferopol suburb and in the Sudak area. Although Tatars would presumably be the primary beneficiaries of the aid program, sizable numbers of Russians would also be able to enjoy the benefits. PLPCs are to work with the UNCIDP on projects in six specific areas:
* School construction. The UNCIDP would provide construction and teaching materials to open schools in settlements currently lacking educational facilities. Local labor would be utilized in building the schools, thus helping to alleviate the chronic unemployment that plagues many Tatar communities. *Housing construction. The UNCIDP aims to supply material and equipment to build roughly 280 homes in the two settlements. *Improving access to health care. The UNCIDP hopes not only help to build clinics, but also work to improve mobile medical care. *Increasing access to water. The UNCIDP intends to lay about 13 miles of main-line water pipe in three new settlements. *Technical training. The UNCIDP aims to transfer leadership skills to community organizers to facilitate the implementation of infrastructure improvements. Foreign specialists would also train local leaders on how to form and run financial institutions, specifically credit unions, which could become engines for economic growth in communities. *Small business assistance. The UNCIDP and IOM plans to make small- scale grants to entrepreneurs in order to stimulate small- and medium-sized business activity in new settlements. It would also provide technical training to would-be entrepreneurs.
If all goes according to plan, settlements working with the UNCIDP would develop into self-sustaining communities, where a large percentage of the population would be able to share in the prosperity. Economic growth, in turn, would greatly ease inter-ethnic tension as people learn that cooperation, not confrontation, is the best way to improve the current stagnant conditions. Unfortunately, developments have not unfolded as envisioned. Indeed, donor disinterest has brought everything to a standstill. The two PLPCs-near Simferopol and Sudak-have little to do, as the lack of funds frustrates attempts to undertake specific projects.
So instead of providing hope, the slow implementation of development projects-not only in the UNCIDP's case, but in others as well-has created disappointment. It can be argued that foreign development efforts in the Crimea have done just as much damage as good-at least so far. The gap between words and actions has heightened the general mood of disillusionment among Tatars, thereby increasing the region's volatility. Many Tatars feel let down by the international community, and regaining their trust could be a lengthy process. Over the long term, a prosperous, civil society will be difficult to build in the Crimea unless Tatars feel assured that the international community strongly backs their cause. That is because Tatars tend to view global public opinion as a key protector against future discrimination and possible deportation. If Tatars doubt the international community's ability to follow through on commitments, they may be less willing to make the compromises with Crimean Russians needed to build a stable environment on the peninsula.
In the nearer term, the sluggish behavior of the international community has weakened the mejlis' authority, inversely increasing the allure of radical options. So far, the mejlis' message of moderation has proved the most effective force in the battle to contain frustration in the Crimea. However, in order to retain widespread respect, the mejlis could use a few tangible economic achievements for which it could claim credit, showing that restraint pays off. If Tatars lose faith in the mejlis' ability to solve their problems, many might drift into the radical camp.
The international aid projects planned or implemented to date have also had the unintended effect of dividing people instead of bringing them together, according to some foreign development officials. For one, virtually all programs have concentrated on helping Tatar resettlement. While such emphasis would seem natural to outsiders, it has whipped up resentment in the Russian community, which feels traumatized by the events of the last five years, and therefore thinks itself entitled to a share of foreign attention. Their perception of being ignored fuels feelings of hostility for returning Tatars. Within the Tatar community itself, international programs have also created divisions. That is because many plans have been extremely narrow in scope, intended to benefit only a limited number of people. So, a project such as the extension of a water pipe can spark fierce jockeying among Tatars neighborhoods, all vying for access to such an essential commodity. The losers in the competition for foreign aid often are filled with resentment for the winners.
Recommendations
If international development aid is going to have the desired effect of preventing conflict, then greater emphasis must be placed on the completion of specific, even if small-scale, projects. Promises should not be made that can not be kept. At the same time, projects should be designed to benefit larger numbers of people. At least in this early stage of a Crimean assistance effort, symbolism is an important component of overall success. The Tatar community, especially the mejlis, wants most of all to be reassured that the international community strongly supports Tatars' right to live in the Crimea. Promises of aid, without the follow-up, suggest that the international community is ambivalent about Tatar repatriation.
Full implementation of the UNCIDP program would be a good point of departure in the effort to breath new life into the global aid effort. But insufficient funds will probably continue to hamper aid efforts. Therefore, to maximize the impact of smaller amounts of resources, projects should probably concentrate over the longer term on providing needed skills to future generations, rather than on making improvements in settlements themselves. Education is all important. Older generations of Tatars are likely to be more patient about their own problems, and tolerant of others, if they believe younger generations will be able to enjoy a better life. Breaking ground to build a few schools would provide the immediate signs that many Tatars are looking for that the international community cares about their fate. In any event, the construction of one school can benefit a far larger number of Tatars than they laying of a couple miles of water pipe, or the construction of a few houses. Likewise, providing extensive leadership and entrepreneurial training can go a long way towards the creation of stable, viable communities. To accomplish this, governments and NGOs could sponsor study-abroad programs, in addition to helping build facilities locally. And Ukrainians, and Russians, as well as Tatars, should be eligible for study.
Locally, there are a few noteworthy educational projects already in operation that need assistance. One such project is that of the Crimean State Industrial-Pedagogical Institute in Simferopol, run by leading Tatar educator Fevzi Yakubov. The institute, which was founded in January 1994, aims to become a center for the revival of the traditional Crimean Tatar educational system. In 1996, it had 900 students, including roughly 600 Tatars, all of whom were being trained to become teachers. The institute was also working on writing and publishing new textbooks in the Tatar language. A money shortage is frustrating the institute's plans, however. According to Mr. Yakubov, approximately $500,000 is needed to complete the task of publishing new Tatar textbooks. The institute also needs to raise up to a million dollars to finish construction of its campus.
There is also a severe shortage of computers in the Crimea, along with the technology enabling residents to gain access to the internet. The internet could be utilized to increase contact between Russians and Tatars, as well as link the peninsula with the outside world. Exposing diverse populations in the Crimeans to a wide variety of information and opinion could foster increased levels of tolerance. Care must be taken, however, not to overestimate the internet's potential. The local infrastructure is in such a dilapidated state-with an inadequate electrical supply system and an antiquated telephone network-that the internet will remain inaccessible for hundreds of thousands of Crimeans for years, if not decades to come. Regardless, computers will be needed at the very least to equip young people with job skills for the 21st century.
While expanding economic opportunity is unquestionably the key to long term stability, less tangible objectives are also important under present circumstances. The UN is looking to address this, but in a somewhat narrowly focused manner. Another way to promote mutual trust and tolerance is to address the Crimea's information deficit-something that is not receiving much international attention. The various ethnic groups that share the peninsula tend not only to be isolated from one another news-wise, but are also frequently misinformed. Such an information void offers ample opportunity for malicious acts, or accidental conflict. What is needed, therefore, are more sources of information, along with arenas for the exchange of opinion. At present, the Crimean Russian political leadership enjoys a near-monopoly on the flow of information. Accordingly, most mass media outlets, including television, radio, and local newspapers, reflect the official point of view. Those who do not agree with the official line do not have adequate means to present opposing views. Tatars, in particular, receive only a few hours of programming time each week on the peninsular television channel.
Foreign aid could help ease the Crimean information deficit in two ways. First, governments and NGOs could design programs to work with young journalists in the Crimea to develop their understanding on the proper functioning of a free press. Secondly, international support could help establish alternative mass media outlets. As mentioned above, expanding internet access would be one way of helping to diminish the information deficit in the Crimea. Perhaps a more effective means of communication in the near-term, however, might be radio and television. Radio especially would be a cost-effective way of reaching large numbers of Crimeans. According to Reshat Chubarov, the mejlis leader, efforts are underway to launch a radio station geared primarily for the Tatar community. Such a project naturally would benefit greatly from an injection of international assistance. A Tatar-controlled mass media outlet would at least break the regional government's strangle-hold on information.
However, some foreign aid specialists in Ukraine believe helping Tatars establish their own radio station is not the best way to close the Crimea's information gap. A better way would be to establish of a mass media outlet that is accessible to, and controlled jointly by, all major ethnic groups in the Crimea. Such an option may be too complicated logistically to become reality anytime soon, however, even if foreign organizations were willing to provide start-up costs.
In sum, we make the following suggestions for short-term for projects that, in conjunction with the realization of the United Nations aid program, could help reduce inter-ethnic tension in the Crimea:
1) Study-abroad opportunities. Crimeans from all ethnic backgrounds should receive scholarships to attend universities in the leading industrialized nations of the world. Not only could Crimean young people receive strong professional training via study-abroad, but they also would be exposed to new social and cultural trends that might help raise tolerance levels once the students returned home. At present, Turkey offers scholarships to about 100 Crimean Tatars. One institution that would be especially well suited for achieving the dual-purpose of study-abroad for Crimeans is the Central European University. In order to maximize the experience, Crimeans selected for the program should receive intensive language training before going abroad. The greatest benefit might be gained if Crimeans attended universities in groups. Not only should they study together, but they should also live in the same dormitories. Constant exposure would hopefully be the fastest way to build trust from those of different backgrounds. During the study-abroad program, resources should be made available for group travel. Finally, steps should be taken to establish a well-coordinated alumni network. If tension levels were to rise again in the Crimea at some point in the future, the alumni network could be utilized in the effort to avert trouble. Eventually, study-abroad programs could become a major feature of a potential multi-ethnic university in the Crimea.
2) Improving the local media. To entice Crimean authorities to cooperate with foreign advisors, donor governments and non-governmental organizations should offer aid in the form of new media production equipment for television, radio and newspapers. The United States Information Agency, among others, might then be in position to provide experts to work with local reporters and technicians to professionalize the way news is presented in the Crimea. In addition, journalistic exchanges would be organized to promote tolerance. Aid could also be made available to the mejlis to speed the establishment of a Tatar radio station, with the aim of making an alternative point of view widely accessible.
3) A project to examine the e-mail potential for the Crimea. The first part of an attempt to link the Crimea to the internet would be a thorough evaluation of the difficulties and possibilities. In cases where technological barriers are surmountable, computers and other equipment should be made available to various political, civic and community groups in the Crimea. The ability to rapidly communicate could be a crucial factor in avoiding conflict during times of high tension. For example, the mejlis in Simferopol should be linked via computer and e-mail to local Tatar leadership councils in cities across the Crimea and in Central Asia. Such a link up would make it much easier for the mejlis to coordinate its work. Similar links should be established for Russian, Ukrainian and other civic groups. Everyone should be able to communicate with appropriate government officials not only in Simferopol, but in Kiev as well.
4) A Crimean Cultural Center. Funding could be made available for the renovation of an existing building in Simferopol that would serve as a cultural center, giving the peninsula's various ethnic groups a place to come together to exchange ideas and information. The facility should have conference rooms, exhibition space and a large auditorium that could be used for lectures and performances. To generate interest in the cultural center, initial emphasis should be placed on entertainment. Thus, money should also be made available to establish permanent ensembles, such as dance troupes and various orchestras. These troupes could tour the Crimea, and other parts of Ukraine, presenting multi-ethnic programs aimed at both entertaining and strengthening understanding among different ethnic groups.
