The Critical Mode of Thinking
Abstractions
As long as people believe that the world is changeless, they can rest happily with the conviction that their view of the world is the only conceivable one. Tradition, however far removed from reality, provides guidance and thinking need never move beyond the consideration of concrete situations.
In a changing world, however, the present does not slavishly repeat the past. Instead of a course fixed by tradition, people are confronted by an infinite range of possibilities. To introduce some order into an otherwise confusing universe they are obliged to resort to simplifications, generalisations, abstractions, causal laws and all kinds of other mental aids.
Thought processes do not only help solve problems; they create their own. Abstractions open reality to different interpretations. Since they are only aspects of reality, one interpretation does not exclude all others: every situation has as many aspects as the mind discovers in it. If this feature of abstract thinking were fully understood, abstractions would create fewer problems. People would realize that they are dealing with a simplified image of the situation and not the situation itself. But even if everyone was fully versed in the intricacies of modern linguistic philosophy the problems would not disappear because abstractions play a dual role. In relation to the things they describe they represent aspects of reality without having a concrete existence themselves. For instance, the law of gravity does not make apples fall to the ground but merely explains the forces that do. In relation to the people who employ them, however, abstractions are very much a part of reality: by influencing attitudes and actions they have a major impact on events. For instance, the discovery of the law of gravity changed people's behavior. In so far as people think about their own situation, both roles come into play simultaneously and the situation becomes reflexive.6 Instead of a clear-cut separation between thoughts and reality, the infinite variety of a changing world is compounded by the infinite variety of interpretations that abstract thinking can produce.
Abstract thinking tends to create categories which contrast opposite aspects of the real world against each other. Time and Space; Society and the Individual; Material and Ideal are typical dichotomies of this kind. Needless to say, the models I am constructing here also belong to the collection. These categories are no more real than the abstractions that gave rise to them. That is to say, they represent a simplification or distortion of reality in the first place but, through their influence on people's thinking, they may also introduce divisions and . conflicts into the real world. They contribute to making reality more complex and abstractions more necessary. In this way the process of abstraction feeds on itself: the complexities of a changing world are, to a large extent, of man's own making.
In view of the complications, why do people employ abstract concepts at all? The answer is that they avoid them as much as possible. As long as the world can be regarded as changeless, they use no abstractions at all. Even when abstractions become indispensable, they prefer to treat them as part of reality rather than as the product of their own thinking. Only bitter experience will teach them to distinguish between their own thoughts and reality. The tendency to neglect the complications connected with the use of abstractions must be regarded as a weakness of the critical mode of thinking because abstractions are indispensable to it, and the less they are understood the greater confusion they create.
Despite their drawbacks, abstractions serve us well. It is true that they create new problems, but the mind responds to these with renewed efforts until thinking reaches degrees of intricacy and refinement which would be unimaginable in the traditional mode. A changing world does not lend itself to the kind of certainty that would be readily available if society were changeless, but in its less than perfect way thinking can provide much valuable knowledge. Abstractions generate an infinite variety of views; as long as a fairly effective method is available for choosing between them, the critical mode should be able to come much closer to reality than the traditional mode which has only one interpretation at its disposal.
The Critical Process
Choosing between alternatives may then be regarded as the key function of the critical mode of thinking. How is this task performed? Based on the reasoning outlined in the Appendix, two points can be made.
First, since there is a divergence between thinking and reality, one set of explanations will fit a given situation better than another. All outcomes are not equally favorable; all explanations are not equally valid. Reality provides an inducement to choose and a criterion by which the choice may be judged. Second, since our understanding of reality is imperfect, the criterion by which choices may be judged is not fully within our grasp. As a result, people will not necessarily make the correct choice and, even if they do, not everybody will accept it as such. Moreover, the correct choice represents the better of the available alternatives but not the best of all possible solutions. New ideas and interpretations may emerge at any time. These are also bound to be flawed and may have to be discarded when the flaws become apparent. There is no final answer, only the possibility of a gradual approximation to it. It follows that the choice between alternatives involves a continuous process of critical examination rather than the mechanical application of fixed rules.
It is to emphasize these points that I speak of `the critical mode of thinking.' The expression should not be taken to suggest that in a changing world everyone maintains an open mind. People may still commit themselves unreservedly to a particular view; but they cannot do so without at least being aware of the alternatives, and rejecting them in some way. The traditional mode of thinking accepts explanations uncritically, but, in a changing society, no one can say `this is how things are, therefore they cannot be any other way.' People must support their views with arguments, otherwise they will convince no one but themselves; and to believe unconditionally in an idea rejected by everyone else is a form of madness. Even those who believe they have the final answer must take into account possible objections and defend themselves against criticism.
The critical mode of thinking is more than an attitude: it is a prevailing condition. It denotes a situation in which there are a large number of divergent interpretations; their proponents seek to gain acceptance for the ideas in which they believe. If the traditional mode of thinking represents an intellectual monopoly, the critical mode can be described as intellectual competition. This competition prevails regardless of the attitude of particular individuals or schools of thought. Some of the competing ideas are tentative and invite criticism; others are dogmatic and defy opposition. One could expect all thinking to embody a critical attitude only if people were completely rational - a contradiction of our basic premise.
Critical Attitude
A critical attitude can be more appropriate to the circumstances of a changing world than a dogmatic one. Tentative opinions are not necessarily correct and dogmatic ones need not be completely false. But a dogmatic approach can only lose from its persuasive force when conflicting views are available: criticism is a danger, not a help. By contrast, a critical attitude can and does benefit from the criticism offered; the view held will be modified until no further valid objection can be raised. Whatever emerges from this rigorous treatment is likely to fulfill its purpose more effectively than the original proposition.
Criticism is basically unpleasant and hard to take. It will be accepted, if at all, only because it is effective. It follows that people's attitude greatly depends on how well the critical process functions; conversely, the functioning of the critical process depends on people's attitude. This circular, reflexive relationship is responsible for giving the critical mode of thinking its dynamic character, as opposed to the static permanence of the traditional mode. The effectiveness of the critical process varies according to the subject matter and purpose of thinking. It is to be expected, therefore, that a critical attitude is more dominant in some areas than in others.
Scientific Method
The critical process functions most effectively in natural science. Scientific method has been able to develop its own rules and conventions on which all participants are tacitly agreed. These rules recognize that no individual, however gifted and honest, is capable of perfect understanding; theories must be submitted to critical examination by the scientific community. Whatever emerges from this interpersonal process will have reached a degree of objectivity of which no individual thinker would be capable.
Scientists adopt a thoroughly critical attitude not because they are more rational or tolerant than ordinary human beings but because scientific criticism is less easily disregarded than other forms: their attitude is more a result of the critical process than a cause of it. The effectiveness of scientific criticism is the result of a combination of factors. On the one hand, nature provides easily available and reliable criteria by which the validity of theories can be judged; on the other hand, there is a strong inducement to recognize and abide by these criteria: nature operates independently of our wishes and we cannot utilise it to our benefit, without first understanding how it works. Scientific knowledge serves not only to establish the truth; it also helps us in the business of living. People might have continued to live quite happily believing that the Earth was flat, despite Galileo's experiments. What rendered his arguments irresistible was the gold and silver found in America. The practical results were not foreseen: indeed, they would not have been achieved if scientific research had been confined to purely practical objectives. Yet they provided the supreme proof for scientific method: only because there is a reality, and because man's knowledge of it is imperfect, was it possible for science to uncover certain facets of reality whose existence people had not even imagined.
Outside the realm of natural phenomena the critical process is less effective. In metaphysics, philosophy and religion the criteria are missing; in social science the inducement to abide by them is not so strong. Nature operates independently of our wishes; society, however, can be influenced by the theories that relate to it. In natural science theories must be true to be effective; not so in the social sciences. There is a shortcut: people can be swayed by theories. The urge to abide by the conventions of science is less compelling, and the interpersonal process suffers as a result. Theories seeking to change society may take on a scientific guise in order to exploit the reputation science has gained without abiding by its conventions. The critical process offers little protection because the agreement on purpose is not as genuine as in the case of natural science. There are two criteria by which theories can be judged: truth and effectiveness - and they no longer coincide.
The remedy proposed by most champions of scientific method is to enforce the rules developed by natural science with redoubled vigor. Karl Popper has proposed the doctrine of the unity of science: the same methods and criteria apply in the study of both natural and social phenomena. As I have argued in The Alchemy of Finance, I consider the doctrine misguided. There is a fundamental difference between the two pursuits: the subject matter of the social sciences is reflexive in character and reflexivity destroys the separation between statement and fact which has made the critical process so effective in the sciences. The very expression 'social science' is a false metaphor; it would seem more appropriate to describe the study of social phenomena as alchemy because the phenomena can be moulded to the will of the experimenter in a way that natural substances cannot. Calling the social sciences alchemy would preserve the critical process better than the doctrine of the unity of science. It would acknowledge that the criteria of truth and effectiveness do not coincide, and it would prevent social theories from exploiting the reputation of natural science. It would open avenues of investigation that are currently blocked: differences in the subject matter would justify differences in approach. The social sciences have suffered immeasurably from trying to imitate the natural sciences too slavishly.
Democracy
Having abandoned the convention of objectivity, how are social theories to be judged? The artificial distinction between scientific theories which purport to describe society as it is and political ones which seek to decide how it should be disappears, leaving ample room for differences of opinion. The various views divide into two broad classes: one contains those that propose a fixed formula; the other makes the organization of society dependent on the decisions of its members. As we are not dealing with scientific theories, there is no objective way of deciding which approach is correct. It can be shown, however, that the latter represents a critical attitude while the former does not.
Definitive social schemes assume that society is subject to laws other than those enacted by its members; moreover, they claim to know what those laws are. This makes them impervious to any positive contributions from the critical process. On the contrary, they must actively seek to suppress alternative views because they can command universal acceptance only by forbidding criticism and preventing new ideas from emerging; in short, by destroying the critical mode of thinking and arresting change. If, by contrast, people are allowed to decide questions of social organization for themselves, solutions need not be final: they can be reversed by the same process by which they were reached. Everyone is at liberty to express his or her views and, if the critical process is working effectively, the view that eventually prevails may come close to representing the best interests of the participants. This is the principle of democracy.
For democracy to function properly, certain conditions must lie met which may be compared to those which have made scientific method so successful: in the first place there must be a criterion by which conflicting ideas can be judged, and, in the second, there must be a general willingness to abide by that criterion. The first prerequisite is provided by the majority vote as defined by the constitution, and the second by a belief in democracy as a way of life. A variety of opinions is not enough to create democracy; if separate factions adopt opposing dogmas the result is not democracy but civil war. People must believe in democracy as an ideal: they must consider it more important that decisions be reached by constitutional means than to see their view prevail. This condition will be satisfied only if democracy does in fact produce a better social organization than a dictatorship would.
There is a circular relationship here: democracy can serve as an ideal only if it is effective, and it can be effective only if it is generally accepted as an ideal. This relationship has to evolve through a reflexive process in which the achievements of democracy reinforce democracy as an ideal and vice versa. Democracy cannot be imposed by edict.
The similarity with science is striking. The convention of objectivity and the effectiveness of scientific method are also mutually dependent on one another. Science relies on its discoveries to break the vicious circle: they speak more eloquently ;n its favor than any argument. Democracy, too; requires positive accomplishments to ensure its existence: an expanding economy, intellectual and spiritual stimulation, a political system that satisfies man's aspirations better than rival forms of government.
Democracy is capable of such achievements. It gives free reign to what may be called the positive aspect of imperfect knowledge, namely creativity. There is no way of knowing what that will produce; the unforeseen results may provide the best justification for democracy just as they do for science. But progress is not assured. The positive contributions can come only from the participants. The results of their thinking cannot be predicted; they may or may not continue to make democracy a success. Belief in democracy as an ideal is a necessary but not a sufficient condition of its existence. This makes democracy as an ideal very tricky indeed. It cannot be enforced by eliminating rival views; its success cannot be guaranteed even by gaining universal acceptance for the ideal. Democracy simply cannot be assured, because it remains conditional on the creative energies of those who participate in it. Yet it must be regarded as an ideal if it is to prevail. Those who believe in it must put their faith in the positive aspect of imperfect knowledge and hope that it will produce the desired results.
The Quest for Certainty
Democracy as an ideal leaves something to be desired. It does not provide a definite program, a clear-cut goal, except in those cases where people have been deprived of it. Once people are free to pursue alternative goals, they are confronted by the necessity of deciding what their goals are. And that is where a critical attitude is less than totally satisfactory. It is generally assumed that people will seek to maximize their material well-being. That is true as far as it goes; but it does not go far enough. People have aspirations beyond material well-being. These may surface only after the material needs have been satisfied; but often they take precedence over narrow self-interest. One such aspiration is the creative urge. It is likely that material wealth is being pursued in modern Western society long after material needs have been filled exactly because the pursuit gratifies the creative urge. In other societies, wealth has ranked much lower in the hierarchy of values and the creative urge has found other means of expression. For instance, people in Eastern Europe care much more about poetry and philosophy than they do in the West.
There is another set of aspirations that the critical attitude is singularly ill-equipped to satisfy: the quest for certainty. Natural science can produce firm conclusions because it has an objective criterion at its disposal. Social science is on far shakier grounds because reflexivity interferes with objectivity; and when it comes to creating a dependable value system, a critical attitude is not much use at all. It is very difficult to base a value system on the individual. For one thing, individuals are subject to the ultimate in uncertainty, death. For another, they are part of the situation they have to cope with. It is practically impossible for people to develop a set of values on their own. Most of their values will be inherited or adopted from outside sources; the critical review each may conduct will barely scratch the surface.
The traditional mode of thinking meets the quest for certainty much more effectively than the critical mode. It draws no distinction between belief and reality: religion, or its primitive equivalent, animism, embraces the entire sphere of thought and commands unquestioning allegiance. No wonder that people hanker after the lost paradise of primeval bliss! Dogmatic ideologies promise to satisfy that craving. The trouble is that they can do so only if they eliminate conflicting beliefs. This makes them almost as dangerous to democracy as the existence of alternative explanations is to the traditional mode of thinking.
The success of the critical mode of thinking in other areas may help to minimize the importance attached to dogmatic beliefs. There is an area of vital interest, namely; the material conditions of life, where positive improvement is possible. The mind tends to concentrate its efforts where they can produce results, neglecting questions of a less promising nature. That is why business takes precedence over poetry in Western society. As long as material progress can be maintained - and continues to be enjoyed - the influence of dogma can be contained.
