Part I: Forced Migration in the North Caucasus
Review of the Developments in the Region
Exodus of the Russian-Speaking Population
Part II: Working in the Current Environment
Humanitarian Responses to a Deadly Emergency
Getting around and Getting Oriented
Avoiding Unnecessary Risks
Advancing to Postwar Rehabilitation
Making the First Contacts
Part III: NGOs and Activists in the Region
Chechnya
Ingushetia
Dagestan
The disintegration of the Soviet Union and the ensuing upheaval in the newly independent states have posed many new and unexpected challenges to the international community. While the threat of global destruction receded with the end of the nuclear arms race, new threats to world security arose in the deadly conflicts that broke out in the Caucasus and Central Asia.
An alarming consequence of this turmoil has been the tide of more than 9 million people who have been forced from their homes by interethnic intolerance, armed conflict, economic collapse, and environmental degradation. While 1997 has been a year of relative quietude in the causes of forced migration, the risk of renewed unrest remains high.
The international community, unprepared for the pace and diversity of crises during the post-Soviet breakup, has already missed crucial opportunities for preventive action. Recognizing this in May 1996, several international organizations, including the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the International Organization for Migration (IOM), and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) through its Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) organized the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) conference on migration-related issues in Geneva.
Unfortunately, the actual implementation of UNHCR/IOM projects designed for the conference’s four-year follow-up phase has lagged; only one-fourth of the $88.5 million international appeal for 1997 was pledged by the industrialized nations. Hearteningly, some local and international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have independently undertaken projects to further the implementation of conference recommendations.
This report focuses on such local NGOs in the war-stricken North Caucasus—and specifically the contiguous republics of Chechnya, Ingushetia and Dagestan. Its purpose is to encourage collaboration and support between international organizations, local groups, and individuals. Through such endeavors, civil society and the rule of law can be enhanced—perhaps the optimal preventive strategy with respect to the causes of forced migration.
Part I is a scholarly paper written by Dr. Emil Payin, a senior advisor for nationality issues to the Russian government, introducing the complicated ethnic and migration dynamics of the region. Part II presents a summary of the challenges facing those who wish to support the postwar reconstruction in the region and offers lists of experienced local NGOs struggling toward this goal.
Part II was researched and written by Andre Kamenshikov, a consultant to the Forced Migration Projects (FMP), in collaboration with Vladimir Sukhov and Mikhail Charaev. All three are members of the Moscow-based NGO Nonviolence International/NIS. Their work is the product of three lengthy missions in 1997 to Chechnya, Ingushetia, and Dagestan.
The report was edited by Kathleen Hunt, an author and FMP consultant, with assistance from FMP Editorial Manager Justin Burke. Editorial assistance was also provided by Jennifer Stuart, a student at the Columbia University School of International and Public Affairs.
The Forced Migration Projects apologize to any organization whose work with refugees, migration, or related issues escaped our notice. At the same time, we have not knowingly listed any organization which has abused the status of “NGO” for purposes of conducting activities unrelated to human rights, migration, refugee assistance, or advocacy. Inclusion in the lists, nevertheless, does not imply an endorsement in any respect by the Forced Migration Projects. We sincerely thank the many people in the field who helped in the research of this report, and dedicate it to all those who lost their lives in service to the innocent victims of Chechnya’s war.
Arthur C. Helton
Director, Forced Migration Projects
January 1998
Part I: Forced Migration in the North Caucasus
Millions of people have been on the move in the former Soviet Union, uprooted by unemployment, political instability, human rights abuses, and ethnic conflict. One region which has been severely affected is the North Caucasus, and several factors have made this strategic strip of land a leading destination for forced migrants.
First is its proximity to the war-torn states of Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia. Secondly, the hospitable climate makes it a magnet for people looking to leave other parts of Russia. This is especially applicable to those in Russia’s harsh northern and eastern regions, where the deteriorating economy has resulted in a sharp decline in living standards, forcing many jobless migrant workers to the Russian “heartland,” specifically to their homeland in the North Caucasus. In the early 1990s, some of Russia’s smaller northern cities lost as much as 22 percent of their population.
In addition to the economic collapse which drove many people home to the North Caucasus, armed conflicts in such places as Abkhazia (1992-93), Tajikistan (1992), and other regions of the former Soviet Union sent many more back to their ancestral land within the Russian Federation. Although experts have observed a recent shift in migration toward the Greater Volga, the Ural Mountains region, and Western Siberia, the North Caucasus has so far taken in the largest number of forced migrants.
The intensification of migration to, and within, the North Caucasus coincided with the bids for sovereignty in the early 1990s by the Russian Federation and several of its constituent regions. In the ensuing social and political instability of the North Caucasus itself, Russian-speaking people fled to Stavropol, Krasnodar, and Rostov—regions outside the North Caucasus—where Russians are in a majority, while members of the Caucasian nationalities began to return to their “titular” republics.
Most of the local authorities in the North Caucasus frowned on these migration trends, and in the early 1990s they began to adopt local legislation, regulations, and executive decrees to restrict the process. Although such regulations intended to prevent further ethnic conflicts, they violate the Russian Federation’s constitutional guarantees—notably citizens' freedom of movement and choice of residence. They also threaten to further destabilize the region and undermine the legal cohesion of Russia.
Within the regulations adopted by local authorities a sharp contrast has emerged between the autonomous republics of the North Caucasus and the neighboring Russian regions of Krasnodar, Stavropol and Rostov. The authorities in these latter regions, for example, have adopted tough legislation concerning all migrants, forced included. On the other hand, the leaders of republics where Caucasians are in the majority have chosen to improvise with a loose legal framework regulating migration issues, coupled with quotas.
While this stems in part from local traditions of “informal” leadership when interpreting the law, there are several pressing political factors that shape their decisions. First, as subjects of the Russian Federation, and thus anxious for federal subsidies, the local authorities make an effort to avoid irritating Moscow, which upholds the interests of Russian speakers on its territory. A second factor is the demand that Caucasian leaders face from nationals to return to their titular nations. Finally, local leaders must beware of the potential instability they could provoke if they take drastic action toward a given ethnic group.
Review of the Developments in the Region
Recent migration patterns differ dramatically from the decades preceding the Soviet breakup. Since the 1950s, residents of the North Caucasus were steadily moving, in part due to the high birth rate and shortage of agricultural land. Large numbers relocated from the mountains to the plains, and from rural areas to cities. Thousands also left the region entirely to seek employment in industrial centers half a continent away. The republic of Dagestan illustrates these striking population shifts: from 1979 to 1989 the inhabitants of the outlying districts of Agul and Kurakh declined by 24.5 and 26.2 percent, respectively.
By 1990, the pattern of migration began to reverse, a trend that was reinforced in 1991 when the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation passed the law On the Rehabilitation of the Repressed Peoples. This inspired the return of many Chechens, Ingush, Balkars, and Karachais who had been deported to Central Asia in 1944 by Stalin and chose not to go home when permitted, beginning in 1956.
Their return to the North Caucasus often prompted social and political instability. The mass return in the early 1990s of Ingush to North Ossetia, where they had lived before deportation, sparked the first armed conflict within the post-Soviet Russian Federation. The return of former deportees also seriously complicated ethnic and political relations in two other republics—Kabardino-Balkaria and Karachai-Cherkessia.
In Kabardino-Balkaria, some 15,000 deported Balkars were guaranteed legal and material assistance, land plots, and housing funds by order of a Russian presidential decree. These federal benefits drew the ire of the Kabards (and the neighboring Cherkess popular movements) who feared potential unrest, possibly leading to an open bid for an independent Balkar Republic.
The return of deportees to the region also stimulated heated discussions from 1991 to 1994 about the wrongs suffered by the Adygei people during the 19th-century war with Russia. Some of the debate centered around a report authored by a member of the Adygei Khasse leadership, Assistant Professor A.M. Elmesov.
Entitled On the Political and Legal Assessment of the Results of the Russo-Caucasian War and Measures to Rehabilitate the Repressed Adygei People, the report was criticized for taking out of context well-known facts and documents from the history of Russian-Adygei relations, in order to demonstrate that Adygeis had been subject to genocide in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Critics argued that genocide is the only element of Russia’s policy in the Caucasus, for such atrocities are found in many conflicts.
Nevertheless, years of downplaying the negative features of Russian-Caucasian relations have only heightened attention to these issues today. To prevent the growing resentment from fomenting a new tragedy, local authorities have adopted legislation allowing the repatriation of Adygei peoples, and indeed the Adygei Republic has become a leader in the field of migration legislation. Its constitution gives the “compatriots living outside the Russian Federation the right to return to their historical homeland: members of the Adygei community and their descendants irrespective of their nationality.”
To assist returnees, a number of public associations have been established. One of these is the Historical Motherland—Samgur, which provides practical and legal support for the return of Adygeis whose ancestors were deported to Turkey and the Middle East during the 19-century Caucasian War. In addition, the Repatriate Adaptation House (DAR) has been opened to facilitate homecomings.
At the same time, the Adygei Republic issued a decree on May 30, 1994, to limit the number of immigrants of non-Adygei nationality. With a preamble calling for “preventing mass migration from other regions, including the Krasnodar Territory,” the Adygei established a two-tiered migration policy which has evoked strong discontent among indigenous Cossacks.
This tendency to restrict entry by non-Caucasians is further demonstrated by the general policies in the region of granting automatic citizenship to returnees of the titular nationality. These migration policies meant to increase the indigenous population of the North Caucasus are beginning to pay off.
In Dagestan, for example, 86 percent of those who have arrived are from the titular community. In five years, almost 222,000 people have received residence permits, and most claim they have returned because of “administrative violence” against them in Azerbaijan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Chechnya, Ingushetia, and Georgia. They resettle in the very regions which saw a steady exodus for the last four decades.
Of all the North Caucasian republics, North Ossetia has developed the most efficient legislation regulating migration, due to the fact that it was one of the first to face a mass inflow of refugees and forced migrants from over the mountains in Georgia.
In 1991, the complex ethnic and political struggle in the Georgian district of South Ossetia exploded in war and sent tens of thousands of ethnic Ossetians fleeing northward to North Ossetia. Although the war in South Ossetia has ended and the peacekeeping troops of three CIS countries have been deployed there since July 1992, thousands of Ossetian refugees are in no hurry to return to Georgia. Since they are unlikely to do so in the near future, they are effectively potential citizens of North Ossetia. The same is true of Ossetian refugees from other regions of the former Soviet Union.
While war was raging in Georgia, ethnic tensions in Central Asia provoked the flight of many more Ossetians back to their country of origin. Then in 1992, North Ossetia itself experienced a bloody conflict between ethnic Ingush and Ossetian forces, which prompted a mass exodus of Ingush from North Ossetia across the border to Ingushetia.
When that war broke out, Ingush numbered 35,300 and constituted the largest ethnic minority (5.2 percent) in North Ossetia. Practically the entire Ingush population of the Prigorodny district and the capital Vladikavkaz (30,000) fled during the fighting, as did the Russian population living in Vladikavkaz. (These research findings slightly differ from the statistics provided by the Migration Service of Ingushetia which has registered 33,600 Ingush forced migrants from North Ossetia).
As of July 1, 1996, the Ingush population of North Ossetia was 13,700, approximately 9,000 of whom had returned to the republic after August 1994 when the campaign to return ethnic Ingush was launched.
Like its neighbors in the North Caucasus, North Ossetia has suffered a severe economic crisis along with the rise in ethnic and political tension since the early 1990s. These problems are aggravated by continuing population movements, and the spiraling crime rate in the republic. According to the North Ossetian government, refugees have committed 250 crimes in the republic over the last two and a half years, including 22 murders, 63 robberies, and 32 crimes involving severe bodily harm.
Faced with the danger of further deterioration of the economic, ethnic, political, and criminal situations in the republic, the North Ossetian parliament passed the law On Migration in 1996. The law lays out the basic principles for regulating migration processes in North Ossetia. These include: preventing ethnic or religious discrimination against migrants; taking into account historic, ethnic, and political realities of the life of the Ossetian people; and providing support for Ossetian compatriots living outside the republic.
North Ossetia also regulates migration in the republic through an agreement with the Russian authorities that sets out their respective powers pertaining to the return of refugees and forced migrants.
Exodus of the Russian-Speaking Population
Migration patterns in the North Caucasus republics differ from those in nearby Russian regions by the direction of migratory flows and their ethnic composition. While nearly a quarter of a million people entered Dagestan in the last few years, about 196,000 people have left. Ethnic Russians account for 95 percent of those leaving.
As in the case of indigenous repatriation, the pattern of Russian migration is a reversal of a trend started in the 1960s. Back then, ethnic Russians were encouraged to move to the North Caucasus to fill the need for skilled workers in the construction of large industrial enterprises, notably Chechnya’s oil refineries.
At that time Russians accounted for 20 percent of the population (1959), constituting the second largest group in Dagestan, Chechen- Ingushetia, and Ossetia. Since then their proportion has plummeted to 7.26 percent (1995). More than 450,000 people have left Chechnya and Ingushetia; the same is true of other republics of the North Caucasus, although on a smaller scale.
The main reason for the exodus of ethnic Russians from the region is the transformation of governments in the North Caucasus republics that placed new emphasis on their national identity. Laws that instituted proportional representation by nationality and that required the local language to be used in the media and government hierarchy restricted opportunities to those who spoke the national language. This created a serious social, cultural, and economic disadvantage for Russians.
Another important development that constrained Russians from full participation in the economy and politics was the revival of the local tradition of favoring paternal relations, which was contained under Soviet rule by administrative appointments from Moscow.
The Russians, faced with strong national movements among North Caucasians seeking to protect their political and economic interests, have failed to form similar movements to defend themselves. The only exception is the Cossacks, who have stepped up their political organizing, thereby exacerbating the ethnic tensions in Dagestan, Adygei, and the Karachai-Cherkessia republic.
It is the lack of political organization within the Slavic population which is partly responsible for their emigration from the North Caucasus, as well as for the Cossacks’ ethnic mobilization and use of force to settle disputes.
Part II: Working in the Current Environment
The North Caucasus, spanning the northern face of the Caucasus mountains from the Black Sea to the Caspian, is arguably the most politically complex region in the former Soviet Union. Home to a dazzling array of ethnic and linguistic groups, it is a narrow territory of shark-toothed peaks and limited arable land, stained by a bloody history of resistance to Tsarist and Soviet rule. With certain minorities seeking redress for their forced deportation by Stalin in 1944, it took less than a year after the dissolution of Soviet power for conflict to break out over territory claimed by the Ingush people and their Ossetian neighbors.
The brief war in October-November 1992 that launched the expulsion of Ingush from North Ossetia traces its roots to the mass deportation nearly half a century earlier. In the depth of winter 1944 the Ingush, Chechens, and other minorities were rounded up and loaded onto cattle cars to Siberia and Central Asia on the pretext of collaborating with the Nazis. When they were officially released from exile beginning in 1956, the Ingush discovered that their native Prigorodny district was now within the enlarged border of North Ossetia. The dispute over that land finally erupted in local skirmishes between armed gangs and escalated when Russian troops intervened on the Ossetian side. Hundreds were killed, and up to 70,000 Ingush people were forced to flee Prigorodny district and seek refuge next door in Ingushetia. According to a report by Human Rights Watch/Helsinki, estimates of the number of displaced Ingush range from 34,500 to 64,000, depending upon the source of statistics. For a detailed analysis of that conflict and its aftermath, see The Ingush-Ossetian Conflict in the Prigorodny Region (New York: Human Rights Watch, May 1996).
Shocking as it was, the conflict in North Ossetia was soon to pale in comparison with the Russian assault on Chechnya at the close of 1994. Chechnya’s collision with Moscow had begun in the twilight of the USSR, when General Djokar Dudayev, a former Soviet strategic bomber pilot, unseated Chechnya’s Communist leaders and declared his republic independent.
For the next three years, although Russia intermittently imposed “blockades” on Chechnya, business went on as usual. Finally, Moscow launched a full-scale assault on the Chechen capital, Grozny, expecting to depose Dudayev swiftly. Instead, it found itself mired in two full years of combat.
The war formally ended in the fall of 1996 when an agreement was signed between Russian Federation authorities and the Chechen resistance leaders. The accord provided for the withdrawal of all federal troops from Chechnya, elections, and a five-year postponement on resolving the republic’s claim for sovereignty. In all, some 50,000 people died, hundreds of thousands were uprooted and left homeless, and much of Chechnya was reduced to rubble.
Humanitarian Responses to a Deadly Emergency
The stunning conflicts in the North Caucasus brought a rush of experienced international humanitarian relief organizations who were unfamiliar with the region and the Soviet legacy. Soon southern Russia became a quagmire of competing military and security forces, with layers of Soviet-legacy bureaucracy, and an endless array of clan-based militias and gangs.
The influx of highly financed, high-profile international relief organizations—unheard of in the USSR—almost destined them to become targets, and the expectation of any protection from local authorities was repeatedly dashed. Robbery, kidnapping for ransom, and the murder of humanitarian aid workers have distinguished Chechnya as the world’s deadliest emergency zone, and created distressing obstacles to working there today.
No place in Chechnya is really safe, but the security situation varies greatly from place to place. It is generally worse in Grozny and other cities, and differs in the rural areas; as of mid-1997, it was also extremely dangerous in southeastern Chechnya. The elected leadership has yet to establish a strong civil authority over the armed political factions. Some of these gangs are an offshoot of the Chechen resistance, whose field commanders were known for their independence and whose numerous armed groups operated at whim.
The most spectacular and appalling attack on humanitarian workers in Chechnya was the point-blank murder of six volunteers of the International Committee of the Red Cross in December 1996. Hor-rified by the wanton crime, the last in a litany of unprecedented violence against humanitarian workers, most of the international community pulled out its staff.
Suspicion of anyone from the outside is heightened in any conflict zone, and in Chechnya it reached the point where some locals have tried to justify violence against journalists and humanitarian workers by accusing them of espionage. Even the act of setting up an office in a given capital could spark suspicions of “collaborating” with the officials there, and provoke hostility from opposition or resistance groups in the same region.
A detailed analysis of mistrust in the North Caucasus is beyond the scope of this guide, but at least two crucial factors seem to be at work. One is the Soviet background of many contemporary officials who enjoyed the controlling power that the Communist Party exerted over everything. Another is the aggressive resurgence of internal security forces in the environs of the war. Whatever the explanation, many relief workers have found that it takes only one negative experience with an international aid organization to aggravate this tendency to mistrust.
Getting Around and Getting Oriented
It is extremely important to develop contacts with NGOs operating on different levels, particularly local groups and individual activists who have worked in the thick of conflict. But this, too, can be challenging. Many local groups are still highly informal, a product of ad hoc volunteer efforts to cope with the massive suffering caused by the war. Rarely have they had the resources to plan beyond urgent needs, and the difficulty of long-term planning is compounded by their deepening economic hardship.
A second, but no less crucial, challenge is the lack of reliable communications to the region. Within the region, telephones lines are limited and often out of order, and postal service is equally unreliable. Many groups are aching for an e-mail hookup, but computers are scarce, and the spotty telephone lines compound the problems. Satellite phones are far too expensive, and more significant, to be seen carrying a satellite phone or even a regular cellular phone, puts a team at risk of robbery or worse.
Transportation is another daunting logistical challenge in view of the poor roads, limited number of vehicles, and extreme danger of attack by armed gangs. In addition, many layers of civilian and military officialdom demand a variety of visas and travel permits which can be more time-consuming and costly for international workers to obtain than for locals.
Some international NGOs have avoided certain risks by setting up operations in neighboring republics to help Chechens still displaced by the war. But a drawback to this approach is the incentive it creates for displaced persons to travel back and forth to collect assistance, or simply not to go home. Perhaps more important, it creates friction among the local population in, for example, Ingushetia and Dagestan, both of which have immense problems which will be outlined briefly below.
Travelling in the North Caucasus is a very risky activity, and it is not advised to get into a car and drive into Chechnya looking for the addresses of local NGOs. Establish a relationship with a Chechen family with whom you can travel and stay overnight. Avoid travelling after dark, or being alone for too long. If you have no choice but to travel alone, you might be safer taking a bus than hiring a car.
Before undertaking any relief or development program it is essential to obtain the approval of both the central authorities in Grozny, the local administration and field commanders. Again, it is advised to find reliable local Chechens to help with the negotiations. They will know how to generate interest in your proposed work and how to explain its benefits for Chechnya without exposing too many details about your resources. Small projects are much safer than large ones, because the latter are likely to attract a lot of unhealthy interest among officials (and non-officials) who might want to control or exploit the projects.
Certain compromises in setting up a project are often inevitable, and local NGO contacts sadly state that groups known to be well-funded require “protection.” According to a knowledgeable local person, “one armed guard is not likely to be enough.” Understandably, such negotiations require the perspective of a local NGO contact who is versed in the ongoing power struggles between government, opposition and freelance armed factions. A local person can help identify the best group to approach for this service.
Once the protection question is settled, local NGOs advise that donors may sidestep some risks of exposure if, before submitting a formal proposal to the authorities, they informally “float” their project idea around the community under consideration. If the local people respond favorably, then the proposal would likely have a better chance of gaining support higher up. None of these techniques, however, is a guarantee for success, and what works for a given project and location may be counterproductive for another.
On the matter of local suspicion, it is not uncommon to hear jokes and remarks about foreigners working for clandestine services. To avoid giving people any reason to doubt your humanitarian objectives, there are several obvious points which are worth keeping in mind.
Avoid asking questions that are not directly related to the work you wish to do. When talking with people who are engaged in delicate work such as prisoner exchanges and missing-person searches, take care to avoid pointed questions about locations, contacts and suspects behind a person’s capture. It is especially important to avoid questions about how people gathered their information.
At the same time, if you are considering potential partners, you must ask questions that focus on their specific activities. It is advised to listen with a critical ear, and check with some of the contacts listed below for possible references.
Advancing to Postwar Rehabilitation
With the pullout of most international agencies after the ICRC murders, humanitarian organizations seeking to help postwar Chechnya face a terrible dilemma. To stay and work in the current circumstances could be mortally dangerous. Yet, local humanitarian workers argue that the need for economic rehabilitation and development is more desperate than ever. In a setting of extreme poverty and plentiful weapons, they argue, the Chechen leadership will hardly succeed in quelling crime.
Today, the chances for a durable peace settlement of the Chechen crisis remain uncertain, and immediate humanitarian needs in Chechnya remain immense. In the past, some of the large international organizations have been reluctant to work closely with lesser-known local groups from the troubled areas, choosing to run their operations alone. Beyond the expense of setting up a large operation staffed with expatriates, the growing danger faced by foreigners and high-profile projects has made it necessary to craft creative approaches to working through knowledgeable local people. These efforts should concentrate on the shift from emergency response to rebuilding the economy and social organizations through small-scale, sustainable projects.
This objective is more likely to be achieved if donors initially pool some resources to develop a basic communications infrastructure for local organizations. As long as it is so perilous for expatriate staff to be based in the region for programmatic work and monitoring, international organizations and NGOs need a means of rapid and reliable contact with local counterparts.
In the same vein, some of the international delegations to the region could be substituted by experienced local NGO workers and human rights monitors who could then report back quickly and inexpensively with improved telecommunications.
In the event that the lawlessness in Chechnya is brought under control, one of the first projects sought by local NGOs will likely be the establishment of several e-mail communications points in Chechnya. Given that most people in the North Caucasus have no cultural tradition of business correspondence—much less proposal writing!—international groups should plan to provide technical assistance to enable nascent NGOs to express their plans and ideas in a form that will be useful for outside donors. (For technical details on setting up communications points in the North Caucasus, contact Nonviolence International/NIS in Moscow.)
In the meantime, one immediate project worth considering is the support of a local NGO which could provide essential support services to other NGOs and outside visitors. These would include communications/messenger services, reliable information updates on the region, and logistical arrangements and translating.
It is common wisdom that postwar populations need sources of income-generation, and Chechnya, too, cries out for small enterprises that would produce immediate benefits to the population. In the social and health sector, several local NGOs are struggling to deal with the legacy of the war, including the large number of children without parents, and people needing psychological support.
Beyond the social sector, food production in Chechnya, never its flagship enterprise, languishes with processing plants in ruins and fields littered with landmines. Grain, however, is still grown in some areas, and local NGOs are anxious to set up small mills to produce flour.
In addition to flour mills as small enterprises, bakeries and bottling plants have been proposed by local activists. Chechnya has an abundance of natural mineral waters which could be an important source of income if sold for medicinal purposes.
All these enterprises still leave unsolved the huge problem of housing repair and reconstruction that is required for the thousands of homes that were razed or damaged during the war. A small-scale brick-making factory could begin to meet some of the needs, but once again, the larger the project, the greater the risk of robbery or corruption.
Since it is not advised to go wandering into Chechnya, it is crucial to first make contact with groups and individuals in Moscow who know the landscape. It is also wise to contact the local offices of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and request a meeting at the border or in the Ingush capital of Nazran.
The following is a brief list of organizations and journalists who have worked extensively in the Caucasus and could serve as advisors to organizations seeking to work there.
Organizations (in Moscow, if not otherwise indicated; area code from outside Russia is 7095)
1. Nonviolence International–Newly Independent States (NI–NIS), Louchnikov Lane #4, entrance 3, room 2, 103982 Moscow, tel. 351-4855, 206-8618, tel./fax 206-8853, e-mail: ninis@glas. apc.org; Andre Kamenshikov.
2. Human Rights Center Memorial, tel. 200-6506, e-mail: memhrcenter@glas.apc.org; Oleg Orlov, Tatyana Kasatkina.
3. Karta: Human Rights Society of Ryazan, P.O. Box 20, 390000 Ryazan-central, tel. (0912)-77-51-17, e-mail: karta@glasnet.ru, http://www.openweb.ru/ryazan; Andrei Blinushov.
4. Committee of Soldiers’ Mothers of Russia, Louchnikov Lane #4, apt. 32, 13982 Moscow, tel. 928-2506; Valentina Melnikova.
5. Order of Mercy and Social Protection, Pestelya St. #6B, 127490 Moscow, tel. 903-7993, tel./fax 903-7995; Evgeniya Poplavskaya.
6. The Right to Life and Human Dignity Society, Louchnikov Lane #4, entrance 3, apt. 19, 103982 Moscow, tel. 206-8589, tel./fax 963-9929; Victor Kogan-Yasny.
7. Center for Peacemaking and Community Development, tel. 241-3487, 240-0862, tel./fax 241-3487, e-mail: peacecenter@glas. apc.org; Chris Hunter. Founded by British Quakers, acts as a support office for affiliated centers in the North Caucasus listed below.
8. The Organizing Committee of the Agreement for Peace and Freedom Against the Bloodshed in Chechnya, tel. 299-1180, fax 973-2094; Ludmila Vahmina.
Journalists (all have years of experience in the North Caucasus)
1. Alexander Mnatsakanyan, Obshaya Gazeta, tel. 915-7078.
2. Yulia Kalinina, Moskovskiy Komsomolets, tel. 946-6293.
3. Alexander Yevtushenko, Komsomolskaya Pravda in Pyatigorsk, Russia, tel. (87900) 59-504.
4. Andrei Mironov, independent journalist and human rights advocate, tel. 251-8348.
5. Correspondents for NTV news (Boris Koltsov, Elena Masyuk, Alexander Habarov, Vladimir Luskanov), tel. 217-5277, 217-5431, 217-5436.
6. Ilyas Bogatyrev, correspondent for Russian Public Television ORT, tel. 426-5402. Released from kidnapping in summer 1997.
7. Another important information resource is the Network of Ethnological Monitoring and Early Warning of Conflicts, created by the Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology of the Russian Academy of Science. It has established an e-mail network among 30 experts from different regions of the NIS including the North Caucasus. Address: 11734 Moscow, Leninsky Prospect #32-a, tel. 938-0043, e-mail: umara@eawarn1.msk.su.
Part III: NGOs and Activists in the Region
One of the many logistical difficulties faced by local NGOs in the North Caucasus is communications. Where possible, telephone number are provided for the local organizations listed in this section; alternatively, the Moscow-based NGO Nonviolence International/NIS (tel.: (7-095) 206-86-18) has agreed to serve as a point of contact.
The emergence of committed, indeed courageous local NGOs working under Russian bombardment and artillery barrage is encouraging, but it also illustrates Chechnya’s standing as one of the most forbidding places for standard international humanitarian relief efforts. The following NGOs are among the few who remain working in Chechnya.
Center for Peacemaking and Community Development—Chechen Branch
Address: Orgtechnika Club, Staropromyshlovskoye Shossye,
Butenko district, Grozny
Tel.: (7-095) 241-3487 (Chris Hunter), (7-095) 241-3487,
(7-095) 240-0862 (Moscow Center for Peacemaking and Community Development),
(7-096) 9018342 (Adlan Adaev)
E-mail: peacecenter@glas.apc.org
Contact: Adlan Adaev, Chris Hunter
Activities: The Center for Peacemaking and Community Development (CPCD) has been working in Chechnya since 1994 in the fields of human rights, nonviolent conflict resolution, and humanitarian assistance. Several international organizations have channeled their humanitarian donations for war victims through CPCD.
In December 1996, the Chechen branch of CPCD was registered locally, with a diverse membership of Chechen, Ingush, Russian, and British volunteers who mainly live and work in Chechnya. Since the evacuation of most foreigners from the region, it is one of the very few groups that can function with some flexibility thanks to its roots in the local community.
One of CPCD’s major activities is a psychological rehabilitation center for children that opened in May 1997 with support from Unicef and several European NGOs. Housed in a former children’s sanatorium building at the edge of Grozny, the center has psychologists who evaluate children in schools in the heaviest combat zones and select those who exhibit symptoms of war trauma. These children build trust with the psychological staff in the course of many sessions and receive treatment through play, art, and drama therapy.
Other activities have included a conference entitled Peace in Chechnya, Peace in the Caucasus, World Peace in January 1997, attended by young people from the Caucasus, Russia and Western Europe. Their goal was to develop a joint program to promote peace and human rights in the region, and they designed an e-mail project to keep in touch and to coordinate future activity. Following the conference, a Chechen youth group called Laman Az was created, which works closely with CPCD in areas of demining and psychosocial rehabilitation.
CPCD plans to open a community center in Grozny at the Orgtechnika Club in the Butenko district, which will serve as its headquarters and offer a variety of classes in human rights, nonviolent conflict resolution, and computer and language skills.
Working in partnership with local NGOs, the Society for Peace and Human Rights and Nonviolence International/NIS, the CPCD plans to establish a grain mill in Sernovodsk with financial help from the International Organization for Migration (IOM), the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and several European NGOs. The mill will process grain free of charge for internally displaced persons (IDPs) and other local people in need.
Potential obstacles: Although CPCD has taken pains to build strong ties with local individuals and obtain proper authorization from the Chechen government, there is always a risk that its projects could attract the attention of bandits if its resources appear too abundant.
Center for the Protection of Rights and Culture
Address: 105 Michurina Street, Grozny
Contact: Elhanov Islamjan Israilovich, Head; Said-Magomed Hasiev,
Bisultanov Apti, Co-Founders
Activities: Founded in 1995, the Center for the Protection of Rights and Culture (CPRC) has concentrated on helping victims of war, and restoring key cultural centers destroyed by the fighting. During the conflict, national archives were burned and libraries and monuments were destroyed. The restoration of a library is one of CPRC’s highest priorities, and it has been actively soliciting assistance to procure books for it.
Potential obstacles: As with many local NGOs, CPRC is adjusting from wartime emergency response to longer-term projects for peacetime. It is likely to need technical assistance as well as support for its main activities to rebuild cultural resources and monuments.
Chechen Mothers
Address: 187 Zavety Ilyicha Street, apt. 36, Grozny
Contact: Madina Magomadova, Head
Activities: Since January 18, 1995, when Madina Magomadova’s brother disappeared during the war, she has been one of the forces behind a network of activist women from Chechnya and Russia searching for missing relatives. Their NGO colleagues include the Soldiers Mothers of Russia and an international group called Lawyers Without Borders.
Magomadova has lobbied the Russian Federation and served on the OSCE’s Commission on Missing People. She has located nearly 50 Russian POWs and negotiated the release of many of them. Although she has only recently registered her group officially, Magomadova provides an outstanding example of what grassroots individuals can accomplish on one of the world’s most treacherous political terrains.
While other NGOs are concerned about adjusting to new postwar needs, the demand for investigations into missing persons continues unabated. Despite the official cessation of hostilities, many hundreds of captured Russian and Chechen troops are still held by their opponents in violation of the agreement signed by both sides. Thus the Chechen Mothers need financial and technical assistance—for local travel, secretarial staff, and eventually a computer for managing their caseload.
Potential obstacles: To date, most of the work has been carried out by Magomadova herself, so her group will likely face some growing pains if their work expands.
Council for Religious and Confessional Affairs of the Chechen Republic
Address: 86A Mayakovskogo Street, apt. 44, Grozny
Contact: Sumbulatov Aguzar Alievich, Head
Activities: Created after Chechnya declared independence from Russia in 1991, the Council for Religious and Confessional Affairs (CRCA) is a multidenominational organization, with a department each for Christians and Muslims. During the war, it helped to distribute vast amounts of humanitarian aid, mostly donated by churches and religious NGOs, such as Caritas. It has also assisted the Orthodox leadership in Grozny, which created a shelter for people left homeless by the war.
During the first half of 1995, Chechnya’s provisional government supported CRCA with about $1.2 million, mainly for the reconstruction of churches, mosques, and other religious facilities. Having ex-hausted those funds, CRCA seeks support to resume the renovations, as well as to offer salaries to two or three volunteers who will soon have to leave in search of paid work. Since the close of the war, CRCA has concentrated some of its efforts on social and educational projects to promote tolerance and interethnic understanding within Chechnya. A high funding priority is its media program: to produce a local educational television series to inform the population about various religions, stressing their common roots and principles.
Potential obstacles: The Council for Religious and Confessional Affairs may need to develop its organizational structure, particularly if it is to manage and monitor a variety of projects. It has nevertheless shown considerable potential and needs support particularly in its educational and media work.
Republican Children’s Creativity Center
Address: 10 Krasnoznamennaya Street, Grozny
Contact: A woman known as “Janna”
Activities: The Republican Children’s Creativity Center (RCCC) in Grozny is the largest local NGO working to stimulate the minds and spirit of Chechen children who survived the war. Unlike many local NGOs, the staff dates back to the Soviet-era “Pioneer Palace,” which was the center for children’s extra-curricular activities and recreation. Remarkably, RCCC operated throughout the war, interrupting its work only twice during fighting in Grozny itself. When their old building was damaged beyond use, RCCC relocated to a few rooms in a primary school and a nursery school.
About 400 children take part in some 20 different activities, down from almost 3,000 children who participated before the war. To reach out beyond Grozny, RCCC is producing materials for distribution in schools and child centers on how to organize similar activities.
RCCC has proven its potential not only to survive under dire circumstances, but to tackle the critical task of restoring some normalcy to children’s lives. It needs support to repair a performance hall for the children and rooms for their clubs, as well as to organize summer field trips.
RCCC also seeks donors for a photocopier, which is sorely needed for the distribution of its educational materials, and it hopes to develop international fundraising strategies such as printing postcards of children’s drawings, or coordinating performance tours by a children’s ensemble.
Potential obstacles: Banking in Chechnya is not reliably developed yet, and therefore RCCC does not yet have a bank account. Alternative systems would be required to furnish financial support for them, which is generally the case for all local NGOs.
Revival Fund of the Chechen Republic
Address: 78 Hankalskaya Street, Grozny
Tel.: 903-3077 (cellular line: area code from Moscow is 8-2; from other
regions of the CIS dial 8096)
Fax: (7-095)928-4873 (in Moscow)
Contact: Shamil Beno, Head (former Chechen Foreign Minister)
Activities: The Revival Fund was created in May 1995 by nine individuals ranging from businessmen to scholars who had provided humanitarian assistance during the war and who had participated in various peacemaking efforts.
Unlike many NGOs, the Revival Fund prefers to assist a small number of families comprehensively, rather than provide a small amount of aid to many. For example, it will identify an uprooted family and help them get resettled by providing a new apartment and purchasing a small kiosk to provide a living.
One of the strongest features of the Revival Fund is its clear organizational structure, which consists of a managing council, a higher body known as the “conference” of Fund members, and an annual reporting system. It has contact with donor governments outside the former Soviet Union as well as with the Islamic World Council on Disability and Rehabilitation. Among the programs the Revival Fund is planning are a home for some 250 children who were orphaned during the war, a registry for people who were injured; humanitarian assistance for the coming winter, and a new ophthalmology office in Grozny. Given the exorbitant cost of sending people abroad for medical treatment, the Revival Fund also seeks to develop new medical centers in Chechnya.
Potential obstacles: The main problem facing the Revival Fund is shared by other NGOs in Chechnya, namely the risk of spreading itself too thin. However, its strong organization and practical experience could help minimize the risk of major mistakes.
Society for Peace and Human Rights
Address: 51 Sovetskaya Street, Sernovodsk
Tel.: (7-096) 901-8342
Contact: Shaman Adaev, Leila Tsoroeva, and Andre Kamenshikov
Activities: The Society for Peace and Human Rights (SPHR) is the creation of Shaman Adaev, a young Chechen man who responded to the outbreak of war in his homeland by volunteering as a driver/ guide for human rights monitors and correspondents covering the conflict. Adaev himself gathered extensive information on human rights abuses and helped distribute international humanitarian aid.
Given its extensive work during the past three years, SPHR is in a unique position to eventually become a local NGO communications center. But more immediately, it is seeking support from UN agencies, several European NGOs, and others to establish a much-needed grain mill as a small enterprise. All mills were destroyed in the southwestern region of Chechnya and yet large quantities of grain are being harvested. SPHR has worked out many of the details, and plans to collaborate with another local NGO, the Center for Peacemaking and Community Development.
Potential obstacles: The most serious risk is a common one—the aspiration to take on too many tasks at once. SPHR is at a critical point in its evolution, as it must shift from being fuelled by volunteers’ enthusiasm, to managing larger-scale projects which require detailed work plans, routine activities, and a paid staff.
Union of North Caucasian Women—Chechen branch
Address: 129 Staropromyslovskoe Shosse (Zavety Ilicha Street),
apt. 43, Gorodok Mayakovskogo, Grozny
Contact: Svetlana Umarovna Alieva, Zainap Gashaeva
Activities: The Chechen chapter of the Union of North Caucasian Women was founded in early 1995 by the writer Svetlana Umarovna Alieva, with the aim of documenting and exposing the mass human rights violations committed by Russian troops during their armed offensive. With support from the Moscow-based Center for Peacemaking and Community Development, the courageous Chechen women traveled widely through the war zones to take photographs and record more than 100 video cassettes of the ravaged population and landscape.
Members of the group took part in international advocacy campaigns to put pressure on Russia to end the war. They also participated in the antiwar movement in Russia and distributed small quantities of humanitarian aid donated by Oxfam and Saudi Arabia.
Today the Chechen Women’s group, like other local NGOs born out of the war, is adapting its work to the long-term needs of postwar Chechnya. They seek to continue providing humanitarian assistance and psychosocial help for families who suffer the severest hardships from the war. For this they require a source of income for salaries and public transportation around Chechnya, as well as technical training in preparing budgets and accounting.
Potential obstacles: Adjusting to the new demands of the postwar environment puts strains on all local NGOs as they search for the proper structure and role for their organizations. It is crucial that they avoid undertaking activities for which the group is not well suited, and that they strive to maintain cooperative relations among group members as they expand the scope of their operations.
Unlike Chechnya, the small Ingush Republic offers an example of relatively significant progress achieved against daunting odds. In 1992, the Ingush broke away from what was then the republic of Chechen-Ingushetia and formed their own republic within the Rus-sian Federation, with its capital in Nazran. By the end of that year, many Ingush living in the neighboring republic of North Ossetia to the west were forced to abandon their homes and seek refuge in Nazran. The brief but bloody armed conflict in North Ossetia was sparked by the Ingush claim to an area of ancestral land they had lost in 1944, when they were deported by Stalin to Central Asia.
Despite resistance from the Ossetian leadership, many Ingush returning from exile resettled in their native district, and the tension between them and the Ossetians finally exploded in October 1992. Over 700 people were killed and over 60,000 Ingush were forced to flee Ossetia. Most of them sought refuge with relatives or in public shelters in Nazran, and more than half of them are still displaced, unable to get permits and security guarantees to return to their former homes.
If the influx in 1992 placed a burden on Ingushetia, by early 1995 the flood of more than 160,000 refugees from the war in Chechnya swamped the tiny republic. Yet despite these hardships, the Ingush Republic has made notable progress under the leadership of President Ruslan Aushev, a former general in the Soviet army. Aushev negotiated an economic agreement with Moscow which gave Ingushetia favorable tax status, allowing exemptions for Ingush businesses and attracting many Russian companies to register there.
In addition, Ingushetia’s economy benefitted from the infusion of capital brought by the hundreds of humanitarian relief operations forced by the insecurity in Chechnya to base their supplies and staff in Nazran. All these advantages, nevertheless, should not obscure the fact that Ingushetia is a small republic squeezed between two conflicts, with a poor communications infrastructure, a generally weak economy and a large refugee population.
Faced with its humanitarian crises, Ingushetia experienced an encouraging display of civic initiatives, and an impressive number of local NGOs were born out of the disasters. The following are among the leading local organizations doing humanitarian work in Ingushetia.
Association for the Protection of Deported Peoples
Address: 39 Gilyarovskogo St., office 800, Moscow, 129110
Tel./fax: (7-095)971-2827
E-mail: isp@jnvluk.msk.ru
Contact: Muharbek Aushev, Chair (and director of a major Russian oil company)
Activities: The Association for the Protection of Deported Peoples is located in Moscow and according to its literature has plans to become an all-Russian organization, but most of its activities thus far have pertained to Ingushetia. Its stated goals include networking, resolving the problems caused by interethnic conflicts, and developing new jobs in the Ingush Republic. The researchers for this guide have not yet had any working experience with this association.
Council of Social Organizations of the Ingush Republic
Address: 5 Chechen St., Nazran
Fax: 923-4066 (cellular line: dialed like a local Moscow number)
Contacts: R. Buzurtanov, Chair; L.Tsoroeva, Coordinator
Activities: The Council of Social Organizations (CSO) of the Ingush Republic was set up in February 1995 to improve communication and coordination efforts among 12 Ingush NGOs. Most of CSO’s work has concentrated on the upheaval in the neighboring republics of Chechnya and North Ossetia. In addition to campaigning against the war in Chechnya, CSO has participated in negotiations to bring about a peaceful solution to the dispute between North Ossetia and Ingushetia and lobbied for the safe repatriation of displaced persons.
CSO is also concerned with strengthening the rule of law in the North Caucasus and has drafted a project to develop legal education in Ingushetia, to monitor human rights conditions for those displaced, and to publish a newsletter.
The effort to unify the disparate NGOs in the region is very important and worth encouraging. One role such a coordinating council could play is to provide updated information and logistical services to international donors seeking local partners. In this capacity, CSO could be a good starting point for a much needed telecommunications/e-mail network for NGOs in the region.
Potential obstacles: Through mid-1997 much of CSO’s work had been carried out by one very active member organization, “Almos,” which is run by Leila Tsoroeva. The degree to which other members of the Ingush CSO are willing or able to take the initiative for such activities needs to be explored.
NGO members of the Council of Social Organizations of the Ingush Republic:
1. Almos: Women’s Committee of Ingushetia
2. Union of Veterans of World War II
3. Union of Veterans of Afghanistan of the Ingush Republic
4. Chernobyl Union of the Ingush Republic
5. Union of Cossack Formations of the Ingush Republic
6. Union of the Deported from North Ossetia
7. Charitable Fund for Social Protection of Motherhood and Childhood
8. Committee for the Search for Hostages and Missing Persons
9. Actors Union of the Ingush Republic
10. Artists Union of the Ingush Republic
11. Federation of Child and Teenager Organizations of the Ingush Republic
12. ECOS: Youth ecological organization
Almos: Women’s Committee of Ingushetia
Address: 1 Tsoroeva St., Altievo, Nazran
Tel: 25-405, 24-202 (via Moscow operator, 8-13 or 8-15)
Fax: (7-095) 923-4066
Contact: Leila Muratovna Tsoroeva, Head
Activities: Almos was registered in March 1993, soon after the first presidential elections in the newly created Ingush Republic. The main objective of the organization is the protection of human rights, and a core of five volunteers works closely with local Ingush lawyers, as well as with the vast network of the Soldiers’ Mothers Committee in Russia.
Among Almos’ leading projects is the maintenance of a photo and information archive on people missing or killed during the 1992 ethnic conflict in North Ossetia. The group was in the forefront of antiwar activities during the conflict in Chechnya, meeting with Russian and Chechen delegations and helping Russian mothers free their young soldier sons from Chechen detention.
Almos also provides legal aid to widows, single mothers, and the elderly who are seeking services from the government, and it monitors trials of Ingush people brought to court in regions outside Ingushetia.
Having proven its commitment and effectiveness in several areas of human rights protection, Almos is in urgent need of financial backing in order to continue and expand its work. It is hampered by its lack of permanent office space, reliable communications, and transportation. And as with most other local NGOs, some of the active members can no longer afford to volunteer and require modest compensation.
Beyond these basic needs, Almos would benefit greatly from technical assistance and training in budgeting, planning, proposal-writing, and computer skills. It has accomplished an impressive amount in a few years, and seems an excellent candidate for small grants to Ingush NGOs. Its head, Leila Tsoroeva, is also one of the most active members of the Ingush NGO council.
Potential obstacles: As an organization, Almos is still in its formative stage, relying on sporadic support from various individuals or organizations. On one hand, its programs stand in jeopardy if its volunteers run out of enthusiasm. But at the other extreme, experience in the former Soviet Union has painfully shown that the sudden award of major funding (even $10,000 is a large sum) could cause disruption in an organization without adequate structure, accounting procedures, and technical training to absorb it.
Red Crescent Society of Ingushetia
Address: 35 Moskovskaya St., Nazran
Tel: 23063 (via Moscow operator, 8-13 or 8-15);
the Nazran office can also be reached through the ICRC in Moscow,
tel.: (7-095) 926-5426; fax: 564-8431;
e-mail: icrcmosru@glas.apc.org.
Contact: Liza Amarhadjieva, Director
Activities: The Red Crescent Society (RCS) of Ingushetia stands apart from other NGOs by virtue of the scale of its operations and the number of people it has assisted. It is arguably the most competent organization to channel humanitarian aid, for it has vast experience working with international relief agencies such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, Oxfam, World Vision, and others.
Founded in 1992 to cope with the victims of the Ossetian-Ingush conflict, RCS has since provided regular food and assistance to several hundred thousand people—mainly displaced persons from North Ossetia and Chechnya. It has nine permanent and 35 part-time employees, the latter collecting up-to-date information and distributing aid to families in remote areas of the republic. The organization keeps a computerized database of its beneficiaries.
In keeping with the work of Red Cross/Crescent societies throughout the world, RCS of Ingushetia helped organize medical centers at locations along the Chechen border when the fighting intensified. Recently RCS began to implement a program of aid for homebound elderly people. The society is also prepared to mobilize an urgent response to new crises, such as the sudden renewal of fighting in Grozny in August 1996.
What RCS needs for its further development is the infrastructure and skills to communicate directly with various potential donors. Again this echoes the general need for an NGO e-mail hookup in a region isolated by a poor telephone system. RCS also seeks funds to expand its storage facilities and to increase the salaries for part-time staff in the field.
Potential obstacles: As the Ingush Red Crescent Society is a well-experienced, organized and reliable organization, there are no immediate reasons to expect serious problems in its future work.
The republic of Dagestan is a sprawling mountainous republic of the Russian Federation, bordered by the Caspian Sea to the east, Azerbaijan and Georgia to the south, and Chechnya to the west. Its capital is Mahachkala, with a population of 2,066,657, up from the 1989 Soviet census figure of 1,802,188.
Dagestan’s ethnic mosaic comprises over 100 nationalities, the major groups being Avars, Azerbaijanis, Armenians, Chechens, Dargins, Dagestanis, Kumyks, Laks, Lezgins, Russians, Tatars, and Ukrainians. The languages spoken are equally numerous and belong to three linguistic groups: Turkish, Indo-European and Ibero-Caucasian.
The rugged Dagestani mountain people take pride in their legendary history of resistance to outside domination, culminating with the 19th-century Caucasian war against incorporation into the Russian Empire, and the resistance to Bolshevik rule following the 1917 revolution.
As glasnost loosened the Soviet state’s control over its national minorities during the 1980s, multiethnic Dagestan saw a buildup in local tensions, but managed to avoid the breakdown into communal violence that devastated its neighbors to the south and west. Since then its fortunes have shifted, in part due to its strategic location on the path of the sole railroad linking Russia with Chechnya. Following the border closings imposed by Russia to cut off Chechnya, Dagestan suffered a virtual economic blockade.
Its subsequent economic collapse, compounded by ethnic strife and rampant crime, triggered the mass emigration of Dagestan’s Russian-speaking population to Russia proper. At the same time, local pressures have been aggravated by the return of thousands of ethnic Dagestanis from other parts of the ex-USSR, and the influx of hundreds of thousands of Chechen refugees from the two-year war with Russia.
To an outsider, the ethnic kaleidoscope of Dagestan can be mind-numbing, but the underlying disputes echo familiar contention. Land being reclaimed by people returning from Stalin’s deportations in the 1940s and divided ethnic groups straddling borders with Azerbaijan and Chechnya are the two main sources of controversy. There is also reason to monitor other potential conflicts involving groups such as the Terek Cossacks and the Nogai, who claim indigenous rights in three separate republics of the region.
As in the more remote reaches of the former Soviet Union, Dagestan’s multitude of ethnic groups had developed traditional norms of coexistence over the centuries. These cultural norms are eroding with time, and the added dislocation and turmoil since the breakup of the USSR have brought Dagestan to an alarmingly explosive point.
With local Dagestanis blaming both Russia and Chechnya for their current crisis, political analysts interviewed for this guide describe Dagestan as a “powder keg.” They underscore the urgency to support grassroots efforts at interethnic communication, and small-scale economic development. The following are groups and individuals whose work in these vital fields desperately needs support. (Note: when calling Dagestan from Moscow, it is necessary to dial 8, then the area code and number listed; if unsuccessful, an operator can help place the call, by dialing 8-13 or 8-15.)
Fund Medik—Kizlyar branch
Address: 1 Pobedy St., apt. 2, Kizlyar
Tel.: (from Moscow) (8-87439) 230-981
Contact: Andrey Tretyakov (in Jeleznovodsk, Russia, tel. (8-86532) 47-493)
Activities: Fund Medik (FM) mainly provides medical and social assistance to children, elderly, and disabled people, making visits to those who are homebound. During the war in Chechnya, FM helped distribute medical supplies, winter clothes, and children’s toys to IDPs. Working with students from the Dagestan Medical Institute, FM took charge of children’s institutions and a special school in Mahachkala, but suspended this work when funds ran out.
Today, in cooperation with Nonviolence International/NIS, Fund Medik is developing a program to provide psychosocial assistance to children, doctors, and teachers who are still suffering stress symptoms from the war. Budgeted at under $8000, the project is intended as a pilot for similarly affected groups in Chechnya itself.
Potential obstacles: As is common in the North Caucasus, Fund Medik in Kizlyar is largely driven by its energetic and committed founder, Andrey Tretyakov. Effective grassroots activists risk “burning out” unless they find support to continue and institutionalize their work. Given the political pressures and dangers in this district of Dagestan, it will be crucial for Fund Medik to obtain support in order for Tretyakov to delegate more of his work to a larger team.
Fund Spasenie—Hasavyurt regional charity
Address: 63 Zarechnaja St., Hasavyurt
(located within Hasavyurt furniture factory)
Tel: (8722) 310- 36-64
Contacts: Umar Djavtaev, Chair; Vahmurad Ashabov,
Assistant Chair; Irainat Karimova
Activities: Poised on the frontier with Chechnya, Fund Spasenie (meaning Salvation) has evolved primarily as an assistance center for refugees fleeing the war. Its services include legal aid for refugees, locating temporary lodging, promoting media coverage of problems concerning refugees, and searching for missing people and Russian POWs.
Since the end of the war, most refugees have returned to Chechnya, and Fund Spasenie has begun to shift its efforts to easing the ethnic tensions along the Chechen-Dagestan border. To this end, Nonviolence International/NIS hopes to help set up e-mail communications for Fund Spasenie and the Fund Medik in Kizlyar.
Potential obstacles: Given its strategic location and delicate work in humanitarian assistance and conflict-prevention, Fund Spasenie may face mounting risks if the animosity between ethnic Chechens and local Dagestanis continues to rise. Yet, its very location and experience place it in a pivotal position to provide early warning signals and prevent communal violence.
Individual Resources
Ms. Gulnara Ahmedova
Address: 11 G Marksa St., apt. 21, Makhachkala
Tel.: (8722) 672-795
Activities: Gulnara Ahmedova is a young woman living in the Dagestani capital who has attended youth conferences with NGO representatives from the Caucasus. She could be a useful contact for international organizations arriving in Mahachkala and is eager to become affiliated with an NGO that works to encourage peace and interethnic cooperation in her republic.
Mr. Kisriev Enver, member of the Network of Ethnological
Monitoring and Early Warning of Conflicts
Address: 11G Marksa St., apt. 21, Makhachkala
Tel.: (8722) 673-974, 672-795.
E-mail: enver@eawarn.dagestan.su
Activities: Enver Kisriev is a leading expert in the fields of anthropology and interethnic relationships in Dagestan, and a consultant to the Dagestani government. Though not technically an NGO activist, Kisriev has considerable expertise which could be valuable to organizations hoping to work in this troubled region.
Forced Migration Projects
Open Society Institute
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Fax: (212) 548-4676
E-mail: refugee@sorosny.org
Copyright ©1998 by the Open Society Institute
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ISBN 1-891385-00-3 Paperback
Published by The Open Society Institute 400 West 59th Street New York, NY 10019 USA
Produced by Todd Diamond
Cover: During heavy bombardments of Grozny in September 1996, local citizens come out to quickly bury their dead before a new russian attack. Photo by Jason Eskenazi.