An analysis of the armed conflict in Chechnya from 1994 to 1996 may
provide some indications as to the way the situation in Kosovo will develop,
specifically, the duration and ferocity of the conflict, and its consequences
in respect of forced migration.
One is struck by the many similarities between the conflicts in Chechnya
and Kosovo. Both conflicts are unfolding on territory in which 90 percent
of the population are Muslims (Albanians in Kosovo and Chechens in Chechnya)
who mistrust federal authorities (Yugoslavia, Russia), and who support
the demands of the corresponding national movements for the creation of
independent states. Both national movements emerged in 1991 following the
dissolution of the USSR and communist Yugoslavia. Both movements formed
military units, the Armed Forces of Ichkeria in Chechnya and the Kosovo
Liberation Army in Albania.
Armed Chechen groups are active not only in Chechnya but in the neighboring republics of Dagestan and Ingushetia populated by Chechens and the kindred Ingush. Likewise, the Albanian rebels are active not only in Kosovo, but also in the Western parts of Macedonia, where Albanians are predominant. In both rebel armies, foreign mercenaries or volunteers from Islamic states have enlisted. The Chechen and Albanian diasporas as well as some international Islamic organizations assist the rebels financially and militarily. In July 1998, for example, the German authorities had to call for an immediate stop to the collection of donations for the Kosovo Liberation Army from Albanian immigrants in Germany. Something similar happened during the Russian-Chechen war from 1994 to 1996 when financial and military assistance flowed to the Chechen rebels from the Chechen diasporas in the CIS countries, the Middle East, Europe, and the United States.
But along with these often superficial similarities, there are fundamental differences in the way the Kosovo and Chechen conflicts have developed. First, there is the question of territorial status. In the Chechen case, compromise would seem impossible. Chechens want outright independence, while Russian officials want Chechnya to remain within the Federation, enjoying broad powers of autonomy. Russian federal authorities have recognized the constitution and sovereignty of the Chechen Republic within the Federation, its legitimately elected president, parliament, and other bodies of state power. Thus, Chechnya remains technically an autonomous republic within the Russian Federation. De facto, however, Chechnya has been effectively an independent state since the autumn of 1996. So, the Russian authorities have no way of upgrading the formal status of Chechnya within the Russian Federation, while the recognition of Chechnya’s independence would run counter to the Russian Constitution that does not provide for the secession of any region from the Federation.
By contrast, in Kosovo there are several options for upgrading the status of the territory within Yugoslavia. For one, its status as an autonomous province within Serbia can be restored. Before the breakup of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Kosovo, as well as Vojvodina, had the status of autonomous territories within the Socialist Federal Republic of Serbia. But in 1989, the Yugoslav government stripped Kosovo of that status. It was only after the recent outbreak of violence that Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic told Western European diplomats that he would consider autonomy for the territory. Alternatively, Kosovo can be granted the status of a full-fledged republic within federal Yugoslavia, along with Serbia and Montenegro. This is the option backed initially by the Albanian authorities and the moderate Kosovars, headed by Ibrahim Rugova, leader of the self-proclaimed republic of Kosovo. The international community also backs some form of political autonomy to Kosovo.
To sum up, it appears that reaching a political solution to the Chechen conflict may be more challenging than resolving the situation in Kosovo. On the other hand, the odds are lower in Chechnya of continued military action involving the regular federal army.
It is safe to say that Moscow will not resume military action in Chechnya in the foreseeable future. The Russian federal forces suffered a crushing military defeat there, and have totally lost control over the situation in that republic. Russia is even unable to control the situation on the Chechen stretch of its border with Georgia. Indeed, Moscow has had to cut its armed forces deployed around Chechen borders. Some Russian military units even had to be withdrawn from Dagestan to minimize casualties caused by the raids of Chechen fighters.
The central authorities in Serbia, on the contrary, have significant forces in Kosovo, which control key points in the territory. In July and August, the Yugoslav army re-occupied all the main centers in the province and opened up roads. The rebels have been pushed back to the Albanian border and in most cases have had to withdraw to rural areas. But one should bear in mind that the war in Kosovo is a guerrilla war. A war against partisans cannot be won easily, especially if they have the assistance of fellow countrymen abroad. This makes one think not only of Chechnya, but also of Tajikistan and Afghanistan. The experience of guerrilla warfare in those countries would seem to suggest that the armed conflict in Kosovo will be protracted.
Indeed, it will probably last longer than the Chechen conflict. Final victory over Albanian guerrillas is unlikely, but the Kosovo Liberation Army has much less chance of overpowering the regular Serbian army than the Chechens had in the struggle against the Russian army. It is not just that the Serbian army is better trained and has more combat experience than the Russian army. More importantly, unlike the Russian army, it has the support of public opinion inside the country. It will be recalled that in Russia most of the public opposed the deployment of the Russian army in Chechnya, and especially the launching of hostilities. On the contrary, in Serbia the population hails the victories of its army over the Albanian separatists. And it opposes any mediation leading to a peaceful settlement of the Kosovo conflict. In a referendum this year, 95 percent of Serbians backed the position of the country’s leadership, which opposes the participation of international organizations in the settlement of the Kosovo conflict. It should be remembered that Russia promptly agreed to OSCE mediation in the Chechen conflict, and the representatives of that organization made a major contribution to bringing about a ceasefire.
Russian public opinion has become reconciled to the idea that Chechnya will sooner or later gain independence. Some probable candidates for the post of Russian President in the 2000 elections, including Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov, have even suggested speeding up the process of expelling Chechnya from the Federation. Nothing similar can be observed in Serbian society, in which the prevailing view is that Kosovo is an inalienable part of Serbia.
The differences in popular consciousness can, to a certain extent, be attributed to the differences in the histories of the two territories. It took Russian forces decades before they were finally able to conquer Chechnya, annexing the territory in 1859. Russians have always been in the minority there. As for Kosovo, it denominates the cultural cradle of modern Serbia. Albanians became a majority in the territory fairly recently, after World War II. Accordingly, the Serbians consider Kosovo to be as much their homeland as it is that of the Albanians. Russians in Chechnya have always felt themselves to be foreigners.
Having noted the substantial differences in the Kosovo and Chechen armed conflicts, one cannot help being struck by the amazing and very unfortunate similarity of the character of combat actions, and the profound delusion of those rulers, whether Russian or Serbian, who hope to solve problems by armed force.
What is happening in Kosovo at present is highly reminiscent of the Chechen war. One thinks of the triumphant reports in 1995 and 1996 about Russian troops seizing the strongholds of Chechen fighters. It seemed that one final effort would win the war. But this did not happen. As soon as the offensive was suspended and the troops were withdrawn, fresh Chechen forces descended from the mountains and regained the lost positions without a shot being fired because they enjoyed the support of the local population.
Something similar may happen in Kosovo. The Kosovo Liberation Army has retreated, but it has not been destroyed. Soon, the Serbians will likely have to retake the cities of Malisevo, Unik, and Lapusnik, from which the rebels have been driven out, and then they may have to retake them for the third and the fourth time just as in the case of the Chechen cities that were the bases of armed resistance—Bamut, Gudermes, Vedeno, and others.
In spite of the successes of the summer military offensive, the Serbians may become bogged down in Kosovo. The only theoretical possibility of crushing the resistance is waging a war of annihilation, attempting to kill or drive out the entire Albanian population of 2 million —an outcome the international community will not allow.
Objectively, Belgrade is at present more interested in political settlement than the separatist leaders. But Albanians do not relish such a prospect. As always happens in the course of military actions, radicals tend to strengthen their political positions. In Kosovo, the Albanian radicals seek the creation of an independent state and unification with neighboring Albania.
If the Kosovo conflict develops into a protracted guerrilla war, the number of refugees from Kosovo will far exceed those forced from Chechnya. According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, there are about 250,000 displaced from Kosovo outside Yugoslavia. The Federal Migration Service in Russia recorded 149,000 forced migrants during the time of the self-proclaimed independence of Chechnya. The potential for forced migration from Chechnya has been practically exhausted because most of the displaced were ethnic Russians, virtually all of whom have by now left the republic. The refugees from Kosovo, on the other hand, are mostly the representatives of the ethnic majority and the reserves for such an outflow remain large.
The cause of the mass flight of Albanian civilians is not connected exclusively to the actual hostilities. Another factor is the fear of reprisals by the Yugoslav army. And if the guerrilla movement strengthens in Kosovo, there will inevitably be attempts at the forcible recruitment of fighters into the Kosovo Liberation Army, leading to further reprisals on the part of Serbian authorities and the army.
To be sure, the escalation of the armed conflict in Kosovo is not inevitable. But if the Kosovo problem, like that of Chechnya, is to be solved by peaceful political means, the parties to the conflict must demonstrate greater readiness to negotiate.
One decision concerns the role of the Commission on Real Property Claims. An honest evaluation is needed to determine the extent that the property commission can contribute to the fulfillment of the goals set out in the DPA.
In theory, the property commission has the authority to resolve tenancy disputes that comprise a major obstacle to return. Annex VII of the DPA gives refugees and displaced persons the option to return to their prewar homes or be compensated for their property. In turn, it gives the commission the power to “receive and decide any claims for real property...where the property has not voluntarily been sold or otherwise transferred since April 1, 1992, and where the claimant does not now enjoy possession of that property.” The commission was thus an institutional effort to partially reverse and/or mitigate the legacy of ethnic cleansing, through the enactment of property rights, which could encourage voluntary return.
In practice, the property commission’s work has not fulfilled these expectations. It has not moved vigorously to fulfill its mandate, often avoiding complicated tenancy rights disputes. At the same time, the commission faces opposition from local officials. As is the case with other adjudicating institutions in postconflict Bosnia, most notably the Federation Ombudsman, the Human Rights Chamber, and the Office of the Ombudsman—local authorities often do not implement property commission decisions regarding ownership and tenancy. This is partially due to the fact that judicial systems and law enforcement agencies responsible for reinstating property owners remain under the control of the ruling political parties in both of Bosnia’s entities. These parties often seek to preserve the ethnic homogeneity of regions under their control as a means of preserving their political power.
In trying to carry out its work, the property commission is frequently stymied by officials employing obstructionist tactics. On the level of Bosniak-Croat Federation and Republika Srpska, authorities have delayed legislative reform. The Federation parliament suspended war-time property laws and enacted reformed property laws in April, 1998, but has effectively blocked or stalled implementation. The legislated period to submit claims is set to expire in October. Republika Srpska authorities, meanwhile, have utilized the parliamentary elections, and the potential loss of crucial votes for their reformist political faction, to justify maintaining the war-time property laws that favor current occupants over prewar property rights holders.
On the local level, international monitors say officials are also hampering implementation of the property legislation adopted in April. Monitors have documented cases in which municipal housing authorities have charged illegal application fees. Military and police officers have additionally subjected applicants to intimidating interviews.
The DPA does not specify penalties or sanctions for the noncompliance
of local authorities. As a result, the effectiveness of the property commission
in promoting restitution remains greatly dependent on the political will
of the local ruling elites.
Problems have also plagued cases in which property owners and tenancy
rights holders have sought to exchange or receive compensation for their
real property. The property commission bears primary responsibility for
the problem, as it has so far not developed the necessary procedures and
capabilities to award just compensation for property.
Based on a recent mission to Bosnia, the Forced Migration Projects have developed recommendations that address current weaknesses. The international community should, taking into account conditions on the ground, reexamine expectations for the property commission.
There are several immediate steps which can be taken to improve the commission’s effectiveness. The international community must develop a clear and consistent policy on how to deal with political officials, judges, or police officers who do not recognize or enforce the property commission’s decisions, or give commission officials immediate access to all property records. A firm international response to ongoing noncompliance would develop a stronger sense of legal security for Bosnian citizens and strengthen their faith in the post-Dayton institutions. This should include the amendment of Bosnian property law to permit claims to be filed within six months of a claimant actually learning about the opportunity to reclaim property.
An effective means of addressing noncompliance with the property commission could be achieved though the development of stronger relations with other international organizations active in the implementation of the DPA. An initial step might be for officials from the property commission’s regional offices throughout Bosnia to develop a closer working relationship with members of the UN International Police Task Force (IPTF). Property commission and IPTF officials could support each other and coordinate their efforts to pressure local authorities on implementation issues.
The commission’s regional offices should also be authorized to document obstructionist activity by local elected officials. Prior to any election this information could be forwarded to the OSCE’s Election Appeals Sub-Commission with the request that the material be reviewed, and the relevant officials disqualified for election. Ending the political monopolies of the ruling parties might be a way to promote compliance, particularly by providing a framework for the assertion of individual self-interests.
The property commission must recognize that numerous real estate transactions are already taking place within and between the two entities in an unregulated environment. In many cases, refugees and displaced persons have no choice but to sell their property at a fraction of its actual value. The Commission should develop mechanisms to assess the value of real property. It should also establish regulations for the compensation, lease, or exchange of property in ways respectful of human rights, as well as encourage political authorities to enact legislation which will regulate real estate transactions.
Finally, it would be helpful to re-assess the commission’s long-term strategy towards accomplishing its goals as stated in Annex VII of the DPA. One of the primary challenges the commission faces in its efforts to effectively address property rights claims is that its mandate restricts its activities to Bosnia. The national jurisdiction of the commission, in effect, does not recognize that war-time population shifts in the former Yugoslavia were not confined to the state borders of Bosnia. Thus, the commission is unable to follow the chain of ownership beyond Bosnia to regulate reciprocal exchange between claimants or restore possession to those dislocated outside of Bosnia.
A regional mechanism is needed to address property rights issues. Currently, there are approximately 80,000 refugees and displaced persons from Bosnia living in Croatia, and 550,000 from Bosnia and Croatia living in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. More displacements are expected, due to the fighting in Kosovo. Tens of thousands of Albanians have fled the violence in Kosovo to either Bosnia or Montenegro. These statistics highlight the regional nature of both current and future repatriation efforts, as well as the need for cooperation among the international community and political leaders in the region to ensure appropriate solutions across state boundaries.
The 77-page report, entitled Tajik-istan: Refugee Reintegration and Conflict Prevention, examines the country’s civil war and the challenges associated with restoring the peace, in particular the return of Tajiks who fled to neighboring Afghanistan. The report, published in September, also contains extensive information on the international humanitarian response. Special attention is given to the activities of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe.
“This report could not be more timely, given the deteriorating situation in Tajikistan,” said FMP Director Arthur C. Helton. “The international community is demonstrating a waning interest in addressing the issues. Yet it is important to make investments now that could prevent future conflict and displacement.”
The report also contains a 22-page insert featuring 32 photographs depicting
the hardships faced by the displaced. A chronology of events in Tajikistan,
tracing the roots of the conflict back to the 1930s, is additionally included
as an appendix.
The stories of several refugees are highlighted, allowing readers to
better understand the difficulties involved in achieving durable repatriation.
One such story underscores the need for a legal advocacy component, focusing
on a young widow desperately trying to obtain replacement birth certificates
for her children. The originals were lost when the widow and her family
fled to Afghanistan. Without the documents, the children will have difficulty
obtaining a proper education. Fortunately, the widow found an OSCE field
officer who was able to provide valuable advice on negotiating the confusing
bureaucratic system, providing the widow with hope.
Key to the report are 16 recommendations to improve the humanitarian
response to the Tajikistan peace process. Top priority should be given,
the report urges, to protecting aid workers. Consideration should be given
to the deployment of an armed international protection force in Tajikistan,
under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter. In addition, the FMP report urges that
Tajikistan sign and ratify the Convention on the Safety of United Nations
and Associated Personnel. Ratification would send a clear signal that the
government is committed to fighting terrorism and providing a secure working
environment for aid workers.
The FMP additionally advocates steps to enhance civil society and the
rule of law. Action towards this end could include the creation of an independent
center for human rights. Another urgent task identified by the FMP is the
establishment of an Office of Legal Ombuds-man, a need first identified
by the OSCE in 1996. An Ombudsman could facilitate resolution of a wide
array of legal problems, as well as foster the proliferation of accurate,
unbiased information that could help repatriating Tajiks make informed
decisions.
“This report is designed to assist those involved with the work of postwar reconstruction amid weak central governments -- states that are not capable of discharging the basic responsibilities of governance and that which are faced with broken economies, public health epidemics and criminality,” Helton writes in the preface.
Recent political violence has raised doubts about the peace process. The UN Mission of Observers in Tajikistan (UNMOT) has drastically scaled back its operations in the Central Asian nation. Forty UNMOT personnel, including 33 military observers, were withdrawn from the field and temporarily reassigned to Tashkent, Uzbekistan, on August 24. The action came in response to the July murders of four UNMOT representatives in territory controlled by the United Tajik Opposition.
The FMP report can be obtained free of charge by contacting the Forced Migration Projects by phone at (212) 548-0655, or by electronic mail at <refugee@sorosny.org>.
The project would vastly expand the existing Gasprinsky library, which currently has a relatively small collection of 8,000 books and periodicals relating to Crimean Tatar heritage. Upon completion of the expansion, the library would be home to tens of thousands of volumes, as well as provide state-of-the-art facilities for researchers.
The Dutch government will provide roughly $243,000 for the library, including much of the construction costs, computers, and other equipment. The IRF, which is part of the Soros foundations network, is earmarking about $145,000 to cover such costs as librarian training and book and periodical acquisition. The IRF funds are being made available under the auspices of its program “The Integration of Formerly Deported Crimean Tatars, Germans, Greek, Bulgarians and Armenians into the Ukrainian Community.” Much of that program’s 1998 budget of $430,000 is being devoted to education and cultural revival activities connected with the formerly deported peoples, of which Tatars comprise the overwhelming majority. The Library will make its resources available to the entire community in the Crimea.
“The library project could be one of the most important components of the integration program, serving as a marvelous manifestation of the cultural heritage of Crimean Tatars,” said FMP Director Arthur C. Helton. “Such a cultural survival initiative, if managed sensitively, can help defuse interethnic tension and promote tolerance and long-term stability.”
Roughly 200,000 Crimean Tatars were deported in 1944 by former Soviet dictator Josef Stalin, who falsely accused them, along with other entire ethnic groups, of collective collaboration with Nazi Germany during World War II. During the deportation, Soviet authorities destroyed Tatar schools, libraries, and cultural monuments. Tatars spent almost 50 years in internal exile, mostly in the Central Asian nations of Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan. Over the past decade, amidst the collapse of the Soviet Union, approximately 260,000 of the 500,000-strong Tatar community have returned to their traditional Crimean homeland. Most of the Tatar repatriation occurred without a detailed accommodation blueprint. As a result many Tatar settlements are lacking sufficient services, including electricity, sanitation, health care and education.
The Forced Migration Monitor is published bimonthly by
the Forced Migration Projects of the Open Society Institute-New York. The
Forced Migration Projects were established to monitor
circumstances in different regions of the world in order to provide the
international community with early warning of forced
movements of people, as well as to identify the social, economic, and political
conditions which cause such dislocations. The Projects
encourage early and effective humanitarian responses to migration emergencies;
advocate the humane treatment of those unable to return;
urge permanent solutions for those displaced; and promote measures that
avert individuals’ need to flee. The Projects gather
information concerning displacements and the circumstances that motivate
them,
concentrating primarily on the countries of the former
Soviet Union, the former Yugoslavia, Haiti, and Cuba.
Forced Migration Projects Open Society Institute
400 West 59th Street, 4th floor
New York, NY 10019
tel: (212) 548-0655
fax: (212) 548-4676
e-mail: refugee@sorosny.org
http://www.soros.org/migrate.html
Advisory Committee:
Ludmilla Alexeeva
Jeremy R. Azrael
Arthur C. Helton (convenor)
Murray Feshbach
Morten Kjaerum
Aryeh Neier
Barnett R. Rubin
Warren Zimmermann
Staff:
Arthur C. Helton, Director
Justin Burke
Eliana Jacobs
Marie J. Jeannot
Paulette A. Layton
Alexander Lupis
Tatyana Lyutova
The Open Society Institute-New
York is a private operating and grantmaking foundation that promotes the
development of open
societies around the world.
OSI-New York develops and implements a variety of domestic and international
programs in the areas of
educational, social, and legal
reform, and encourages public debate and policy alternatives in complex
and often controversial fields.
OSI-New York is part of a network
of more than 24 autonomous nonprofit foundations and other organizations
created and funded by
philanthropist George Soros
in Central and Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, Haiti, and South
Africa, as well as in the United
States.
© OSI, September 1998