Conclusion
Justifiably, Crimean Tatars want to rectify the injustice done to them by the 1944 deportation. With or without outside help, their resettlement of the Crimea will continue. But the returnees are stretching the Crimea's resource base to the limit. Poverty is widespread-affecting many Tatars, but also plenty of Russians, Ukrainians and others-and a mood of desperation threatens to proliferate. Amid such conditions, irrationality can overpower common sense, sparking a chain-reaction of violence. Even if the influx of Tatars is not a direct cause of conflict, repatriation could be used as a pretext to initiate trouble. Keeping this in mind, Tatars figure to play a central role in determining how developments will unfold in the Crimea. The international community should therefore implement extensive conflict-prevention measures in the Crimea.
As it stands now, the Crimea's problems are so extensive that they can not be completely alleviated by international aid. But additional foreign assistance, on top of what is currently being offered, might ease the prevailing frustrations, fears and feelings of hopelessness, and prevent an explosion of pent-up emotions. Beyond donor governments, projects sponsored by nongovernmental actors can perhaps make a useful contribution.
Conditions may now be more favorable for undertaking conflict-prevention initiatives. First of all, Russia's war in Chechnya helps to suppress radical tendencies in the Crimea, both among Tatars and Russians. It also distracts Moscow from agitating for the Crimea's return to Russian jurisdiction. The low-grade nature of the Crimean territorial dispute facilitates the opening of a constructive inter-ethnic dialogue. Meanwhile, constitutional arrangements defining the Crimea's status within Ukraine await finalization, meaning there remains some room for bargaining. Finally, the mejlis remained in the hands of moderates following the kurultai in June 1996, meaning Tatars will continue to show restraint for the foreseeable future. Changes in the existing set of circumstances might complicate the chances that conflict-prevention measures would have the desired effect.
Greater international attention, in the form of viable aid programs, would encourage moderates on all sides, thereby denying radicals the ability to attract followers and foment conflict. Although Tatars may be most deserving as aid recipients, care ought to be taken to make sure all ethnic groups benefit from international assistance. In addition, projects should be aimed at increasing information and contacts among the Crimea's ethnic groups with the aim of reducing the chances for misperceptions and miscommunication to cause trouble.
The window for effective action may not remain open very long. Feelings of frustration in the Crimea hover alarmingly near the boiling point. The behavior of Russia, as well as Crimean Russians, remains prone to sudden shifts. Relations between Ukraine and Russia remains tense because of squabbles involving possession of the Crimean peninsula itself and ownership of the Black Sea Fleet. And the continued moderation of the mejlis cannot be assured. A significant turnover in general mejlis membership may be an indication that the cohesiveness of the Tatar community is breaking down. The time is now for effective international action. Waiting heightens the risk of a conflict that could deal a mortal blow to the development of civil society not only in the Crimea, but across much of the former Soviet Union.
