PART FOUR: Resolving the Crisis
The case of Abkhazia reveals the formidable obstacles to repatriating an uprooted population prior to reaching a political settlement to the conflict that forced them to flee in the first place. In this case, a further barrier to repatriation was erected in granting one party to the conflict the right to reject a wide range of returnees. Based on the research carried out for this report, several steps emerge as critical to solutions for persons displaced in the former Soviet republic of Georgia, in its secessionist region of Abkhazia, and in other disputed regions.
Establishing Basic Physical Security
The most fundamental problem is the rampant lawlessness in the former war zones and parts of Georgia. The semblance of law and order under communism masked an elaborate system of political corruption and common crime. When the repressive apparatus disintegrated after the break-up of the Soviet Union, corruption and criminality sprang forth without restraint. While it will take years to build functioning institutions, such as a constitutional court, a civilian police force, and a professional criminal justice system, the UN can take several useful measures in the short term:
Expand UNOMIG's mandate to include international policing and enforcement functions. Some success in maintaining law and order has been achieved in other locales through such an approach. The UN should also consider offering intensive training to candidates for a future civilian police force.
Increase the number of UN personnel deployed. A larger international presence will help assuage Abkhaz fears of a Georgian invasion. Of course, given the situation of insecurity, any significant repatriation should be accompanied by concerted monitoring by a wide variety of actors in the international community including NGOs.
Undertake a parallel program to disarm young men in Abkhazia and western Georgia under UN supervision. This is likely to succeed only if aggres-sive efforts are made to bring the parties together for discussions on a settlement. Otherwise the Abkhaz will continue to claim that they need their weapons for defense against Georgian attacks.
Cooperation among International Organizations and NGOs
Neither the UN nor NGOs came to the Soviet republics with experience working in the former Soviet Union. On an interorganizational level, intergovernmental organizations and NGOs must develop liaison groups to share the information and insights they gain through the sometimes painful process of trial and error in the region. Obstructionism by state authorities is never a clear-cut matter, given the layers of former Soviet institutions which survive even to this day.
Compared to Russia, Georgia's political and administrative structure is relatively uncomplicated, and NGO officials report that they have generally obtained government cooperation in carrying out their work. Periodic threats by Tbilisi officials to seize control of humanitarian programs are generally not pursued.
One key area where international organizations and NGOs need to elicit a greater government commitment is in guaranteeing the security of international and local staff, offices, and warehouses. Security, not only for international organizations but for the population at large, is a basic requirement for the development of transitional societies. The international community in Georgia should plan to take several months to expand its population surveys and to assess the pitfalls facing repatriation. In the process, opportunities may open up, particularly with the right kind of development projects, for some of the IDPs to integrate locally within Georgia, without causing the Georgian government to feel it has lost the war.
Linking Political Settlement and Economic Reconstruction
Talks on a settlement must be tied to a visible‹ although not necessarily costly‹economic reconstruction program. It is widely agreed that the rate of criminality will not decrease until the average person has adequate shelter over his or her head, enough to eat, and a job with a steady income.
Formerly, the people of Georgia were accustomed to a relatively good life, more luxurious than the average Russian under the Soviet system. Poverty and displacement have hardened them noticeably. Such conditions, if they continue or worsen, will only impede any efforts to elicit attitudes of tolerance and cooperation essential to long-term reconciliation between the Abkhazians and Georgians.
NGOs in Georgia theorize that it is economic inequalities which invariably spark the small- scale disputes that escalate into full-scale conflict with ethnic connotations or political goals. With this in mind, they have identified regions in addition to Abkhazia and South Ossetia where modest but well-targeted economic development assistance could alleviate economic unbalances and perhaps prevent conflict. In former war-zones, such programs will have to begin with the most basic rebuilding of burnt- out homes if the urge to seek revenge is to be diffused. Though Soviet Georgia was subjected to collectivization and communal ownership, more than elsewhere in the former Soviet Union, the attachment to private homes and the land around them remains deep and enduring. Residents of Abkhazia and IDPs in Georgia frequently cited the destruction of homes as one of the major wrongs suffered on account of the conflict.
Once it is clear to all parties that security can prevail and people will receive equal assistance in slowly rebuilding their homes, the international community can regain some of the credibility that has been squandered by the UNHCR's hasty repatriation plan.
The Lessons of Abkhazia
With the political stalemate, security crisis, and failure of repatriation in Abkhazia, it is instructive to consider as well the secessionist region of South Ossetia, where the conflict between the Georgian government and the local minority is still unresolved. The Ossetians are descendants of Iranian speaking tribes who settled on the northern and southern faces of the Caucasus mountain range in the 4th century. In the north, Ossetians were incorporated into the Russian Federation and became the Autonomous Republic of North Ossetia in 1936 (under Russian jurisdiction).
The Ossetians on the southern slope were incorporated into Georgia, with the status of Autonomous Oblast (district) of South Ossetia in 1922. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, Ossetians' bid for increased cultural and political independence from Georgia spiralled into full-scale war in 1992, during which the South Ossetians received crucial support from their kin in North Ossetia.
Thousands of civilians on both sides fled the fighting. Ethnic Ossetians mainly fled north to the Russian Federation, while ethnic Georgians sought refuge with relatives further south in the Gori region and the capital. According to UNHCR, at the end of 1995, there were 30,000 IDPs from South Ossetia in Georgia and 37,000 South Ossetians across the border in the Russian republic of North Ossetia.
Since July 1992, when the cease-fire was signed and a mixed CIS peacekeeping force of Russians, Ossetians, and Georgians was installed, fighting has virtually come to a halt in the capital of South Ossetia and surrounding villages. Ethnic Ossetians began to return home to Tskhinvali, and thousands of ethnic Georgians have gradually returned to the region, mainly to the villages surrounding the capital. However, as in Abkhazia, South Ossetia has suffered a general breakdown of civil order and is plagued by brutal criminal gangs. According to international officials, the people in power are linked to a state criminal mafia which controls all important economic exchange.
The economy of South Ossetia is also at a standstill. According to a member of the 17- person OSCE delegation (which opened a mission there in October 1993), the economy is functioning at roughly 15 to 20 percent of capacity, with small scale trade being the main activity. Bread is available but vegetables and other produce, grown in Georgia, are prohibitively expensive. Homes in the city have no heat or gas (which would normally come from Georgia). Conditions are generally better in the villages, which are economically more self- sufficient.
Some NGOs and Georgian experts paint a brighter picture, saying that things are moving forward in South Ossetia. The UNDP is conducting a comprehensive economic and social survey of the area and the leaders of the republic have invited NGOs to set up programs there. A darker picture of frustration and pessimism was portrayed by the members of the OCSE delegation, which monitors the cease-fire and "facilitates dialogue‹both official and unofficial" toward settling the dispute over South Ossetia's bid for independence from Georgia.
After five months of weekly meetings, the delegate likened the intransigence of the South Ossetians to that of the Abkhaz leadership, saying that the delayed return of Georgians to their homes in Tskhinvali was conditioned on a political settlement. Despite the formal commitment on both sides to a political solution, the OSCE representative said that the Georgians were determined to take the territory by political settlement or, if necessary, by force.
Another potential hot spot is found in southern Georgia's Armenian districts (Akhaltsikhe). Although the Armenian government would not likely lay claim to the territory in southern Georgia near the border with Turkey, one international official said, "all you need is a few hotheads in Armenia with a few Kalashnikovs, defending 'Greater Armenia,' and before you know it people will be believing they can be part of Armenia. There's desperation in this region, and primitive thinking about roles and positions, and before you know it 50 to 60 people are out blocking a road, taking someone hostage, and someone gets killed." In an attempt to prevent such a scenario from unfolding, a number of NGOs working in Georgia have been setting up small- scale relief and development programs in some of the most neglected areas of the country. The rationale is to prevent the pressures of deepening impoverishment from straining the sometimes delicate ethnic balance in poor regions. In addition to Akhaltsikhe, another potentially sensitive area is the Marneuli region, south of Tbilisi, which is largely populated by ethnic Azeris who are regularly implicated in attacks on the railroad that runs to the Armenian capital of Yerevan. This adds fuel to the long-running conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the mountain region of Nagorno-Karabakh.
Finally, Georgia's southwestern Autonomous Republic of Ajaria enjoys a strategic location with its major Black Sea port and a busy border crossing with Turkey. Throughout these turbulent years Ajaria's leader, Aslan Ibragimovich
Abashidze, has taken pains to maintain good relations with Tbilisi, and his mostly muslim republic has escaped the violent fate of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. But there have been reports of local dissent and severe repression against the dissenters.
Because Georgia's outlets to external markets are few, the importance of Adjaria's border crossing with Turkey cannot be exaggerated, particularly in view of the blockade by Russia to the north of Abkhazia. Turkish goods have flooded the market in much of Georgia, and control of that bountiful border crossing could be a cause of future dispute.
