Table of Contents
The Propiska Legacy: A Source of Woe for Newcomers in Russia
Conference on Forced Migration in Central America and the Caribbean
Local Government Migration Practices in the North Caucasus
Sarajevo Meetings Underscore Property, Citizenship Problems
The Propiska Legacy: A Source of Woe for Newcomers in Russia
During the Soviet era, arbitrariness superseded the rule of law. Today, as Russia staggers in a democratic direction, legislation is still applied haphazardly. Often it is refugees and displaced persons who are the most vulnerable in a transitional society. Laws and international conventions designed to protect the rights of refugees and displaced persons go unimplemented, leaving tens of thousands in limbo.
One of the most insidious instruments used to control the lives of newcomers is the residency registration system. Although the residency permit, known as the “propiska,” was technically abolished following the Soviet Union’s demise, local officials still rely on old methods to limit freedom of movement. Their aim is to keep people perceived as undesirable out of their communities. Without proper registration it is difficult, if not impossible, for people to find employment, educational opportunities, or gain access to social services, including medical care and pension benefits.
Nowhere are requirements more stringent than in Moscow, where Mayor Yuri Luzhkov’s residency regulations openly flout federal law. For example, Moscow charges substantial fees to register, even though the imposition of such fees has been ruled unconstitutional by Russia’s Constitutional Court. In addition, an applicant must prove that he or she has a permanent address before officials will consider registering the individual. Given the severe housing shortage, those with no relatives in the capital stand little chance of finding permanent housing, and therefore no hope of registering. Even those with relatives in the capital must battle the bureaucracy to register. People who lack a propiska are subject to constant harassment by an unsympathetic municipal police force.
Many Muscovites support Luzhkov’s propiska position. The capital has substantially better living standards than the rest of the country, and most Muscovites are anxious to protect their comparative advantage.
The tale of 42-year-old Tatiana Pokoyevaya and her family demonstrates how registration rigmarole hinders the ability of refugees and displaced persons to rebuild their lives. Pokoyevaya, along with her husband and two daughters, fled the Chechen capital of Grozny in 1993. Pokoyevaya and her family first settled in Belgorod, a provincial capital about 300 miles south of Moscow. Authorities there balked at issuing a propiska without the payment of a substantial bribe, which Pokoyevaya said she could not afford. And so her family used up their last savings to travel to Moscow.
Officials in Moscow were not receptive either, at first refusing to give Pokoyevaya status because she had no relatives in the capital. Eventually, however, authorities relented after Pokoyevaya argued that she was entitled to Moscow residency because her father, a Soviet military test pilot who died in a crash when she was nine years old, had lived in the capital. Pokoyevaya and her family obtained forced migrant status in November 1994, a month before the outbreak of the Chechen war, allowing them to stay in Moscow on a temporary basis.
Nevertheless, officials frustrated Pokoyevaya’s ability either to collect unemployment benefits or get job training because she lacked a document detailing her employment history, another vestige of the Soviet era. Her “workbook,” as the document is called, had been left in the apartment in Grozny, forgotten during their hasty departure.
She and her husband had no other choice but to return to Grozny in 1995, at the height of the Chechen war, to collect their documents. Back in the embattled Chechen capital, they found themselves trapped by the fighting. It was only in August 1996 that she and her husband escaped the war-devastated region and returned to Moscow.
Today, Pokoyevaya has completed a job training program, but is still looking for full-time work. Her husband has found a job with an oil company in Moscow, so the family of four is able to cope, living in a two-room apartment with two other relatives. Still life is full of uncertainty for them, largely because they lack permanent residency status.
For Pokoyevaya’s sister, Angelina Slinkova, each day is filled with fear and insecurity. Slinkova has no status in Moscow, and thus is forced to live in a legal limbo. Trained as a teacher, she earns money as a street vendor, selling yogurt and pastries. She is often arrested by the Moscow police because she lacks a propiska, and therefore is not legally permitted to work in the capital. Fortunately for Slinkova, her employer has bailed her out of prison after each arrest.
Pokoyevaya’s is far from the only case in which an asylum seeker is plagued by uncertainty arising from excessive bureaucracy.
For the past year, Olga Vasilivets has been living in a Moscow hospital funded by the Russian Ministry of Railroads, where her 16-year-old daughter, Inna, is slowly recuperating from severe wounds. As the Chechen war drew to a close, Inna’s back and pelvis were shattered by mortar shrapnel. The road to recovery included a harrowing evacuation out of Grozny under shellfire, a stay in a hospital in Vladikavkaz, capital of North Ossetia, and finally arrival at the Moscow facility for her long convalescence.
Although Inna, as a patient of the hospital, was temporarily registered in Moscow, her mother Olga initially did not have any status in the Russian capital, and lacked any source of income. Only through the kindness of the hospital staff was she allowed to live for free and share Inna’s room.
Conditions for Olga and Inna Vasilivets improved recently, after their plight received publicity from the Moscow channel on state television. The broadcast prompted the state to provide Olga and Inna each with social security benefits worth about $260 per month. Concerned viewers also contributed donations. More importantly, the broadcast helped prompt federal migration officials to make an exception and grant the mother and daughter forced migrant status, despite the lack of proper registration. This step makes them eligible to receive compensation for their destroyed property back in Chechnya, a remote prospect in any event.
Inna’s recovery is just about complete, and now she and her mother must contemplate where to go next. Olga sighs at the thought of another move and says, “I don’t know, probably we will try to settle somewhere near Moscow, we’re looking for a sponsor, maybe somebody will help us manage.” Like most displaced persons, Olga doesn’t want to go far from Moscow. She dreads dealing with provincial authorities, and the possibility of going through more registration hassles.
There are thousands of refugees and displaced persons still facing uncertain futures in the Russian capital. Despite their travails, Tatiana Pokoyevaya and Olga Vasilivets can be counted among the more fortunate. Many of those who have been driven from their homes have not been able to obtain status elsewhere. Officials in Moscow have shown themselves to be among the most unsympathetic in the desire to offer the dislocated a durable solution. In order to give people a reasonable opportunity to rebuild their lives, Moscow should simplify its registration procedures, and officials should comply with Constitutional Court rulings.
Conference on Forced Migration in Central America and the Caribbean
The political tumult that traumatized Central America and the Caribbean in previous decades has faded, giving way to a welcome sense of calm. States that were wracked by guerrilla wars and massive population displacements just a few years ago are now making laudable strides in building civil societies. The temptation for the international community is to be lulled into inactivity by today’s comparative security. Yet, the reality is that states’ capacities remain fragile, and upheaval that can lead to displacements remains a threat. Indeed, it is probably more a matter of when, not if, the next forced migration emergency will occur.
The current calm offers regional governments, international institutions and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), along with those in academia, a unique opportunity for contingency planning and creating a framework for action that can greatly reduce the individual hardships associated with population displacement. Establishing new mechanisms to manage refugee and migration emergencies was the subject of discussion at a two-day gathering in Washington, D.C.: The Conference on Regional Responses to Forced Migration Emer-gencies in Central America and the Caribbean.
The meeting, which ended October 1, drew more than 70 participants, including representatives from regional governments, international organizations and NGOs. It marked one of the first occasions that independent ex-perts engaged in debate on regional migration issues. Although participants represented a broad range of opinions, most agreed that such a dialogue now would raise the chances of hardships being reduced, or avoided altogether. “It seems appropriate to hold dispassionate and rational discussions without the operational imperatives that a crisis imposes on a situation,” said Forced Migration Projects (FMP) Director Arthur C. Helton.
The conference yielded results. The four organizers—the FMP, the Organization of American States, UNHCR and the Costa Rica-based Inter-American Institute on Human Rights—announced that they would form a working group to prepare follow-up initiatives, based on the discussions at the Washington gathering.
“We accomplished everything that we set out to do. These things are always step by step,” said Juan Mendez, executive director of the Inter-American Institute for Human Rights. “Most importantly, we got the OAS secretary general’s office interested, and the UNHCR also demonstrated a commitment with high level representation. These two organizations are key.”
The next step will involve considering the promulgation of a plan to avert or reduce the suffering of those displaced by an emergency. “The essential question is: How can we innovate without watering down basic protections,” said Kofi Asomani, UNHCR’s director of the Regional Office for the Americas.
No one is under any illusions that such a framework can be established without arduous debate. “Even if it goes well, it’ll take a number of years to implement,” said Patrick Gavigan, Refugee and Migration Program Coordinator of the US-based National Coalition for Haitian Rights. There are profound differences on fundamental issues, including the scope of a forced migration framework, the definition of an emergency and whether arrangements should be multilateral or bilateral in nature. There are, however, several existing factors in Central America and the Caribbean that can help foster final agreement, including peaceful political conditions and a strong and experienced NGO sector.
Helton, of the FMP, said the best way to ensure adequate protection of refugees and displaced persons would be to forge an expansive compact among regional states that focuses narrowly on migration emergencies. In what he termed “a modest proposal,” Helton said that a new treaty should contain binding commitments by signatory states, and address all essential elements of a crisis. There must be provisions, for example, that allow for unqualified reception of asylum seekers by host nations. In return for such temporary protection, ceilings would be established on the number of newcomers to be admitted to any one state. Other provisions should set out compulsory standards for the condition of stay (identified by Helton as perhaps the “biggest problem area”) as well as the duration of stay—a reasonable period being six months at the outset. A pact should also seek to offer solutions, with the implementation of a status determination mechanism that allows those refugees unable to return safely to their homeland a way to rebuild their lives.
Helton’s proposal differed from ideas advanced by U.S. Immigration and Naturalization official Phyllis Coven, who said the so-called Puebla process, launched in spring 1996, should serve as the basis for new migration arrangements. The Puebla process seeks to manage migration in general, regardless of whether it arises from an emergency or is prompted by economic reasons. “We need to approach migration generally,” Ms. Coven said. It has been the preference of some states, such as the United States, to forge bilateral arrangements, or even to act unilaterally, in response to migration or refugee emergencies. Responses to such crises would be improved by multilateral cooperation, many speakers said, adding that future success also depends on greater burden sharing among governments, as well as engagement by international organizations and NGOs.
Another apparent necessity is enhancement of the connection between analysis and implementation. Mendez, of the Inter-American Institute for Human Rights, outlined a proposal to create a contingency planning center that would foster synergy in the relationship of experts and governmental policy implementors. “What is lacking now is learning from past experience,” Mendez said, adding that the proposed center would facilitate comprehensive decision-making by coordinating all available information on a developing migration emergency.
By forging new migration arrangements, the international community can take a significant step towards ensuring that problematic displacements never develop into humanitarian disasters.
Local Government Migration Practices in the North Caucasus
A decade ago, the North Caucasus region was considered a haven of resorts and health spas, a holiday showcase attracting vacationers from across the Soviet Union. Today, the sanatoria, hotels, and dormitories that once housed families on holiday have fallen into disrepair. Cold, damp, and dilapidated, these resort facilities are now serving as temporary shelters for refugees and displaced persons who have fled the tumult that flared amidst the collapse of the Soviet Union.
Displaced persons began arriving in the North Caucasus in the late 1980s. Overall, the region has received hundreds of thousands of forced migrants, many coming from strife-torn areas in neighboring Transcaucasia, Central Asia, and regions within Russia. Their arrival has placed an enormous burden on the regional economic and social infrastructure. The receiving “ethnic” republics—Dagestan, Ingushetia, North Ossetia, Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachai-Cherkessia, and Adygeia—along with “Russian” Krasnodar and Stavropol krais, or administrative regions, are some of the poorest, most densely populated area in the Russian Federation.
Given the existing conditions, local government officials have not been welcoming newcomers. A lack of resources limits the government’s ability to respond. At the same time, local leaders have erected administrative obstacles, apparently to discourage the dislocated from resettling in the region.
A look at the situation in Stavropol krai illuminates the dire fiscal situation. Stavropol has received a greater number of refugees and displaced persons—over 58,000 having registered officially since 1992, in addition to the thousands of unregistered—than any other Russian region. According to local estimates, it would take about $45 million to adequately accommodate newcomers in Stavropol. However, the estimated federal allocations for all of Russia amount to less than $100 million, thus the share of federal aid to Stavropol covers only a fraction of the region’s needs. Other than federal allocations, there are few ways to generate revenue for migration-related programs.
Similar conditions prevail elsewhere. The Office of the Representative of the Russian President in North Ossetia and Ingushetia, itself a federal body responsible for the return of Ingush displaced during the 1992 Ingush-North Ossetian conflict, reported that it receives only 8 percent of budgetary needs from federal authorities for implementation of a housing reconstruction program. The inability of the federal government to provide adequate amounts of aid feeds frustration among local officials. Most are quick to blame the funding shortage for all migration-related problems. Anger is compounded by the fact that authorities in the North Caucasus perceive Moscow as being responsible for creating conditions that led to massive displacements. Many cite the Chechen war as the most glaring example of Moscow’s malfeasance. “It was Moscow that started the Chechen war! But we are left to clean up without much help from the center,” one local official complained.
Even though Moscow may be largely to blame, local officials frequently vent their frustrations on refugees and displaced persons. Such action is driven by widespread nativist sentiment. With so many pressing needs and so little money, some authorities feel that assisting newcomers should not be a priority. “Our republican budget cannot sustain them [the displaced],” says Hasan Dumanov, the former chairman of a government commission in charge of refugees and forced migrants in Kabardino-Balkaria. “We couldn’t even pay salaries to our own teachers, to state-subsidized organizations. Our unemployed [of which there are 40,000] say: ‘why don’t you place us in sanatoria and feed us like you do with refugees?’”
Hostility towards newcomers can prompt discriminatory action. During the summer, regional authorities, faced with budget cuts imposed by Moscow, threatened to evict refugees and displaced persons in collective residence centers in cities across the region, including Vladikavkaz, Cherkessk and Nalchik. In some instances, the threats were accompanied by temporary cutoffs of water, gas, and electricity, exacerbating the already grim conditions in temporary shelters.
While local officials blame Moscow’s budget cuts for their resultant inability to pay utility companies, those living in the facilities often assert that the cut-offs of essential services are moves designed to force them to leave. “We live in constant fear,” said a bitter Abkhaz refugee now housed in a shelter in Vladikavkaz. “They try to get rid of us by all means…they lie to us that armed police will be sent to kick us out.… They say where we go is our problem.”
Refugees and displaced persons also complain that authorities utilize bureaucratic procedures to hamper their ability to integrate into the local community. Newcomers find that registration procedures are difficult to fulfill, and that fees are exorbitant. Without official registration, newcomers are not able to work legally in the local community, nor are they able to access a broad range of benefits, including health care.
There are several other factors serving to hamper the local governmental response to population movements in the North Caucasus. Firstly, widespread corruption poses an obstacle. In addition, the political structure, with its patchwork quilt-like compilation of “ethnic” autonomous republics, makes it difficult to harmonize migration policies. Each autonomous republic features executive and legislative branches of government that possess greater self-governing powers than do Russian oblasts, or administrative regions. Auton-omous republics also are entitled to have their own constitutions. Local officials do not hesitate to use their powers, but often regional legislation clashes with the federal constitution. For example, an article of the Ingush constitution contains a territorial claim on a portion of the neighboring autonomous republic of North Ossetia.
Federal agencies designed to coordinate activity among the various levels and branches of government, particularly the Federal Migration Service, are largely ineffective. Likewise, indigenous governmental initiatives, such as the recent decision to create a local Organization for Cooperation and Security in the North Caucasus, have had little impact on improving the situation of refugees and displaced persons.
Encouraging the activity of local nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) would appear a logical way to help alleviate the problems arising out of the chronic shortages in government funding for migration-related programs. However, the legal frameworks in many north Caucasus autonomous republics and regions do little to facilitate NGO capacity building. High registration fees and complex taxation regulations frustrate local NGOs’ ability to operate. Many local authorities view NGO leaders, including those who advocate newcomers’ rights, as potential trouble- makers, and are thus reluctant to sanction their activities. “Give us a lawyer, but not a human rights advocate,” said one government functionary in Krasnodar.
There are a few regions where local authorities are receptive to NGO operations. Stavropol is one such region, and it features a comparatively strong NGO community, including several resettlement organizations. Recently, Stavropol officials worked with a local group called the Charity and Health Fund to stage a successful televised fundraiser.
The attitude of local officials towards international organizations and foreign NGOs varies widely. In some auton-omous republics—especially those in which foreign agencies have little or no presence, such as Adygeia, Karachai-Cherkessia, or Kabardino-Balkaria—local governments are anxious to attract the attention of foreign agencies. Of-ficials complain that international aid organizations tend to work in conflict zones, while underestimating migration-related needs in other regions.
The relationship between local authorities and international organizations in other regions is marked by tension, frequently arising out of differing priorities. Inter-national organizations are guided mainly by humanitarian considerations. Local officials, meanwhile, often take economic and political factors into account when addressing migration-related issues. Accordingly, some local governmental agencies seek to reduce the number of officially registered refugees as quickly as possible in order to reduce their economic burden. Yet in some cases, the arbitrary de-registration of those with refugee status creates serious hardships. This naturally draws criticism from international organizations.
International aid workers also bristle at what they perceive as heavy-handed attempts by local officials to control the activity of foreign organizations.
The local governmental response to population displacements in the North Caucasus is inadequate. There is an undeniable shortage of resources that hampers the ability to implement programs. But in many cases, the lack of funds serves as a convenient excuse for local officials, who are unwelcoming of newcomers.
Despite the dearth of money, there are a number of options available to local authorities in the search for durable solutions for refugees and displaced persons. Officials could begin by lowering barriers to registration, making it easier for newcomers to integrate into the community. Local legislatures could also amend legislation and tax codes to foster NGO activity. Finally, steps could be taken to increase regional cooperation and harmonize policies, thereby increasing the effectiveness of federal assistance.
Sarajevo Meetings Underscore Property, Citizenship Problems
Two meetings of experts in Sarajevo last month generated constructive dialogue on citizenship laws and property rights, seeking fresh approaches on contentious questions that hinder the repatriation of refugees and displaced persons in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
“Citizenship and property rights are perhaps the most crucial issues in Bosnia, as far as implementation of the Dayton peace process,” said Forced Migration Projects (FMP) Director Arthur C. Helton. “Stability may be difficult to achieve without repatriation. In turn, repatriation depends greatly on resolving outstanding issues concerning citizenship and property rights.”
The October 24 gatherings, jointly sponsored by the FMP and the Law Center of the Open Society Fund–Bosnia and Herzegovina, were attended by about 40 representatives of international and local nongovernmental organizations and legal experts from Bosnia’s entities—the Muslim-Croat Federation and Republika Srpska. Among the prominent participants were representatives from the Office of the High Representative, the Council of Europe, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), UNHCR, and the three ombudspeople of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
The first meeting focused on complex citizenship arrangements arising out of the collapse of the former Yugoslavia. Under the socialist regime, arcane rules, based largely on the census of 1948, determined citizenship. For example, it was not unusual for a lifelong resident of Croatia to hold Serbian citizenship, and vice versa. The problems inherent in such a system did not manifest themselves until interethnic animosities sparked the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia. That collapse left thousands stateless, and their citizenship dilemmas have yet to be resolved.
In an attempt to offer a durable solution, the FMP have prepared a model agreement on citizenship, which would cover those still lacking citizenship in the former Yugoslavia. The blueprint received a general endorsement from meeting participants, although some key points, specifically provisions on dual citizenship, require ongoing discussion. “The basic concept is recognized as viable,” Helton said.
The next step for the FMP will be to offer a forum for further discussion among regional governments, particularly on citizenship arrangements. Such a forum is contingent on the willingness of government representatives to participate at an appropriate level.
The second meeting focused on property rights. The continued reliance on wartime legislation governing property ownership and tenancy means that many refugees and displaced persons are unable to return to their prewar residences because they are currently occupied by others. The FMP and other organizations urge that these laws be repealed in order to facilitate repatriation. Instead, leaders in Bosnia are moving ahead with privatization plans that could effectively nullify property claims by prewar residents, thereby crippling repatriation prospects.
The Forced Migration Monitor is published bimonthly by the Forced Migration Projects of the Open Society Institute-New York. The Forced Migration Projects were established to monitor circumstances in different regions of the world in order to provide the international community with early warning of forced movements of people, as well as to identify the social, economic, and political conditions which cause such dislocations. The Projects encourage early and effective humanitarian responses to migration emergencies; advocate the humane treatment of those unable to return; urge permanent solutions for those displaced; and promote measures that avert individuals’ need to flee. The Projects gather information concerning displacements and the circumstances that motivate them, concentrating primarily on the countries of the former Soviet Union, the former Yugoslavia, Haiti, and Cuba.
Forced Migration Projects
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tel: (212) 548-0655
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http://www.soros.org/migrate.html
Advisory Committee
Ludmilla Alexeeva
Jeremy R. Azrael
Arthur C. Helton (convenor)
Murray Feshbach
Morten Kjaerum
Aryeh Neier
Barnett R. Rubin
Warren Zimmermann
Staff
Arthur C. Helton, Director
Justin Burke
Eliana Jacobs
Marie Jeannot
Sussan Khozouri
Pamela B. Kilpadi
Allison E. Mindel
Olena Sydorenko
The Open Society Institute-New York is a private operating and grantmaking foundation that promotes the development of open societies around the world. OSI-New York develops and implements a variety of domestic and international programs in the areas of educational, social, and legal reform, and encourages public debate and policy alternatives in complex and often controversial fields. OSI-New York is part of a network of more than 24 autonomous nonprofit foundations and other organizations created and funded by philanthropist George Soros in Central and Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, Haiti, and South Africa, as well as in the United States.
© OSI, November 1997