Does Early Warning Work?
A lack of preparedness leads to unnecessary death, destruction and dislocation. This axiom has been widely evident in the post-World War II era, starting in the 1950s on the Korean Peninsula, and moving right through the 1990s, a decade that has become almost synonymous with civil strife and ethnic cleansing. Meanwhile, crisis response has tended to follow a disturbing pattern. Governments and international organizations have been repeatedly reluctant to undertake early action. Then, when decisions are finally taken, officials are caught without adequate contingency plans, leading to ad hoc reactions and relief efforts.
It does not always have to be like this. In the era of satellites, computers and rapid communication, the technology certainly exists to build an early warning system that could facilitate the international community's engagement in effective conflict prevention and crisis relief, including refugee protection. The biggest problem in pursuing prevention strategies may be the human element.
This human factor was examined in detail at a conference, entitled "Synergy in Early Warning," held in Toronto from March 15-18. More than 120 specialists, including representatives of the US and Canadian governments, international organizations and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), participated in the conference, which was organized by the Centre for Refugee Studies and the Centre for International and Security Studies at York University near Toronto.
Early warning makes sense, if for no other reason than it would likely save governments and international organizations money. Yet the conference confirmed that, when it comes to conflict prevention, pragmatism is often outweighed by other considerations. Efforts to establish sound early-warning mechanisms are hampered by a wide range of deficiencies, particularly a lack of coordination and political will.
There is also a major problem concerning analysis. Many experts believe that intelligence information, which serves as the basis for early warning, must be specifically calibrated for the purposes of conflict prevention and relief. Currently, intelligence gathering and analysis is viewed almost exclusively through the prism of state security. But the interests of a particular state, or states, do not necessarily coincide with humanitarian needs.
Providing more effective early warning requires the formation of new mechanisms to raise the alarm and then engage in early humanitarian action.
The United Nations has difficulties in performing early warning functions, despite Article 99 of the UN Charter which endows the Secretary General with authority to warn the Security Council or other bodies of impending crisis. Prediction can be a very political act, offending the country targeted and risking criticism as interference in the internal affairs of member states. Although the UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA) has an embryonic early warning system, there is a sea of red tape separating this small corner of DHA from the Security Council, the General Assembly, and other political bodies of the UN system.
Governments also find it difficult to disseminate early warning. Bureaucrats in intelligence and foreign-policy agencies are frequently too concerned about career advancement to risk making premature statements about the course of events. Defense and intelligence agencies are reluctant to refocus their information-gathering efforts away from national security towards the broad range of possible humanitarian disasters. Even in donor countries where information is effectively gathered and analyzed, policymakers are frequently isolated from such warnings by thick layers of bureaucracy.
NGOs are better equipped to engage in early warning activities. Relief and human-rights personnel are often closely involved in on-the-ground operations and are therefore attuned to the local mood. Just about the only capability that most NGOs lack is a way to disseminate the information they gather. In this area, while NGOs might benefit greatly from working in closer cooperation with governments, such synergy is difficult to forge. Mutual mistrust mars the relationship between NGOs and governments. The former see any collaboration as compromising their reputation for independence and impartiality, while the latter tend to view NGO workers as unpredictable and overly idealistic.
There is also a general lack of cooperation among NGOs. Differing agendas and mandates often divide groups. In addition, a general funding squeeze often makes NGOs reluctant to share information with potential competitors in the battle to attract donors' largesse. So an NGO, in fulfilling its normal humanitarian functions, may collect important data for effective early warning, but this information rarely finds its way to governmental policy-making bodies.
The generally somber picture for early warning has some bright spots. For example, a few NGOs, answering the calls for closer cooperation and new mechanisms, have joined with several inter-governmental organizations (IGOs) to form the Forum for Early Warning and Early Response (FEWER). Some of the founding organizations include International Alert of London, the Swiss Peace Foundation, the Institute for Ethnology and Anthropology in Moscow, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees' Centre for Documentation and Research, the Centre for Refugee Studies in Toronto and the New York-based Centre for Prevent-ative Action at the Council on Foreign Relations. Founders hope to expand the group to include not only NGOs and IGOs, but also academic institutions and governmental agencies. As with most nascent organizations of its type, funding is tight and so it is too early to say whether FEWER will have an impact.
Other agencies and NGOs are working on similar projects. For example, after the mass exodus of Rwandan refugees in 1994, the Swiss government engaged the Swiss Peace Foundation (SPF) to design and implement the country's early warning system, to be operating by the end of 1997.
As for governmental interest in early warning, France so far is the only western country with a separate Department of Humanitarian Affairs, an executive agency concerned almost entirely with the forecasting and mitigation of famine, civil war, and refugee movements.
Increasingly, computers are being employed to improve early warning capabilities. Software, currently in development in several academic institutions, can read reports from journalists on the ground, searching for the frequency of keywords that may indicate rising ethno-political tensions.
But there are still several limitations. Computers can only narrow the scope of inquiry for early warning organizations. After filtering out particularly low-risk regions, further analyses and forecasting would be required. In addition, software to monitor press reports can, for the time being, function in only a few languages, including English, French, German, and Spanish.
A number of arguments have been raised questioning the feasibility of early warning. With resources for foreign assistance shrinking in most donor countries, devising new early-warning structures may seem unrealistic. It is not a question of a shortage of information. The problem is that often information is not utilized in a way relevant to preventing or ameliorating humanitarian emergencies. Only through greater synergy of NGOs, media, international organizations, and governments can early and effective humanitarian responses be mounted.
Mistakes will be made. There exists a legitimate concern that false alarms will discredit the practice of early warning. Those involved must maintain focus on the potential benefits. Each week, each hour, each day of warning that relief workers have-be they governmental, nongovernmental, or international-can translate into hundreds or thousands of lives saved, and countless secondary crises avoided. There may be no glamour in the crisis that never was, but the subtle task of avoiding the unseen future may be the key to diminishing what appears to be mounting human suffering caused by conflict and other artificial disasters.
The variety and number of participants at the Toronto conference indicate that the international community is aware of the need to improve existing shortcomings in early-warning mechanisms. The actors must now move beyond identifying needs. Proof of the utility of early warning will be in its implementation.
