The bulk of the population suffers from the stoppage of salary payments since August 1998, and the crisis has come as a great psychological shock to a population used to relative economic stability and an abundance of goods over the last five years.
In the short run, chaotic and alarmist reports from Russia, including predictions of mass civil disorders, caused a decrease of out-migration from the CIS and Baltic countries to Russia. A September 1998 survey in Kyrgyzstan showed a noticeable decrease in the intentions among local nationals to leave for Russia. According to Russia’s Federal Migration Service (FMS), the number of fresh arrivals has dropped by two to three times since August, in spite of the fact that early autumn has always been a peak time for migrants. In the long run, the crisis’ effects on migration depend on two questions. One: How vulnerable are other countries’ economies to the Russian troubles and what will its real outside influence be? Two: How fast and at what cost can Russia itself find a way out of the crisis?
Another question is the rise of emigration from Russia to Western countries. The 1997 out-migration (83,000 people) was at a median level for the past several years, and was directed mainly to Germany (58 percent), Israel (15.5 percent), and the United States (11 percent). Since August, the situation has changed, based on the number of people who have been approaching Western embassies in Moscow.
Some embassies have already an-nounced new enlarged migration quotas for Russian citizens. The first wave in this movement will be members of a devastated middle class, such as trade experts and financial brokers, as well as people from high-tech professions like computer experts and scientists.
As for forced migrants in Russia, the situation during the first half of 1998 had been better than in previous years. No doubt, the overall effect of the crisis is a negative one. In 1997, the FMS had registered 131,100 forced migrants (125,400 forced resettlers and 5,700 refugees). It was the lowest number since formal procedures were introduced in 1992. The biggest sending country of forced migrants remains Kazakstan (64,000). For many of these people the situation will go from bad to worse.
First, the high proportion of unemployed among them will become even higher in a situation of growing general unemployment. Second, inflation has devalued established loans and subsidies for purchasing and constructing houses and apartments. Those who have houses and apartments face serious difficulties to pay for wood, heating, and water supplies because of the rise in prices. Many cannot even buy basic foods and medical supplies. Third, the paralysis of the banking system was a great blow for many migrants’ organizations and firms, as well as individual families that actually lost their savings and financial resources. Fourth, the crisis has affected international organizations assisting forced migrants and refugees. UNHCR, International Organization for Migra-tion, and others are holding their money back until the situation improves, and it will take time to restore the affected programs.
The crisis has severely limited the ability of the FMS to implement programs. Major programs have been severely cut back. Construction of houses and distribution of subsidies have been minimized since August. Only about one third of the 388 million rubles designated for compensation of lost properties of forced migrants from Chechnya has been paid. From August to October 1998, no compensation has been paid at all. Practically, all FMS money is now spent on maintaining centers for provisional living and distributing small subsidies. Now, the daily allotment of eight rubles per forced migration is worth next to nothing when a kilo of white bread costs five rubles.
Prospects for Government-NGO Cooperation in
Russia
The following commentary is adapted from comments made by Lydia
Grafova during a roundtable discussion on October 20, 1998, at the Brookings
Institution in Washington. Ms. Grafova is a leader of the Moscow-based
Forum for Migrant Organization, and a visiting scholar at the Kennan Institute
in Washington.
Russia’s economic and political crisis offers an opportunity for unprecedented cooperation among government agencies, especially the FMS, and migration-related organizations. The framework for such cooperation has already been created in the form of a September 28 agreement that aims to better protect the civil rights of refugees and displaced persons in the Russian Federation.
The economic crisis has virtually paralyzed government agencies dealing with migration. The FMS has not disbursed funds since July. International organizations, including UNHCR, have also been severely impacted by the economic turmoil. UNHCR has even had difficulty accessing its bank accounts in Russia.
Prior to the onset of the crisis, FMS relations with migration-related nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) could be characterized as combative. The chance in Russia’s political and economic climate creates a greater need for cooperation. The Forum for Migrant Organizations comprises 143 member organization from 43 regions of Russia. Such associations of NGOs can help fill funding gaps experienced by government agencies, and help implement existing programs.
The FMS-Forum agreement pledges both sides to work jointly to foster tolerance for forced migrants, and explore methods to accommodate newcomers in a more effective manner. The two sides will also seek input from affected individuals in seeking new approaches to aaddress these matters
The UNHCR Viewpoint
The following commentary comes from UNHCR in Geneva.
The current economic crisis may have some negative impact on the capacity of Russian authorities to cater to the needs of a large group of refugees and involuntarily relocating persons. However, the reception and processing of asylum seekers and migrants has not been influenced by these events.
National refugee status determination procedures, outlined in the 1993 Law on Refugees, have been functioning in the Russian Federation since 1994. As of July 1, 1998, some 173,207 individuals have re-ceived refugee status in Russia. Among this group, 282 persons have come from outside the former Soviet Union. In addition, 966,394 persons, including 149,945 internally displaced persons from Chechnya, have been registered as involuntarily relocating persons.
An increasing number of territorial branches of the FMS, including the Moscow office, have started to process refugee claims submitted by Asian and African asylum seekers. UNHCR hopes that additional FMS territorial branches will follow. Eligibility procedures have been recently initiated for the backlog of cases from selected countries in Africa.
OSCE’s Perspective
The following commentary is from the director of OSCE’s Office for
Democratic Institutions and Human Rights in Warsaw.
The implications of (the Russian economic crisis) for migration in the former Soviet Union may be manifold. First, Russia may not be as attractive a destination for migrants from other Newly Independent States as it has been throughout most of the decade. Some groups of displaced persons who have been staying in Russia may now be more interested in returning to their countries of origin.
One such example are ethnic Ossets displaced from Georgia as a result of the Georgian-South Ossetian conflict in the late 1990s. Since the conditions for return are now improving in Georgia, many displaced persons may find that staying on the territory of the Russian autonomous region of North Ossetia-Alaniya is no longer the preferable option, given the financial crisis.
Growing regionalism is a consequence of Russia’s financial crisis that also may have implications for displaced persons. As has been well-documented, some Russian regions have attempted to sheild themselves from having displaced persons settle on their territory by means of discriminatory residency permit systems. Many regions appear to have reinstituted the propiska system despite numerous rulings against such practices by the Russian Consititutional Court. If allocations from the state budget to the regions for humanitarian assistance decrease, many regions may be tempted to introduce even tougher measures to restrict freedom of movement.
Ukraine’s Dilemma
The following commentary is provided by Ukrainian political scientist
Volodymir Prytula.
The economic crisis in Russia could have significant consequences for Ukraine. There are hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians who have migrated to Russia in order to find jobs, many of them working in the oil and gas sector. These workers could find themselves unemployed.
A significant number may decide to return to Ukraine, and they will encounter difficulties reorienting themselves. Ukraine has economic problems of its own. Thus, their return has the potential to aggravate social tensions. At the same time, some in Ukraine who would like to emigrate will not have sufficient funds to do so.
Russia’s Crisis and the Transcaucasian Republics’
Conundrum
The following commentary comes from Forced Migration Projects consultant
Marina Murvanidze, a Georgian national who is currently a visiting fellow
at the Woodrow Wilson School at Princeton University.
The economic crisis in Russia has the potential to negatively impact non-Russians living in the Russian Federation, especially those from the Caucasus and Central Asia, creating conditions that can lead to forced migration. In addition, the economic turmoil can reactivate tendencies that increase migration flows within Russia.
In the 1990s, there have been persistent abuses, especially in Moscow, of Caucasian nationalities, including those from Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia, who have suffered from xenophobic tendencies expressed by the indigenous population. There are hundreds of thousands of people of Caucasian nationalities currently living in Russia. The economic and political difficulties now being felt in Russia could heighten inter-ethnic antagonisms, causing those from the Caucasus, and other regions, to feel unwelcome and thus compelled to leave Russia.
Any potential rise in inter-ethnic tension in Russia could create a backlash effect in other former Soviet republics toward ethnic Russians living in those countries. In turn, this could force additional ethnic Russians to return to Russia. There are already five million such persons who have moved to Russia from other former Soviet republics. Many ethnic Russians felt compelled to leave, claiming that they suffered from discriminatory language and citizenship policies.
The Fallout in Central Asia
The following analysis is from Rozlana Taukina, President of the
Association of Independent Mass Media in Central Asia in Kazakstan.
The events in Moscow will have an impact, first of all, on the economy in Central Asia. The worsening of the situation will cause an increase in unemployment, and when people feel that their are no prospects in Central Asia, they will feel pressure to look for a better life elsewhere.
This is particularly so because there exists a very educated workforce, with many specialists of world class caliber in many fields. These people cannot find suitable work and, most importantly, they are unable to support their families. Language ability is not necessarily the major factor in fostering the desire to leave among those in Kazakstan. In recent months, many ethnic Kazaks have expressed the desire to leave. Their primary desire is to go abroad (beyond the CIS countries) to live and work. Australia has become a fashionable destination. The only barrier holding many back is English language ability. The events will also push those who have another nationality, especially ethnic Germans, to leave. As for Russian speakers, it is doubtful that they will make Russia a destination because of the critical situation in that country. They could hardly expect to live better now in Russia than in Central Asia. But they will likely explore other options. Life is becoming desperate and the economic impact of the Russian events will make things even more difficult.
The Impact on Migration in the Baltic States
The following commentary is contributed by Vello Pettai, the president’s
representative to the Presidential Roundtable on National Minorities in
Estonia.
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have not been significantly impacted by Russia’s political and economic crisis, in large part because Baltic trade with its eastern neighbor has been significantly reduced since the Soviet collapse in 1991. However, the relative prosperity of the Baltic states makes them potential migration destinations. The deterioration of economic and social conditions in Russia will exert migratory pressures.
To date, there have been no tangible signs of the Russian crisis spilling over into the Baltic states in human terms. Still, Baltic border and immigration officials are aware of the potential. On October 21, Andres Kollist, the head of Estonia’s Department of Citizenship and Immigration, stressed in a Russian-language TV program that Estonian legislation and procedures are ready to handle refugees, forced migrants, and other populations if necessary. At the same time, he stressed that he did not view significant in-migration from Russia as an imminent threat.
Kollist mentioned that Estonia has already accepted over a dozen asylum seekers, mostly from Africa and the Middle East. Estonia also has put in place facilities for housing such people despite limited financial resources.
A robust NGO sector could make important contributions to strengthening the rule of law in the South Caucasus—a region that has been devastated during the past decade by civil wars and separatist struggles. In particular, the formulation and implementation of durable remedies for the wide variety of migration-related dilemmas in the region would seem to require the active participation of local NGOs. Without such approaches, long-term stability will be difficult to achieve. But burdensome regulations—in particular heavy taxation and complicated registration procedures—frustrate the ability of many local NGOs to function properly.
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, governmental relationships with local NGOs in the South Caucasus have tended to be characterized by suspicion. Some officials regard NGOs as competitors for funding from the international community of donors. “First they viewed them as their enemies, now as competitors,” said one Azerbaijani NGO representative, who requested anonymity. Thus, those cases of successful cooperation between government and NGOs frequently have been more the result of personal relations and connections than of a jointly held social commitments or sense of purpose.
However, there are signs that the distrust that has marked government-local NGO relations is dissipating. Govern-ments in the region, in particular Georgia, are taking concrete steps to improve existing legislative frameworks. For example, legislation adopted covering grants in Georgia should ease the taxation burdens for local NGOs, thus bolstering the ability of local NGOs to operate. Georgia has taken the additional step of adopting the Law on Public Institutions, which is designed to streamline the registration process. An additional bill pending in the legislature covering charitable activity and charitable organizations would be “one of the most comprehensive and progressive NGO laws in the Newly Independent States,” said Natalia Bourjaily, the International Center for Not-for-Profit Law’s program director for the former Soviet Union.
Local NGOs in the South Caucasus are also taking steps to improve mutual contacts and cooperation. More coordinated action would enhance NGOs’ ability to interact with government agencies. Efforts to build a cross-border NGO network began following the May 1996 CIS Conference on migration-related issues, which adopted a comprehensive Program of Action. So far, four regional conferences have been held with the aim of promoting greater understanding of migration-related issues confronting Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, particularly in the conflict zones of Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh, and South Ossetia.
The meetings have been facilitated by funding from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the Dutch Refugee Council and the Norwegian Refugee Council. The gatherings have had a positive effect, leading to the creation of an NGO working group, as well as the publication of a quarterly informational bulletin Com-mon Migration Space. The Armenian Sociological Association, headed by Gevork Pogosian, who is also a consultant to the Forced Migration Projects, supervises the publication of the bulletin.
Cross-border cooperation has been additionally strengthened through implementation of the International Organization for Migration’s (IOM) National NGO Migration Sector Development Project in Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia. These projects are implemented by IOM in collaboration with well-established national NGOs, including the Armenian Sociological Association in Yerevan, Hayat International in Baku, Azerbaijan, and Multiple Assistance to Georgia in Tbilisi.
The IOM programs are designed to build the capacity of local NGOs by establishing resource centers which provide assistance and training on identifying funding sources and grant-proposal writing. The IOM programs also provide small-scale grants on a competitive basis, helping to implement migration-related monitoring projects.
Grant recipients praise the resource centers, saying they serve as a vital arena for the exchange of information. The steady expansion of contact among local NGOs has correspondingly increased their willingness to collaborate on the implementation of projects. Closer cooperation, in turn, improves operational efficiency and reduces the chances for duplication of effort.
The main strategic task now for local and international NGOs, as well as the donor community, is to build momentum for the expansion and strengthening of the independent sector. The international community should continue to encourage the governments of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia to improve the legislative frameworks governing NGO activities. In addition, steps should be taken to broaden awareness among government officials about the function of the independent sector in a civil society. At present, misperceptions abound. One Georgian NGO representative, who requested anonymity, recalled seeking a government recommendation for a grant application. When he approached an official for a letter of support, the official told him that in the event the NGO received the grant, the government agency itself would implement the project.
At present, NGOs are largely dependent on funding from international organizations. Some local NGO represent- atives express frustration over this situation, saying that fundraising can be a time-consuming and discouraging experience. In addition, the costs associated with meeting the funding requirements stipulated by various international organizations can significantly reduce the resources available to the intended beneficiaries among displaced persons.
Viable mechanisms should be developed to provide more NGOs with access to alternative sources of funding. NGOs also could benefit from capacity-building measures that create greater transparency in their operations. Transparency would increase understanding and trust among local NGOs, governmental agencies, and the general public in the South Caucasus, thus helping to strengthen civil society.
Emphasis in the expansion of capacity building should be placed on increasing outreach to NGOs in rural areas of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia. NGOs trying to operate in remote areas face significant obstacles in communication and transportation. The high cost of travel and communication means that many NGOs in rural areas function in virtual isolation. Many rural NGOs lack essential equipment, and some, such as the Nagorno Karabakh-based youth union Artsakha, lack even a permanent office.
The development of an enabling legislative environment, along with the emergence of potential income generation programs to help sustain NGOs, are hampered by a lack of awareness about the role of the independent sector in a democratic environment. Greater efforts should be made to educate government officials, the general public in the three South Caucasian countries, and even some NGO leaders themselves, about the role and responsibilities of NGOs in the development of an open society.
New approaches by the international community could help keep local NGO development on track in the South Caucasus. For instance, international financial institutions, including the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, could be utilized to encourage NGO growth, as well as to help bridge existing gaps between the independent sector and regional governments. At the same time, international financial institutions could provide technical assistance that helps local NGOs identify alternative sources of funding, specifically in exploring the feasibility of establishing, sustainable programs.
The continued development of the nongovernmental sector in the South Caucasus cannot be taken for granted. The modest improvements in recent months may provide reason for hope, but such hope can easily be dashed. The region’s social, political and economic transition is far from complete, and the new institutions created after the Soviet collapse remain fragile.
The September 7-10 meeting, held in The Hague, The Netherlands, marked the first substantial effort to bring all the major parties together for dialogue on Meskhetian Turk issues, in particular human rights, repatriation, and local integration. A nonbinding document adopted by participants said solutions should be sought under the framework provided by the 1996 CIS Conference on migration-related issues, and the provisions concerning the repat- riation of formerly deported peoples contained in the 1992 Bishkek agreement.
The meeting involved officials from Azerbaijan, Georgia, the Russian Federation, as well as representatives of international organizations and Meskhetian public organizations, including Vatan. The Forced Migration Projects (FMP), the OSCE High Commissioner for National Minorities, and UNHCR co-sponsored the meeting.
Meskhetian Turks are a formerly deported people, who were uprooted from their traditional homeland in Georgia in 1944, and deported mainly to Central Asia. There are approximately 200,000 Meskhetian Turks today living in former Soviet republics.
The conference document also stressed the need to confer the legal status of Meskhetian Turks in their current countries of residence, and underscored the importance of international humanitarian assistance in achieving durable solutions. All sides pledged to promote exchanges of information and take steps to promote greater understanding of repatriation-related issues.
The participants agreed to hold future meetings aimed at establishing an institutional framework for activities that promote both repatriation and the conferral of legal status.
Government representatives from Azerbaijan, Georgia and the Russian Federation said there was an urgent need to conduct opinion surveys aimed at determining both the current status and intentions of Meskhetian Turks. A Georgian official also called for international assistance in establishing programs to teach the Georgian language to Meskhetian Turks.
All participants agreed that the above issues should be included on the agenda for a next meeting.
In the wake of these renewed efforts to reach agreement on the repatriation issue, the FMP is publishing Meshketian Turks: Solutions and Human Security, a 72-page report which examines the economic, social, and political dimensions of issues concerning the Meskhetian Turks.
The report presents strategies to fortify both human and national security, and specific recommendations to manage the issue in ways that could ameliorate hardships and prevent inter-ethnic tensions, thus preventing forced displacement.
The gravity of the situation is reflected in the outcome of a demonstration in September 1998 in Georgia staged by disgruntled Meskhetian Turks. About 80 Meskhetian Turks from Azerbaijan, Georgia, and the Russian Federation staged a protest in Tbilisi, calling on Georgian authorities to rehabilitate the formerly deported people and take steps to facilitate their return to their homeland. Meshketian Turks: Solutions and Human Security will be available free of charge from the FMP in December.
“Any future return strategy should seek to enhance the individual choice of returnees,” Helton wrote in the October 16 letter. “Primary obstacles to re-turn are the continued lack of an adequate legal regime to protect property rights, and the inability of citizenship laws in the region to manage statelessness.”
Prospects for sustainable re-turn remain dim if existing policies are maintained. The relatively strong showing made by nationalist candidates in Bosnia’s election in September indicate that finding durable solutions may become more difficult now than in previous years. About 1.8 million people remain without new or restored homes in the former Yugoslavia, including almost 1 million internally displaced persons in Bosnia.
Many of the programs undertaken to date have not met expectations, and some are clearly not sustainable in their current form. One such initiative is UNHCR’s Open Cities Initiative, which strives to promote minority return to urban centers. According to the International Crisis Group, UNHCR and other agencies had spent upwards of $47 million on the Open Cities Initiative as of March. From this, a mere 582 minority returns had occurred, averaging out to more than $80,000 spent on each resettlement.
“The modest success of international efforts to inspire substantial voluntary return to Bosnia and Herzegovina, including significant minority return, indicates the need for a broad policy re-assessment prior to committing additional funds,” Helton wrote in the letter.
Clarifying lingering questions concerning property rights is a key to stimulating the return of the displaced. Existing mechanisms for the resolution of property rights disputes, specifically the Commission for Real Property Claims, remain underutilized largely because they fail to ad-dress property rights issues on a regional basis.
A regional framework should be developed to facilitate the resolution of interstate property rights issues. There is a similar need for a regional approach on citizenship issues.
“An appropriate approach…is for dual/multiple citizenship that seeks to avoid unnecessary statelessness, ensure durable solutions for refugees and displaced persons and enhance the choices available to returnees,” Helton wrote.
“Appropriate regional arrangements to uphold property and citizenship rights will be crucial to securing solutions compatible with notions of human dignity,” Helton added.
The FMP will be co-sponsoring a roundtable discussion December 10-12 in Budapest, Hungary, that will examine key issues related to the return of refugees and displaced persons. About 40 NGO leaders, experts and diplomats are expected to participate. The meeting will offer a venue to explore new approaches to repatriation dilemmas.
The Forced Migration Monitor is published bimonthly by
the Forced Migration Projects of the Open Society Institute-New York. The
Forced Migration Projects were established to monitor
circumstances in different regions of the world in order to provide the
international community with early warning of forced
movements of people, as well as to identify the social, economic, and political
conditions which cause such dislocations. The Projects
encourage early and effective humanitarian responses to migration emergencies;
advocate the humane treatment of those unable to return;
urge permanent solutions for those displaced; and promote measures that
avert individuals’ need to flee. The Projects gather
information concerning displacements and the circumstances that motivate
them,
concentrating primarily on the countries of the former
Soviet Union, the former Yugoslavia, Haiti, and Cuba.
Forced Migration Projects Open Society Institute
400 West 59th Street, 4th floor
New York, NY 10019
tel: (212) 548-0655
fax: (212) 548-4676
e-mail: refugee@sorosny.org
http://www.soros.org/migrate.html
Advisory Committee:
Ludmilla Alexeeva
Jeremy R. Azrael
Arthur C. Helton (convenor)
Murray Feshbach
Morten Kjaerum
Aryeh Neier
Barnett R. Rubin
Warren Zimmermann
Staff:
Arthur C. Helton, Director
Justin Burke
Eliana Jacobs
Marie J. Jeannot
Paulette A. Layton
Alexander Lupis
Tatyana Lyutova
The Open Society Institute-New
York is a private operating and grantmaking foundation that promotes the
development of open
societies around the world.
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in Central and Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, Haiti, and South
Africa, as well as in the United
States.
© OSI, November 1998