Table of Contents
Trafficking of Women in the Former Soviet Union
German Forced Return of Bosnians
UNHCR’s Open Cities Initiative in Bosnia: A Cause for Optimism?
Refugee Forum Promotes Protection of Aid Workers
Trafficking of Women in the Former Soviet Union
The United Nations estimates that as many as 4 million people are smuggled into foreign countries each year, generating up to $7 billion annually in illicit profits for criminal syndicates. A significant portion of the people trafficked are women who find themselves trapped in debt bondage contracts. They are often forced to work against their will as prostitutes, domestic servants, or in sweatshops.
The Global Survival Network (GSN) recently completed a two-year investigation into international trafficking, focusing on women from the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). The study also examined efforts by governments in Western Europe to curb illegal operations. A major conclusion is that government initiatives against trafficking in many Western European states often have an adverse effect on female victims.
For many Western European governments, the primary objectives in fighting human smuggling are to check illegal migration and to crack down on organized criminal activity. But tighter immigration regulations increase the reliance of many women on apparently legitimate organizations that promise to help with arranging entry visas and passports to enter Western Europe. Once they arrive in Western Europe, fear of arrest, deportation, or detention prevent many of these women, particularly those forced into prostitution, from reporting instances of abuse by traffickers.
Anti-organized crime measures can cause additional harm to trafficked women. Witness protection programs are practically nonexistent for those who testify in trafficking cases, leaving women vulnerable to retribution. Incentives for female victims to testify are minimal. At most, a removal order may be suspended for the duration of a trial, with no guarantee of residency after proceedings are completed.
To better profile some of the strengths and weaknesses of antitrafficking initiatives, a closer examination of practices in two “receiving” countries, the Nether-lands and Belgium, is useful. These two countries have been among the most responsive to female trafficking victims, implementing measures that could serve as models for other Western European nations.
In 1988, the Dutch government adopted a unique practice that granted temporary residence permits for victims of trafficking. The Dutch Aliens Law states that the mere suspicion of trafficking is sufficient for a woman to be granted a stay of deportation while she determines whether or not to testify. In 1993, the stay of deportation was extended to nonvictim witnesses who are willing to testify.
If a trafficking victim decides to give testimony against the criminal networks that brought her into the country, or forced her into abusive and illegal working conditions, her deportation proceedings will be postponed for the duration of the judicial proceedings. During the period of the trial, she is also entitled to social security benefits, safe shelters, legal, medical, and psychological assistance.
The Dutch Attorney General has expanded the criminal definition of prostitution to facilitate prosecution of traffickers. The definition now covers the use of violence, or the threat of violence to coerce a woman into prostitution. Many legal codes around the world, as well as the 1949 Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of the Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others, neglect the critical element of force, violence, or coercion when defining the crimes surrounding prostitution and trafficking. By formulating a new crime which specifically criminalizes the violence or coercion used by individuals to force women into prostitution, the Dutch law fills an important gap.
Another significant initiative by the Dutch government, in cooperation with the European Union, is to fund awareness campaigns in “sending” countries. The La Strada Programme for the “Prevention of Traffic in Women in Central and Eastern Europe” has pilot projects in Poland, the Czech Republic, and Ukraine.
In Belgium, victims, during criminal investigations, are given a 45-day “rest period” in which to decide whether to file charges, and/or give testimony against traffickers. If a woman chooses to proceed with charges, she will be granted a temporary residence permit for three months, during which time she is entitled to social benefits if she is unable to find employment. If the trial continues beyond three months, she receives a renewable six-month residence permit.
In 1995, Belgian authorities established shelters in Brussels and Liege for victims of trafficking. These shelters provide social, medical, legal, and psychological support for female victims. Ultimately, officials at the shelters may help female victims to file a petition for permanent residency. Such status is sometimes granted as a reward for providing evidence used in the prosecution of a trafficking operation.
Despite such progressive initiatives, there is an ongoing need to boost implementation efforts. The Foundation Against Traffic in Women (STV), a Dutch nongovernmental group partially funded by the Dutch government to serve the needs of foreign prostitutes, reports that existing mechanisms are not always utilized. Shortcomings in program implementation have also been identified in Belgium, where access to temporary residency for female trafficking victims seems unnecessarily restricted. The existing discrepancies of victims’ rights on paper and their treatment in practice should be remedied.
There are several challenges now facing advocates for migrant women and the victims of trafficking. The top priority is to convince other Western European nations of the need to address the victimization of women at the hands of criminal traffickers. Unless advocates speak out, and governments listen, antitrafficking measures, driven primarily by governmental preoccupation to control illegal immigration and fight organized crime, will continue to have severe repercussions for female victims.
This article was contributed by Gillian Caldwell, JD, co-director of the Global Survival Network, a nonprofit organization based in Washington, DC. A written report and documentary video based on GSN’s investigation into trafficking operations out of Russia and CIS states are available by contacting: ingsn@igc.apc.org, or by writing GSN, P.O. Box 73214, Washington, DC 20009; tel (202) 387-0028, fax (202) 387-2590. Copies are available in English and in Russian. An international conference on human trafficking issues is scheduled to take place in Moscow on November 3-5. Queries regarding the conference can be addressed to <gdd6@columbia.edu>. Further information on receiving state initiatives can be obtained from http://home. pi.net/~notraf/.
German Forced Return of Bosnians
One morning last June in Berlin, four police officers confronted a young Muslim asylum seeker from the former Yugoslavia standing at a bus stop. They demanded to see the man’s identity papers, but handcuffed him before he could dig the documents out of his pocket. Then they bundled him into a van and roared off to a refugee detention center.
The young man, Fahrudin H. (whose last name is being withheld at the request of his lawyer), was held incommunicado, his personal belongings temporarily confiscated. German guards responded to his request to communicate with friends with taunts of “Abschiebung, Abschiebung,” which means “deportation.” The next morning he was driven directly on to the tarmac at Tegel airport, where he was deposited onto a regularly scheduled Air Bosnia flight to Sarajevo, just one minute before departure time. Two German police officers were detailed to escort him back to his homeland. Once seated, his handcuffs were removed and personal belongings returned.
Fahrudin is one of 32 Bosnians forcibly removed from Berlin since the December 1995 signing of the Dayton peace accords. Throughout Germany, nearly 300 Bosnians have been forcibly returned to Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Although not alone in being forcibly returned, Fahrudin’s experience is somewhat exceptional in that his removal clearly in contempt of German law. Fahrudin should not have been subject to removal because he had already petitioned the Berlin Administrative Court to order an extension of his temporary protection status. Germany had traditionally offered such status to war refugees from the former Yugoslavia, and the court had accordingly issued a temporary order barring Fahrudin’s forced return pending the determination of his case. But because the court order had somehow not been entered into his police file, Fahrudin ended up being summarily deported.
Local media quoted the president of Berlin’s Administrative Court as describing Fahrudin’s deportation as a “very bad mistake.” At the same time, officials show little inclination to reverse the decision.
That mistakes were made should not come as a surprise. One Berlin lawyer who works closely with Bosnian refugees described the Berlin government policy as a campaign of “massive psychological pressure” designed to indiscriminately rid the city of Bosnian refugees.
During the fighting in the Balkans, Germany absorbed about 340,000 Bosnians, at a cost of about 16 billion deutschmarks (roughly $10 billion). About 30,000 Bosnians have settled in Berlin. The expenses involved in accommodating those who fled have taxed the German social welfare system, which is beleaguered by chronically high unemployment. Now many Germans feel it is time for Bosnians to return home. As an inducement to return, federal and state governments offer cash payments and travel assistance to refugees.
Each of Germany’s 16 federal states— including Berlin—has considerable discretion in implementing a December 1995 decision to “return the Bosnian war refugees in a gradual fashion.” Most German states have chosen a lenient approach. Virtually all have continued to issue temporary protection to Muslims and Croats who originally come from the Serb-controlled part of Bosnia. Experi-ence suggests that such individuals are often physically prevented by Serbs from returning to their original home, and that they face difficulties in registering for humanitarian assistance anywhere else.
Berlin is among the handful of German states taking a tough line on repatriation, subjecting all Bosnians, regardless of place of origin, to the threat of forced removal. Although relatively few have been forcibly returned, their examples have had an intimidating effect on the refugee community. Authorities also utilize bureaucratic procedures to pressure Bosnians to leave. In the past, Bosnians were required to renew their temporary protection status (Duldung) every six months. Under current Berlin practice, when they try to renew a Duldung, they have their passports taken away, and receive a temporary identification document giving them a one-to-three-month period within which they must “voluntarily” leave the country.
One Berlin city councilwoman described the city’s approach as chicanery: “The goal of these policies is to make life as uncomfortable as possible for the refugees.... They are attempting to drive people away with lots of expensive bureaucracy and harassment.”
Those who resist the pressure to leave face the possibility of deportation, an ordeal that no one would want to endure. Deportees are rarely given the opportunity to pack, sort out their affairs, or say goodbye to anyone before their departure. Once deported, these individuals usually are forbidden to return to Germany under any circumstances, even to visit family members legally residing there.
For those Bosnians in Berlin who have reason to fear returning to the former Yugoslavia, such as Muslims from Serb-controlled areas, few avenues of relief are available in their attempts to remain in Germany. Authorities discourage asylum applications, viewing such action as an “abuse of hospitality.” The only practical way to remain in Germany is by seeking a court-ordered Duldung. This is the route that Fahrudin had taken before his deportation. Court-ordered protection is working for hundreds of other Bosnians whose cases are pending before the various chambers of the Berlin Administrat-ive Courts. An estimated 60 percent of Bosnians in Berlin are non-Serbs from Serb-held areas, and fear of the conditions awaiting them upon return are driving this group into court en masse.
At the same time, some asylum seekers, especially those unfamiliar with the German language and the country’s legal system, have withdrawn petitions to the court and offered to repatriate “voluntarily.” The motivation for such action is to avoid deportation, and thereby retain the option of re-turning to Ger-many at some point in the future. These people, advocates say, do not understand that a court-ordered Duldung protects against deportation.
The harshest consequences of forced return are frequently felt only after the individual’s arrival back in his or her homeland. In Fahrudin’s case, the efficiency of the German removal process gave way to disorganization once he reached Sarajevo, where there is virtually no infrastructure to accommodate returnees.
His immediate concern upon arrival in the Bosnian capital was housing. Luckily for Fahrudin, his sister was living in Sarajevo with her husband’s family. He was able to move in with her, but his doing so exacerbated an already very “cramped” situation. The four-bedroom house now accommodates four families, 11 people in all.
Registering with the local authorities proved to be the next hurdle, one that Fahrudin still has not cleared. Official registration is often required for receiving humanitarian assistance and social benefits, including medical care. However, due largely to the shortage of resources throughout Bosnia, many local authorities are reluctant to register returning refugees, unless they are prewar residents of the community, or they can prove that they already have their own accommodations.
“I still have not been registered,” Fahrudin said. “I tried to explain that I had spent the last five years in Berlin. However, the officials demanded proof. The only proof I had were papers that I had left sitting in my room in Berlin and which I had not been allowed to collect before deportation.”
The Berlin government has balked at the idea of addressing Fahrudin’s complaints. His lawyer originally called for his deportation order to be reversed, but the recalcitrance of Berlin authorities means a reversal of the deportation action—although it was illegal—is unlikely. Fahrudin’s attorney is trying to arrange for temporary readmission, which would allow him to recover documents needed to register in Sarajevo. He does not know how much longer he will be able to stay with his sister and he cannot re-turn to his native region, Sandzak, a Muslim-majority ar- ea in Serbia. Serbian security forces are stepping up the persecution of Mus-lims in Sandzak, according to published reports.
Like many Sandzak Muslims, Fahrudin applied for and received Bosnian citizenship, as tensions in the Balkans mounted during the early 1990s. He arrived in Germany in 1993. Asked about the future, Fahrudin said he hopes to someday return to Germany to get answers.
Fahrudin’s case clearly demonstrates that forced returns can be a source of grave injustice, an issue that has been of concern to the Forced Migration Projects. The policy is fraught with the potential for serious human rights violations. If nothing else, the process is humiliating to those who must endure it. All German states should suspend forcibly returning asylum seekers until conditions on the ground in the former Yugoslavia are able to sustain their arrival. At the very least, German states should adopt safeguards to ensure the observance of legal protections for refugees.
UNHCR’s Open Cities Initiative in Bosnia: A Cause for Optimism?
A thorny issue in post-war Bosnia is the return of refugees and displaced persons to towns and villages in which they would be part of an ethnic minority. The obstacles to voluntary repatriation are formidable, and the numbers of those participating thus far are small. The question of the advisability of encouraging such returns is controversial.
The Open Cities Initiative (OCI) promotes minority returns and could help resolve existing repatriation dilemmas. Launched in March 1997 by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) with support from the United States, OCI aims to identify cities where reconciliation between ethnic communities is possible, then encourage local authorities to declare publicly their willingness to allow minority groups to return to their former homes and participate as full members of the community. The city is promptly rewarded with funds for housing reconstruction and other pressing needs.
The program has registered some successes in its first six months of operation, thus presenting the international community with an opportunity to build momentum for repatriation, which is a key to ensuring the long-term success of the Dayton Peace process.
Since July 1997, four cities—Konjic, Busovaca, Vogosca, and Bihac—have been declared “open.” These examples of enlightened self-interest on the part of the cities, along with the great personal courage on the part of the returnees, serve as a small but encouraging sign for the future of a multiethnic Bosnia.
“People want to have their normal lives back,” notes Sarah Poole, deputy refugee coordinator for the US Embassy in Sarajevo. This assessment was echoed by Darko Andelic, head of the Ministry of Reconstruction in Konjic, and a minority member himself, who cited being able to “sit in a cafe without fear of intimidation” as one of the benefits of living in an Open City.
When the Dayton peace agreements were signed in December 1995, more than 2.4 million Bosnians were refugees or internally displaced. Their right to return freely to their homes was specifically recognized in the Dayton accords, and the early exercise of this right was an important objective in establishing a lasting peace. According to UNHCR, there were 33,570 minority returns in the first six months of 1997, nearly all of whom belonged to the Muslim-Croat Federa-tion in Bosnia. Only 1,200 refugees and displaced persons returned to the Republika Srpska (RS).
More than 18 months after the signing of the Dayton accords, almost 690,000 refugees are waiting to return to their prewar residences. Few can entertain hope of returning in the near future. It is unclear how many of the 690,000 would be in the ethnic minority if they returned to their prewar homes, but the number is substantial, perhaps several hundred thousand. And this figure does not include internally displaced persons also in need of a durable solution.
Konjic illustrates the possibilities, as well as the problems of the Open City concept in promoting repatriation. This industrial city of 44,000, about 20 miles southwest of Sarajevo, had a Muslim majority of 54 percent before the war. Bosnian Croats made up 26 percent of the population, while Bosnian Serbs comprised 15 percent. Bitter fighting occurred in and around Konjic during the war. Muslim forces eventually gained control of the region, forcing Croats and Serbs to flee. Three Muslims and one Bosnian Croat from Konjic have been indicted by the War Crimes Tribunal in the Hague.
Despite the war’s trauma, Konjic was the first city recognized under OCI, and a steady flow of minority returnees have been arriving since the city’s designation. Konjic benefits from having flexible leadership with mayor Almir Alikadic, a Muslim. And it helps that Alikadic is supported by the top leadership of the Muslim-dominated Party of Democratic Action, a major political force in Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Muslim-Croat Fed-eration.
Another factor facilitating repatriation is demographics: even if all prewar residents returned, Muslims would retain a comfortable majority. There is no risk of being demographically overwhelmed. A third factor is the bountiful attention lavished on the city by a variety of international actors. For instance, U.S. Ambassador to the UN Bill Richardson visited Konjic during his recent trip to the Balkans. Such VIP visits increase media attention.
What makes Open Cities attractive to returnees is the fact that the urban centers are eligible for up to $500,000 in multisectoral assistance, with the money designed to benefit all ethnic groups. Reconstructing the shattered housing stock is perhaps the top priority. Easing the severe housing shortage would significantly reduce the strain that returning minority group members can place on the fragile social infrastructure. Other OCI projects in Konjic include the construction of a primary school and a social services center.
The Open City experience in Konjic has encountered some problems. Nedeljko Stojanovic, president of the Association of Serb Nationality Citizens in Konjic, states that there is no discrimination in schools or in employment. However, he says city authorities have been slow in restoring some apartments to their prewar Serb occupants. Stojanovic identifies the Federation’s wartime Law on Abandoned Property as a major barrier to returns.
Another obstacle facing repatriates is that many are subject to pressures from the leadership in their places of refuge. Many wartime leaders on all sides remain in power, and their vision is still dominated by the biases that produced “ethnic cleansing.” Authorities in Konjic have had some success in overcoming the opposition of advocates of ethnic purity, and have implemented a variety of measures, including opening up the police force to minorities. In addition, an information campaign, run by the American Refugee Committee (ARC), tries to assuage the concerns of returnees.
The value of this approach is underscored by Domagoj Nikolic, an ARC liaison officer in Konjic, who said that the number of families applying to return was on the rise, and observed that “the main difference between this year and last is that people see there is progress in Konjic and are hopeful.”
Enticing returnees from the Republika Srpska poses a bigger challenge, since intimidation and violence are used to discourage repatriation. ARC and the Danish Refugee Council are trying to establish a liaison office in the RS for potential returnees. Nevertheless, some Bosnian Serbs are torn by the “return dilemma.” They would like to go back, but worry aware that if they are not able to stay in their former homes, they will not be able to go back to the RS.
The Konjic example is generally regarded as the most successful of the four OCI locations. Other Open Cities have experienced greater difficulties. The Sarajevo suburb of Vogosca, for example, was the scene of a disastrous assessment visit in August of this year by former Serb residents. Displaced persons from Eastern Bosnia, now living in Vogosca, held the Bosnian Serb visitors and the international staff accompanying them hostage for seven hours before they could be evacuated.
In examining ways to improve OCI, the international community must confront a number of issues that complicate the entire repatriation process, not only minority return. Particularly problematic is the reliance of officials in both of Bosnia’s political entities on wartime legislation governing property and tenancy rights.
Laws on abandoned property were passed by all three sides during the war, legitimizing the use by displaced persons of property abandoned by fleeing refugees. In some cases this was a conscious effort to cement the results of ethnic cleansing. In others, it was a pragmatic attempt to regulate the chaotic situation of displaced persons who sought shelter in abandoned homes. The practical effect at present is that nearly all potential returnees whose homes were occupied during the war face lengthy delays in regaining possession of their former residences. These difficulties are compounded when the returnee is a member of a minority group.
Many property laws were adopted under the pressures of war, and no longer accurately reflect the on-the-ground situation. They should be amended, or abolished altogether, to better take into account current conditions. The Muslim-Croat Federation Law on Abandoned Apartments, for instance, has been characterized as arbitrary and discriminatory by the High Representa-tive, yet it remains on the books, comprising a major impediment to returns.
Potential returnees who owned houses, rather than apartments, have fared somewhat better under Federation law, which at least allows for a procedure to establish the previous owner’s rights and to evict the current tenants. However, the process can be time-consuming. And in some cases, especially where the returning property owner is among the ethnic minority, police have refused to carry out eviction orders.
Property laws in the RS also pose significant obstacles to repatriation. The RS Law on the Use of Deserted Property, for instance, has been found by the High Representative to violate the Dayton accords since it conditions the right to return on reciprocity. It purports to provide a pseudo-legal basis for preventing non-Serbs from reclaiming their prewar property.
The Forced Migration Projects have called for the repeal of wartime property laws that obstruct repatriation, and have urged the international community to offer incentives to those municipalities that welcome the return of refugees and displaced persons.
Outside the legislative realm, there are several general problems that frustrate all movement, including the lack of an independent media that is a source of unbiased information, and dire economic conditions throughout much of Bosnia that have produced unemployment rates of over 50 percent in some areas. The widespread presence of landmines is another significant deterrent. About 30 people are killed each month by landmines left over from the war. It is estimated that only 60 percent of the minefields in Bosnia have been identified. Thus far, demining efforts have proceeded slowly.
Facilitating improvements in communications and transport could reinforce repatriation efforts. At present, traveling in the country poses daunting logistical challenges, particularly when crossing the Inter-Entity Boundary Line (IEBL) . Telephone links across the IEBL are limited, rendering it hard for prospective returnees to get information about their home communities and, should they decide to return, to remain in contact with any family members who remain displaced.
International pressure on those opposing minority return is needed if the lingering problems confronting OCI are to be surmounted. OCI also deserves a greater financial commitment from donors. The U.S. government deserves credit for its leadership in promoting minority returns, including the allocation of $6 million in support of OCI projects implemented by Catholic Relief Services and the pledge of an additional $8 million to UNHCR. Other donor governments should join the United States in supporting OCI, as well as in supporting UNHCR.
Despite its promise, the social volatility surrounding the repatriation of ethnic minorities means that OCI should continue to proceed cautiously. Initial success has generated interest, as about two dozen cities overall have pursued “Open City” status. Standards for OCI designation should remain stringent. Perhaps a period of retrenchment is necessary to avoid a repetition of the unfortunate incident in Vogosca. Care should be taken to ensure that Open Cities are positive examples and showcases for prosperity, generated by the spirit of tolerance and inclusiveness.
Donor governments and organizations can help promote OCI’s further success by supporting the strict enforcement of the Dayton accords. The international community should also support a moratorium on the forced return of Bosnians who are temporarily living in Western Europe. Germany has carried out hundreds of forced returns already, and Switzerland’s federal government has approved such plans. This action could be counterproductive, harming OCI’s chances for success. Forced returns place additional stress on the social and economic infrastructure of fragile Bosnian communities, thus serving as a potential source of renewed interethnic conflict. The Forced Migration Projects have thus called on authorities in Germany and Switzerland to suspend forced returns.
OCI could provide a useful way forward to achieve the revival of a multiethnic Bosnia. Whether it will fulfill its initial promise depends, as so much does in the peace process, on the sustained will of the international community.
This article was contributed by Kate Balian, who is on leave from UNHCR. The opinions expressed in this article are not necessarily those of UNHCR.
Refugee Forum Promotes Protection of Aid Workers
Those involved in humanitarian assistance efforts have faced growing safety risks in recent years, perhaps the worst example being the December 1996 slaying of six International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) field workers in Chechnya. There is an immediate need to formulate mechanisms that afford aid workers greater personal security. Otherwise, essential humanitarian assistance efforts in the future may well be jeopardized.
A meeting of the Refugee Forum, held September 9 in New York, discussed both the changing nature of aid worker security and possible remedies that could alleviate existing concerns. “The Red Cross emblem no longer necessarily protects,” said Walter A. Fuelleman, the ICRC’s delegate to the United Nations and one of the featured speakers at the gathering.
Many conflicts in the 1990s have been internecine, and not wars between nation-states. This poses new challenges for aid workers, who now find themselves targeted for attack because of their close association with relief supplies. Combatants often perceive such supplies, including cash and personal assets, as an important strategic resource. In addition, providing aid to civilian populations can sometimes be construed as a hostile act by one of the warring sides.
Fuelleman said it is imperative for aid workers to observe strict neutrality in conflict zones. “Behavior is key to averting most deliberate attacks,” he said. Meanwhile, Maha Muna of the International Rescue Committee (IRC) said relief organizations must make a more concerted effort to explain the impartial nature of their operations to local populations. A robust debate ensued on the concept of impartiality in the new world disorder.
Several aid organizations, including the IRC, have announced plans to introduce a safety training program specifically tailored for humanitarian aid workers. Currently, the only security training available emulates military practices, often incompatible with the work carried out by representatives of international relief and local nongovernmental organizations.
The Forced Migration Projects published a special report on the occasion of the meeting, which examines the utilization of a legal framework to facilitate protection, including the importance of states acceding to the Conven-tion on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel. This treaty, which could cover NGOs under certain circumstances, would encourage preventative action by states and facilitate the prosecution of offenders. The publication, Protecting Aid Workers: Prospects and Challenges, is available at no cost from the FMP.
The Refugee Forum was launched to provide researchers, practitioners, and policymakers an opportunity to meet on a bimonthly basis to reflect critically on various aspects of the international refugee regime. The forum is jointly sponsored by the FMP, International Center for Migration, Ethnicity, and Citizenship at the New School for Social Research, the IRC and Human Rights Watch.
The Forced Migration Monitor is published bimonthly by the Forced Migration Projects of the Open Society Institute-New York. The Forced Migration Projects were established to monitor circumstances in different regions of the world in order to provide the international community with early warning of forced movements of people, as well as to identify the social, economic, and political conditions which cause such dislocations. The Projects encourage early and effective humanitarian responses to migration emergencies; advocate the humane treatment of those unable to return; urge permanent solutions for those displaced; and promote measures that avert individuals’ need to flee. The Projects gather information concerning displacements and the circumstances that motivate them, concentrating primarily on the countries of the former Soviet Union, the former Yugoslavia, Haiti, and Cuba.
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