PART THREE
The Repatriation Plan
The Plan in Brief
The plan endorsed in April 1994 by Abkhazia, Georgia, Russia and the UNHCR called for the repatriation of the displaced population in stages, starting with some 80,000 people who fled the Gali region in southeastern Abkhazia as defeated Georgian troops retreated in September 1993. Most of these people abandoned their homes before Abkhaz troops reached the region, seeking refuge with the local population in and around the Georgian town of Zugdidi across the Inguri river. Nongovernmental organizations working in Sukhumi believe that about 30,000 have already returned to the Gali region.
According to the UNHCR plan, some 80,000 IDPs were to be repatriated before the end of October 1994. The plan included, among other features, a computerized inventory of all potential returnees; provision of materials to the returnees for reconstruction of homes; a media campaign to inform and prepare the populations on both sides of the border; and a controversial prior review process whereby Abkhaz authorities reserved the right to screen potential returnees, excluding anyone who had taken up arms on the Georgian side (the majority of able- bodied men), or who intended to take up arms in the future. Abkhaz authorities later extended the exclusion criteria to persons "having sent money out of Abkhazia." By autumn 1994, the NGO community believed Abkhaz officials had complied a list of 14,000 to 25,000 Georgians not permitted to return to their homes.
The Cost of the Program
Since the summer of 1994, UNHCR has spent $4 million for its programs in Georgia, of which $1.5 million was spent on repatriation and pre- positioning. Some of the goods purchased for distribution to the resettlers were stored and later sold to the UNHCR emergency operation in Chechnya. In 1994, UNHCR's projected budget for Georgia was $11 million for repatriation and $3 million for IDPs (of which only $1.5 million was received). In 1995, UNHCR budgeted $3 million for repatriation and $4 million for IDPs (of which only $400,000 has been received).4
Flaws in the Plan
At the time of the plan's conception in the spring of 1994, barely half a year had passed since Abkhaz forces launched their stunning offensive on Georgian troops in Sukhumi and sent the vast majority of ethnic Georgians fleeing in fear of ferocious retribution. Shock and bitterness were and still are palpable on both sides.
The Abkhaz point to the brutality of Georgia's first armored assault on Sukhumi in August 1992,
which triggered a rampage of looting, murder and gross human rights abuses against Abkhaz and other non-Georgian civilians‹Russians, Armenians, Greeks‹residing in the Black Sea republic. When the war turned in favor of the Abkhaz forces in September 1993, similar atrocities were committed against the resident Georgian civilians: part vengeance, and part gratuitous looting, vandalism and murder.5 Critics of the UNHCR repatriation program, including the NGO community in Tbilisi, faulted
the plan for its hasty preparation, particularly for ignoring some of the refugee organization's own standard procedures in assessing community attitudes on both sides of the border before promoting a mass repatriation. Following are the main criticisms of the plan cited by leading NGOs working in Georgia:
UNHCR declined to participate in a January 1994 household survey of IDPs in Tbilisi conducted by NGOs, UNICEF, WHO and the Georgian government. During 1994, UNHCR stated that it conducted monthly trips to Abkhazia, though it did not conduct a systematic survey of attitudes among the resident population who would have to receive the returnees.
At least 70,000 landmines (UNHCR estimates run as high as 700,000 with a rough middle figure of 150,000) are believed to be widely spread around the border area between the Gali and Zugdidi regions. They are found on tea plantations and roadsides, as well as in the Gumista river valley further northwest. Planted by both sides, landmines pose an enormous risk to all civilians. UNHCR presented no detailed plan for detecting and removing them, even though managing this risk would be crucial to ensuring a safe and dignified return.
In the post-war lawlessness of Abkhazia, no credible institution was iden-tified or established to ensure the safety of the returnees and the potentially hostile population into which they were expected to reintegrate. Neither PKF nor the UNOMIG observers have been given a mandate to maintain law and order locally.
An exclusionary clause included in the Quadripartite Agreement allows authorities to exclude former Georgian combatants from repatriating to their Abkhaz homes. But it also casts a wide net over all men of fighting age, excluding them for past as well as possible future activity; moreover, the time-frame for the screening process is open-ended, allowing the authorities to assess someone at any time. While the women and children related to excluded men would be allowed to return, critics point to the destabilizing effect of long-term family separation, and the massing of a restive male exile population on the Zugdidi side of the border.
Why the Plan Failed
Given the UNHCR's record of success with mass repatriations in countries such as Cambodia, Mozambique and Uganda, its hasty and seemingly blinkered approach to Abkhazia has surprised and exasperated many in the international community. Some international officials attribute the ill- conceived project to the personal enthusiasm of the first UNHCR representative in Georgia, who apparently believed that with the support of both the Georgian and Abkhaz governments the program would be a relatively neat success. Pushing forward with the program, he repeatedly dismissed NGO sector concerns about the continuing murders, beatings, and rapes in Abkhazia. Describing as a fait accompli the small-scale "spontaneous" repatriation, he reportedly told a meeting of NGOs last spring that it was the UNHCR's duty to be there to help them since they are already going back on their own.
Despite numerous discussions with a skeptical NGO community, the UNHCR representative expressed confidence that with a mass media campaign, computerized inventories, and the sheer presence of NGO staff on the ground, UNHCR would be able to resettle 80,000 IDPs and restore peace to the Gali region. Indeed, NGO officials recalled meetings during which the UNHCR representative said that "peace will trickle down from the central authorities."
The UNHCR headquarters staff in Geneva was aware of this program, and delegations were dispatched to Georgia to perform assessments. Geneva also deployed one of the most experienced field officers from its ex-Yugoslavia program to run the operation from Zugdidi. To the NGOs in Georgia it seemed inconceivable that the headquarters would proceed with a $4 million plan without considering the physical risks to the returnees and the potential for the program to end in disaster. By September 1994, many NGOs were even more adamantly opposed to proceeding under the terms of the plan, citing the above criticisms and underscoring the UN's own weekly reports of rampant criminality in Abkhazia and daily assaults, abductions, rapes and house- burnings in the Gali region when Georgians tried to return from Zugdidi.
Still, the computers arrived, IDP lists were generated, an expert in mine clearance from the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) in New York came out in August 1994 to assess the extent of the problem and to help initiate a mine-awareness program, and a public relations officer came from UNHCR Geneva. The International Rescue Committee (IRC) and Oxfam began small programs in rehabilitation and sanitation, while Médecins sans Frontières took charge of vaccinating children and training local doctors and nurses. Despite repeated appeals by the groups that were to serve as implementing partners in the repatriation plan, UNHCR did not sufficiently survey either the displaced population in Georgia or the resident population in Abkhazia into which the IDPs would have to be reintegrated. While thousands trickled home on their own, only 311 people finally opted to repatriate under the UNHCR plan.
